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The growing role of local militias, criminal networks and possible external forces in the escalation of violence in Plateau State

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3 weeks ago

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The growing role of local militias, criminal networks and possible external forces in the escalation of violence in Plateau State

By: Zagazola Makama

The security crisis in Plateau State is increasingly moving beyond the traditional description of a farmer-herder dispute. What is emerging is a multi-layered armed conflict in which communal grievances, local militia mobilisation, criminality, retaliatory violence and information manipulation are reinforcing one another.

The most important distinction for the Federal Government is this: ordinary Berom, Mwaghavul and Fulani citizens are not the enemy. The security threat is posed by identifiable individuals and armed group networks operating within or around these communities.

Available evidence shows that armed groups associated with both farming and pastoralist communities have been involved in violence. BBC, ACLED and Zagazola Media Network have documented attacks involving both farmer and pastoralist communities in Plateau and warned that attacks frequently trigger reprisal violence, producing a cycle of retaliation. The present danger is that this cycle is becoming institutionalised.

There are now repeated reports of armed groups dressed in black moving between communities, conducting mass attacks and withdrawing to hide in the same communities before security forces arrive.

On August 11, troops reportedly engaged an armed group identified by security sources as Berom militia after intelligence indicated that the group was moving from Barkin Ladi towards communities in Mangu. The same reporting also recorded an encounter with suspected Fulani militia in another part of Mangu.

The following day, three people one local resident and two Fulani herders were killed in a clash involving Mwaghavul youths and herders in Jwak Maitumbi, Mangu. Troops intervened and used surveillance to clear the area.

More recently, troops reportedly foiled an attempted attack by suspected local militias moving towards Manja in Mangu on September 17. The attackers reportedly exchanged fire with troops and, while withdrawing, set houses on the outskirts of the community ablaze.

These incidents demonstrate a serious reality that armed communal networks exist, possess firearms and are capable of moving offensively across community boundaries and should be treated as a national security problem. The same cycle is consuming both sides. The danger is particularly visible in the sequence of attacks recorded in September.

On September 12, three young Fulani herders were reportedly killed in Alohom, Mangu, while dozens of cattle were also shot. Community leaders alleged that the attackers were Mwaghavul militia members dressed in black. Some bullets were recovered at the scene.

Less than 24 hours later, six commuters were reportedly killed when the same gunmen dressed in black attacked a commercial vehicle at Dungus Kuru in Jos South, killing both Muslims and Christians. Suspicion is not evidence. But suspicion itself can become a weapon. Both groups traded blames on who was responsible for the attacks.

Once communities believe that one attack must have been retaliation for another, young men will just mobilise before investigators establish what actually happened and carry out a deadly attack on the other community. That is how a single criminal attack becomes a communal war.

Berom and Mwaghavul armed groups require the same scrutiny as armed Fulani groups. They are all criminals and have perpetrated terror. It would be dangerous and analytically dishonest to discuss Plateau insecurity while examining only one side, as many mediums domiciled in Plateau state are doing. There have been hundreds of documented reports of armed Berom militias, including the most recent August incident in which troops reportedly intercepted a group moving towards communities in Mangu.
There have also been clashes involving Mwaghavul youths and herders, as recorded in Jwak Maitumbi.

At the same time, there are repeated reports of attacks attributed by community members to armed Fulani bandits. For example, the Mwaghavul Youth Movement recently alleged that armed Fulani elements were responsible for attacks in Kikyau, Larkas, Ntul and Kinat in Mangu. While some of the reports were true, some of them were rejected by MACBAN.

The security principle should therefore be that if an armed Berom group attacks civilians, pursue it. If an armed Mwaghavul group attacks civilians, pursue it. If an armed Fulani group attacks civilians, pursue it. If a criminal gang exploits the conflict, pursue it. Use the same energy used to go after Fulani bandits to go after Berom and Mwaghavul militias. Their actions show that they are all part of the same security problem when they engage in organised violence against civilians.

The most dangerous development may be the emergence of conflict entrepreneurs, which deserves much greater attention.

Youth groups in Plateau are already turning communal fear into an economic and social enterprise. There is no gainsaying that some individuals are financially benefiting from inflammatory content, mobilisation or conflict-related activities. The underlying phenomenon is real enough to warrant investigation. An attack committed by criminals can be transformed into evidence of a national religious conspiracy. And once such a narrative takes hold, facts become almost irrelevant.

The algorithm rewards anger. The conflict entrepreneur monetises it. The community pays the price. Emotional mobilisation can become another weapon This is perhaps one of the most uncomfortable truths recently revealed by the BBC investigation in Plateau.

A 2026 Premium Times investigation documented how misinformation, old photographs and videos, inflammatory narratives and unverified claims circulated on social media during Plateau violence and helped intensify perceptions of impending reprisals. The investigation found that online narratives could move faster than official clarification and contribute to real-world tension.

This creates a new type of warfare: the person who does not carry a rifle but helps create the environment in which someone else picks one up. The people must begin to ask: Who benefits financially, politically or socially from keeping Plateau permanently in crises? That question deserves the same seriousness as the question of who pulled the trigger.

This is how communities become militarised:
Attack → fear → mobilisation → revenge → counter-revenge → displacement → arming of youths → media propaganda → another attack.

Eventually, young people who previously had no interest in violence begin to believe that joining an armed group is necessary for survival. At that point, the conflict develops its own recruitment mechanism. The state is then fighting not merely armed men, but an entire ecosystem of fear.

Perhaps the most disturbing allegation emerging from affected communities is that some of the worst attacks may involve non-local gunmen or hired fighters who enter a community, conduct mass attacks and disappear into areas where they are difficult to identify. If evidence confirms that mercenaries are being formed in Plateau to conduct attacks and then sheltered by local networks, the character of the conflict changes substantially.

It would mean that some attacks are not merely spontaneous communal reprisals. They could represent organised armed operations using local knowledge, local logistics and external manpower. That claim cannot be simply accepted, but neither should it be ignored.

One of the most persistent claims in Plateau is that local residents, youths groups and traditional authorities know the individuals responsible for carrying out attacks. While these individuals carry out terror, their host communities view them as heroes or defenders of the land. The communities always protect the criminals even when they genuinely possess information about perpetrators, making peace efforts difficult for security agencies.

The greatest obstacle is often fear and, in many cases, complicity from within. A resident who identifies an armed perpetrator may fear retaliation from that person’s relatives or associates, likewise, a traditional ruler may fear that publicly naming suspects could trigger another attack. A youth leader may possess information but fear being branded a traitor.

The Federal Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces already recognise the need for a combination of military pressure, intelligence and peace-building. The Chief of Army Staff, Lt.-Gen. Waidi Shaibu, had during his visit to Plateau State directed troops to sustain pressure on criminal groups while supporting peace-building, stronger intelligence gathering and cooperation with traditional and community leaders.

The next step should be to turn that principle into a specific Plateau armed-group strategy, while a dedicated multi-agency cell should map:
armed Fulani networks, armed Berom networks, armed Mwaghavul networks, criminal or kidnapping gangs, weapons suppliers and gun runners,financiers, informants and logistics networks. suspected external actors; and online actors demonstrably linked to mobilisation or threats.The purpose should be individual identification and prosecution.

Develop an attack attribution system.Every major attack should generate a formal case file containing: location + time + victims + weapons + ammunition + direction of attack + escape route + witnesses + communications intelligence + previous incidents + suspects + evidence. This would make it harder for perpetrators to sometimes disappear behind the phrase “unknown gunmen.”

Treat weapons as evidence, not just recovered items.The recovery of an AK-47, locally fabricated rifle or ammunition should trigger ballistic and intelligence exploitation. The question should be: Where has this weapon appeared before? A weapon used in three attacks across different LGAs could provide a direct link between incidents that communities currently regard as separate.

The person who fires the weapon is only one part of an organised attack. Establish a rapid-reaction architecture around known flashpoints. Mangu, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bokkos and vulnerable approaches to Jos South require sustained intelligence-led patrols.

The message to Plateau’s communities must also change. The Federal Government should make one point unmistakable: No community has a licence to kill another community in the name of self-defence. A Fulani civilian must not be treated as a militia member or a terrorist simply because he is Fulani. The same goes for Berom and Mwaghavul.The state must pursue armed individuals based on evidence of conduct, not identity.

The greatest threat to Plateau is not simply the number of people killed in individual attacks.
The problem is that people are gradually normalising killings as if they were nothing. Once that continues to happen, every road becomes a potential frontline, every market becomes a potential target, every cattle route becomes a security corridor, and every social-media post can become an early-warning signal for revenge.

Identify the armed networks. Identify their financiers. Identify their weapons. Identify their logistics. Identify those who shelter them. Identify those who incite attacks. Build admissible evidence. Arrest suspects. Protect witnesses. Prosecute cases. And do this regardless of whether the perpetrator is associated with a Berom, Mwaghavul, Fulani or any other community.

Plateau’s conflict is no longer adequately understood as two communities simply fighting over land. It is increasingly a security ecosystem involving communal grievances, armed local networks, criminal opportunists, retaliatory mobilisation and information warfare.

The Federal Government therefore has an opportunity to change the trajectory of the crisis: move from responding to communities after they are attacked to dismantling the armed networks that repeatedly produce the attacks.

Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region.

The growing role of local militias, criminal networks and possible external forces in the escalation of violence in Plateau State

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EU Releases €225,000 Humanitarian Aid for Conflict-Displaced Persons in Kebbi

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22 hours ago

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October 8, 2026

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EU Releases €225,000 Humanitarian Aid for Conflict-Displaced Persons in Kebbi

By: Michael Mike

The European Union (EU) has released €225,000, equivalent to about N340 million, in humanitarian assistance to support communities displaced by conflict in Kebbi State.

The intervention, announced on Wednesday, will enable the Nigerian Red Cross to provide emergency assistance to conflict-displaced persons in the state over a six-month period.

The assistance comes amid worsening insecurity in Kebbi, where armed attacks and communal violence across seven Local Government Areas have displaced thousands of residents and left affected communities in urgent need of humanitarian support.

According to the EU, the funding will prioritise multipurpose cash assistance, allowing displaced families to meet their most immediate needs, while protection services will be provided for vulnerable individuals.

The response is expected to reach approximately 7,700 conflict-displaced people living in settlements and host communities across the state.

The EU said particular attention would be given to female-headed households, persons with disabilities, elderly people and individuals facing acute protection risks.

The intervention will also include continuous monitoring of population movements and the mobilisation of local volunteers, with the EU saying the effort would help lay the groundwork for longer-term recovery interventions by other humanitarian actors.

The latest intervention is part of the EU’s contribution to the Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

The EU said insecurity in Kebbi State had deteriorated significantly following an escalation of armed attacks and communal violence.

While displacement had been ongoing since mid-August, it said a sharp escalation in violence around August 31 triggered the humanitarian response.

The violence has reportedly affected more than 16,600 people across the state, including 7,706 people who have been displaced and 108 others who sustained injuries.

The EU said the affected population was confronting a complex security environment characterised by organised banditry, armed group activity and communal violence.

It added that displaced families living in temporary settlements and host communities were in urgent need of shelter, food, clean water, healthcare and protection.

The humanitarian funding is being channelled through the IFRC’s DREF, a mechanism established to provide immediate financial support to National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies responding to disasters and other emergencies.

The EU said the intervention reflected its broader commitment to humanitarian assistance for populations affected by conflicts and disasters.

Through its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid department, the bloc provides emergency assistance to vulnerable populations affected by natural disasters and man-made crises around the world.

The European Commission has also signed a €16 million humanitarian delegation agreement with the IFRC to support the Federation’s DREF.

Established in 1979, the DREF is funded through contributions from donors and provides National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies with rapid access to emergency financing.

For smaller-scale disasters, the IFRC allocates grants from the fund, which can subsequently be replenished through donor contributions.

EU Releases €225,000 Humanitarian Aid for Conflict-Displaced Persons in Kebbi

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N101m defamation judgment debt: A/Court begins hearing SERAP’s appeal Friday

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1 day ago

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October 7, 2026

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N101m defamation judgment debt: A/Court begins hearing SERAP’s appeal Friday

The Court of Appeal in Abuja has scheduled hearing for Friday in the appeal filed by the Incorporated Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) in relation to the May 5 judgment given against the group by a High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

Information about the planned hearing date is contained in a notice sent on Wednesday by the appellate court’s Registry to parties in the appeal marked: CA/ABJ/CV/1114/2026.

Justice Halilu Yusuf of the High Court of the FCT had, in the May 5 judgment, awarded N101million in damages and cost against SERAP and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare upon holding that they defamed two officials of the Department of State Services (DSS) through a false publication it made on September 10, 2024.

The judgment was on the suit marked: CV/4547/2024 filed by the DSS officials – Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele – who accused SERAP and Oluwadare of making false claims in publications on the group’s website and social media platforms that the claimants invaded their Abuja office on September 9, 2024 and subjected them to harassment.

Justice Halilu Yusuf held among others that claimants led sufficient evidence that effectively established all the ingredients of defamation.

Justice Yusuf rejected that defence of justification raised by SERAP and Oluwadare on the grounds that they failed to provide evidence that their publications were not based on falsehood.

The judge noted that the words like invasion, forceful entry and harassment were used inaccurately, the defendants having admitted at trial that the DSS officials did not forcefully enter into SERAP’s premises and did not brandish any weapon

He held that the publications made by the defendants injured the reputation of the claimants in their professional capacity and standing in the society.

Justice Yusuf said: “Having been unable to establish invasion and harassment, the defence of justification fails. There is no doubt that the publication affected the claimants mentally and psychologically.”

The judge said, going forward, it was necessary for care and due diligence on the part of SERAP and its officials before releasing information to the public.

He added that in the exercise of their right to tweet and send information out, the defendants should be aware of the rights of others, particularly as it relates to government agencies and their officials.

The judge dismissed the objection raised by the defendants against the competence of the suit and held that the claimants possessed the requisite locus standi to file the suit over which the court has the jurisdiction to entertain.

He held that as against the defendants’ argument, the claimants must not be named in the publication complained about for defamation to be established.

Justice Yusuf noted that from when the claimants complained about the inaccuracy of the publications, the defendants failed to take any steps to pull down the injurious publication.

He proceeded to adjudge the publications as defamatory and awarded damages of N100million against the defendants in addition to N1m as cost of prosecuting the suit.

The judge also ordered the defendants to publish a public apology on SERAP’s website, X handle, two national daily newspapers and two television stations.

He held that the judgment sum shall attract 10 percent interest per annum from the date of the judgment until the sum is fully paid by the defendants.

N101m defamation judgment debt: A/Court begins hearing SERAP’s appeal Friday

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NCYP Backs Tinubu’s 2027 Bid, Says Economic Reforms Must Translate Into Jobs

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2 days ago

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October 7, 2026

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NCYP Backs Tinubu’s 2027 Bid, Says Economic Reforms Must Translate Into Jobs

By: Michael Mike

The Northern Christian Youth Professionals (NCYP) has thrown its weight behind President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election bid in 2027, arguing that continuity in economic policy is necessary to consolidate ongoing reforms and translate Nigeria’s improving macroeconomic performance into jobs, investment and higher living standards.

The group’s position came as the World Bank reported that economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is gaining momentum, with Nigeria among the countries whose growth forecasts have been upgraded, while warning that the next challenge is to convert growth into more jobs and better opportunities.

In a statement signed by its National Chairman, Isaac Abrak, on Tuesday, NCYP said Nigeria had reached a critical stage in its economic reform journey where the emphasis should shift from stabilisation to inclusive prosperity.

The group was reacting to President Tinubu’s Independence Day address on October 1, in which the President declared: “The emergency treatment is over. The foundation has been repaired,” and said the government’s economic priority had moved from correcting the country’s economic course to achieving “shared and widespread prosperity.”

According to NCYP, the latest World Bank assessment reinforces the argument that Nigeria must sustain the reforms rather than reverse course.

The World Bank said on October 6 that growth in sub-Saharan Africa was being supported by improved macroeconomic resilience, stronger domestic demand and investment, while noting that years of reforms and improved economic management had contributed to improved forecasts for countries including Nigeria. It nevertheless warned that growth remained insufficient to substantially reduce extreme poverty or create enough jobs for the region’s rapidly expanding labour force.

The World Bank’s latest country assessment similarly said Nigeria’s macroeconomic performance had improved further in 2026, with real GDP growth of 4.2 per cent in the first half of the year, compared with 3.9 per cent a year earlier.

It, however, cautioned that growth was still insufficient to generate enough productive jobs and materially reduce poverty, stressing the need for greater private investment, productivity, human capital development and job creation.

NCYP said this was precisely the challenge facing the Tinubu administration in the next phase of its economic programme.

“Nigeria must now move from reform to prosperity, from growth to jobs, and from jobs to poverty reduction,” the group said.
It noted that the country’s real GDP grew by 4.43 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, compared with 3.89 per cent in the first quarter, citing the National Bureau of Statistics’ latest GDP report. The NBS has published its Q2 2026 GDP report dated August 31, 2026.

While describing the improving growth trajectory as encouraging, NCYP maintained that headline economic figures would only become meaningful when ordinary Nigerians experienced improvements in employment, income and living conditions.

The group said youth development should therefore remain central to the next phase of the economic programme, particularly given Nigeria’s large young population.
It cited the Nigeria Education Loan Fund (NELFUND), saying more than 1.1 million students had gained access to tertiary education financing.

NELFUND’s current data shows that more than 1.08 million students have been supported across 37 states, with over ₦191 billion in loans disbursed, while its broader student-loan platform records more than 1.4 million registered students.
NCYP also backed proposed reforms to the National Youth Service Corps, saying a more productive national service scheme could equip graduates with specialised skills in agriculture, medicine, education, technology, digital innovation, infrastructure, the green economy, enterprise and the creative sector.

The organisation argued that Nigeria’s youthful population should be treated as an economic asset rather than merely a demographic challenge.

“With education, skills, financing and the right economic environment, our young people can become entrepreneurs, skilled professionals, job creators and drivers of industrialisation,” it said.

The group outlined what it described as the economic pathway to prosperity: reforms should create stability; stability should encourage investment; education and skills should create opportunities; enterprise should create businesses and jobs; while industrialisation should deliver sustainable prosperity.

It said the agenda was particularly important for Northern Nigeria, where it called for an economy capable of converting skills into enterprise, enterprise into jobs and jobs into sustainable livelihoods.

The World Bank has similarly identified the creation of more and better private-sector jobs as central to Nigeria’s long-term prosperity, with its 2026–2032 Country Partnership Framework focusing on competitiveness, private capital, human capital and resilience.

The Bank has also acknowledged that Nigeria’s recent reforms have strengthened macroeconomic stability, but warned that household incomes have not fully recovered and poverty remains high. It has called for the stabilisation gains to be consolidated while accelerating inclusive growth.

Against this backdrop, NCYP said it had decided to support President Tinubu’s re-election in 2027, framing the decision around continuity of economic policy.

“It is against this background that NCYP supports the re-election of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2027, with our position anchored on policy continuity and the need to consolidate the economic reforms while moving decisively into the next phase of job creation, human-capital development and industrialisation,” Abrak said.

NCYP Backs Tinubu’s 2027 Bid, Says Economic Reforms Must Translate Into Jobs

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