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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PATH TO PEACE IN A DANGEROUS NEIGHBOURHOOD

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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PATH TO PEACE IN A DANGEROUS NEIGHBOURHOOD

By: Michael
Mike

Nigeria’s foreign policy to promote peace and prosperity is a constitutional obligation as much as it is a considered and sensible manifesto pledge, writes Hon Yusuf Tuggar, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I was born in a civil war and was not able to vote for my leader until I was in my 30s. Nigeria is now a country guided by the rule of law and a constitution that clearly defines our system of government. This includes our foreign policy objectives, and rightly so, because in an interconnected world, we define our sovereignty in the context of certain, key principles: our right to self-determination; our right to defend our autonomy and secure our borders; and responsibility to respect our obligations under international law.

As foreign minister, I think these provisions are not just reasonable but vital – both for our own democracy, domestic peace and prosperity but also for a more just and stable international order. But the point is this: it is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, not the manifesto of a political party or predilections of a particular politician, that lays out these provisions. In a democracy, we have the privilege of healthy debate about our values, policies and performance. But if we are to live up to the responsibilities that come with democracy, that debate should be informed, fair and reasonable.

I respect the Constitution and its vision for Nigeria’s place in the international community, as do many of us. It has been an honour and a privilege to protect and promote those constitutional principles. They are the best guarantees for legitimacy, and the authority all governments need if they are to deliver. It is complex and time consuming. To our cost, we have learnt that there are no short cuts. Some Nigerians find fault in our Constitution, while others seek to amend it. There is always room for serious debate in a healthy democracy. But the fact remains it is the very document that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and every public official has sworn to uphold since 1999.

Nigeria’s Constitution declares that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria, from whom government, through this Constitution, derives all its powers and authority. The same Chapter of the Constitution goes on to state Nigeria’s five foreign policy objectives: promotion and protection of the national interest, African integration and support for African unity, promotion of international cooperation for peace and mutual respect, respect of international law and treaty obligations and promotion of a just world economic order. Those who suggest Nigeria does not have a foreign policy or those who agitate for a shift away from an Afro-centric foreign policy are wrong; either they are ill-informed, or deliberately disingenuous.

The irony of it all is that Nigerians are able to speak in support of our military-ruled neighbours, governed without constitutions, precisely because Chapter Four of our own constitution guarantees them these rights and freedoms. This is not the same for the citizens ruled by the very regimes for which they seek to cheerlead of those countries governed without constitutions. Nigerians who are older than 30 know this to be true because we have been there, done that. Somehow in the passage of time, some forget that the military regime here that despatched troops to restore democracy in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s had first – and by force – taken that same democracy and rule of law away from us – just as military regimes continue to do the world over.

The Constitution also makes clear why any responsible Nigerian government should be concerned when neighbours are governed without a constitution or codified rules. It goes without saying that the sovereignty of our neighbours is their business. They can grant powers to whatever governing structures they deem fit and should expect their autonomy to remain safeguarded. But when our Interdependence Sovereignty overlaps, we equally have a right to exercise control over our borders in those cases where neighbours face insurgencies that significantly comprise territorial integrity and state authority.

International Legal Sovereignty also becomes an issue when we consider that respect for international law and treaty obligations is one of our irreducible foreign policy objectives. This is not the Tinubu administration’s foreign policy; it is a constitutional provision that every Nigerian President and government official swears to uphold. Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS, which is founded on treaties and protocols to which our foreign policy objectives commit us. All 15 member countries are signatory to the treaties and protocols, which is why it was no surprise that President Tinubu, as one who swore to uphold the Constitution, abided by it when ECOWAS leaders collectively objected to Unconstitutional Changes of Government.

In reality, the contemporary nation-state system is highly competitive and Nigeria exists in a self-help world. Our Constitution and international laws are meant to serve as guard rails in navigating the system. And by virtue of our size, we have the additional responsibility of being the regional power. Regardless of how some may try to diminish our standing, it is the way other countries perceive us. Our Constitution further reifies this leadership role right from the preamble- dedicating ourselves to promoting inter-African solidarity, to the foreign policy objectives- promotion of African integration and support for African unity and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations.

The Tinubu administration comes at a time when an interlocking suite of occurrences have made our neighbourhood less secure; implosion of Libya, failure of the EU Sahel Strategy, terrorism and criminal gangs, effects of climate change and population explosion. Nigeria did not create these challenges and was equally contending with its own domestic issue as these challenges escalated. Nigeria was not part of Operation Barkhane or the G5 in the Sahel, which were intended as efforts to fight terrorism and irregular migration but instead strengthened some irridentist Azawad/Tuareg groups that controlled border areas. This created a cauldron of disharmony between them and their national militaries, trained for a lifetime to keep their countries intact.

Nor was Nigeria part of the Partnership Framework with Third countries that conditioned aid and trade deals for Sahelian migration transit states in exchange for reducing the flow of migrants, with penalties for those who do not comply. In the case of Niger, a moment of truth was the passing of Law 2015-36 in May 2015 when its government, in consultation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and technical and financial support from the European Union and its member states, criminalized ancillary activities of the migration economy, such as providing transportation and accommodation to foreign nationals anywhere north of Agadez, in direct contravention of ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of people. They were persuaded to use a blunt hammer to crack a delicate nut. There is a highly politicised migration crisis in parts of Europe, that together we can and should resolve. But it was reckless to seek to solve one problem by creating another.

There is a reason why we have free movement in West Africa; seasonal migration- referred to in Hausa as ‘Ci Rani’. Seasonal migration in the semi-arid Sahel can be a matter of life and death, which is why we have always had turbaned Tuaregs going as far as Lagos and Port Harcourt to work as Maigadis (security) during the dry months, only to return back north during the rainy season. The weaponisation of sub-Saharan migration in Europe as a political tool led to the securitisation of the Sahel region, further exacerbating the security situation by forcing many of those affected to turn to criminal activities and terrorism. European migration figures show majority of migrants are from Syria, Afghanistan and Central Asia, not sub-Saharan Africa.

Yes, we need to work with our Sahelian neighbours to fight terrorism, by maintaining a right of pursuit into each others territories. But it would be myopic to think of this in absolutist terms, because we can accede to all conditionalities laid by them, it would still not be enough to tackle the challenges without a lasting solution to the bifurcated Libyan State as a source of weapons, training and fighters, as well as the shadowy involvement of a range of other state and non-state actors.

To achieve a lasting peace in Libya and the Sahel, Nigeria needs to deal with all the countries in the neighbourhood as well as all the major powers. For this reason, it does not make sense to simply deduce that Nigeria has to distance itself from France because that is the prevailing trend in its former colonies. The fulcrum of the Tinubu administration’s foreign policy is Strategic Autonomy, providing us with the clarity to engage with any and all nations based on our national interests and not those of others. As a nation, Nigeria is adult enough and sophisticated enough to deal with countries without being unduly influenced, because that has been part of our historical and civic tradition. You cannot cure an illness by picking which symptoms to consider and which to ignore.

Nigeria and ECOWAS will continue diplomatic efforts towards Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. At a minimum, we have shared interest in peaceful co-existence. President Tinubu has sent a number of high-level delegations that included a former Head of State, traditional rulers and religious scholars. President Tinubu pushed for the unconditional removal of ECOWAS sanctions imposed on Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. What he has consistently asked of the countries in question is for them to come up with a timetable for the restoration of constitutional rule and, in the case of Niger, the release of ousted President Bazoum.

Their response was to declare their intention to leave ECOWAS. With the one-year notice period coming to an end in January 2025, President Tinubu further pushed for ECOWAS to extend the grace period for another six months whilst intensifying diplomatic efforts. The response to this initiative last month was evidence-free allegations that Nigeria was harbouring foreign soldiers and as sponsoring state terrorism. Whenever President Tinubu and other democratic leaders offer stoic statesmanship and an opportunity to work together towards our common interests, it is met by confected controversy designed to divert and distract from a failure to meet the basic responsibilities of public administration. I know why coup leaders might seek to do that: it’s harder to understand the motives of apologists closer to home.

On my part, since assuming the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs on 21st August 2023, I have engaged diplomatically without pause, proposing personal visits and inviting senior government officials and representatives. Response has been akin to a diplomatic cold shoulder. We constituted a ministerial advisory committee that visited Niger and Mali and facilitated the visit of the Nigerian CDS to meet with his counterpart in Niamey. I regret that a proposed return visit was suspended by Niger after a date had been set. But let there be no doubt: we will continue to pursue diplomatic efforts assiduously, with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that has existed for 67 years.

Nigeria’s principle of strategic autonomy is one that abhors the presence of foreign forces and private military companies in our region, whether from east or west. Nigeria presently has troops on peace keeping operations in Guinea Bissau and Gambia, with Sierra Leone on the way, where it is also supporting the setting up of a logistics base in Lungi. Nigeria is also leading the actualisation of the ECOWAS standby force, all in an effort to fight terrorism and instability within our region under the rule of law. We work closely with our partners on sharing of intelligence in order to guarantee the same rights and freedoms are enjoyed by all the people of the region.

As several of my colleagues in the region remind me, we are the hegemon, whether we admit it or not. And global politics works almost like physics, with polarity, ordering principles, distribution of power, balancing, etc. Nigeria has never had expansionist tendencies, never been threatening towards our neighbours and always chosen the path of peace and conciliation. This in part may have to do with the makeup of our polity and social fabric. Being such a huge country, we are used to the virtues of principled compromise. It is not by accident that we are the only country on the continent with six former leaders living in peace and harmony within our borders. Diversity, not division, is our strength. This is as true for Nigeria as it is for the smallest of countries – and collectively for all of our region.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PATH TO PEACE IN A DANGEROUS NEIGHBOURHOOD

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Troops Repel ISWAP Attack on Mandaragirau FOB, Detonate IED During Clearance Operation in Borno

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Troops Repel ISWAP Attack on Mandaragirau FOB, Detonate IED During Clearance Operation in Borno

By Zagazola Makama

Troops of the 162 Amphibious Battalion under Operation Hadin Kai have successfully repelled an attack by suspected Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mandaragirau in Borno State.

Security sources said the attack occurred at about 2:00 a.m. on August 15, 2026, when the terrorists launched a coordinated assault on the base from two separate fronts.

According to the sources, the troops, who were on high alert, immediately engaged the advancing terrorists after sighting them. The Battalion Commander reportedly led standby troops to reinforce ambush teams already deployed along likely enemy approaches.

A heavy exchange of fire ensued, during which the troops decisively repelled the attack on one axis, inflicting significant disruption on the assailants.

In a separate manoeuvre, another group of terrorists attempted to bypass the ambush positions and breach the camp through the river line. However, they were also successfully repelled by the troops, forcing the attackers to withdraw in disarray.

Following the encounter, troops pursued the fleeing terrorists, but the operation was later halted due to poor visibility and difficult terrain. Security sources said further exploitation of the area would continue at first light.

No casualties were recorded on the side of the troops, while the number of terrorist casualties could not be immediately ascertained. The situation in the general area was described as calm but highly unpredictable.

Meanwhile, troops conducting follow-up clearance operations along the Mandaragirau–Kana axis on the morning of August 15 discovered and safely detonated a command-detonated improvised explosive device (IED) suspected to have been planted in anticipation of troop reinforcement movement.

Security sources said the IED was detected short of a bridge along the route and was safely neutralised by the clearance team before it could be triggered.

In a related development, troops also discovered the corpse of a civilian who had reportedly fallen victim to another IED planted by the terrorists in the area. The remains were found a few metres from the detonation site during the clearance operation.

Authorities said detailed assessment and photographic documentation of the incidents would be provided as troops conclude ongoing clearance operations in the axis.

Troops Repel ISWAP Attack on Mandaragirau FOB, Detonate IED During Clearance Operation in Borno

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ISWAP Fighter Surrenders in Borno After Eight Months in Terrorist Camp

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ISWAP Fighter Surrenders in Borno After Eight Months in Terrorist Camp

By Zagazola Makama

A 25-year-old suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighter has surrendered to troops in Monguno Local Government Area of Borno State after spending about eight months with the terrorist group.

The surrendered fighter, identified as Alhaji Ali Gambo Kanuri, a native of Ngarinna village in Monguno LGA, reportedly joined the group about eight months ago after being introduced by a friend.

According to military sources, Gambo later became disillusioned with life within the terrorist group and decided to abandon the organisation.

His decision to surrender was reportedly influenced by the difficult conditions confronting members of the group amid sustained military operations against terrorist enclaves in the North-East.

Gambo eventually made his way out of the terrorist-controlled area and surrendered to troops in Monguno town, where he was taken into custody for further processing.

Military sources said the former fighter was subsequently transferred to the appropriate authorities for further action in line with established procedures for persons who voluntarily disengage from terrorist groups.

His surrender comes amid sustained military pressure against Boko Haram and ISWAP elements operating across Borno State, with security forces continuing clearance and counter-terrorism operations in various parts of the North-East.

Authorities have continued to encourage individuals associated with terrorist groups who are willing to disengage from violence to surrender peacefully and submit themselves to the established screening and rehabilitation processes.

ISWAP Fighter Surrenders in Borno After Eight Months in Terrorist Camp

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Al-Shabaab and the Emerging Debate Over a Taliban-Style Political Transition

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Al-Shabaab and the Emerging Debate Over a Taliban-Style Political Transition

By Zagazola Makama

A growing debate within Al-Shabaab’s media ecosystem over the possibility of negotiations with the Federal Government of Somalia may signal an important internal discussion about the future direction of the militant group.

The debate has gained attention following the publication of two articles by a writer using the alias Eng. Kurtun Hassan, whose writings have appeared extensively in Al-Shabaab-affiliated media.

The articles raise questions about whether Al-Shabaab could eventually pursue a path comparable, in some respects, to the political transition undertaken by the Taliban in Afghanistan, including negotiations and eventual engagement with the international community.

The emerging discourse is significant because it goes beyond battlefield developments and touches on the central question of whether Al-Shabaab could evolve from an insurgent organisation into a political and governing authority.

Sources cited in the emerging reporting suggest that elements within Al-Shabaab’s leadership may be considering negotiations with the Federal Government of Somalia, potentially through foreign intermediaries trusted by both sides.

The reported discussions, however, have not been publicly acknowledged by the Somali government or Al-Shabaab leadership as a formal negotiation process.

According to the assessments, the militant group’s leadership may be waiting for what it considers favourable political and security conditions before making any public decision.

Such a development, if eventually confirmed, would represent a major departure from Al-Shabaab’s longstanding strategy of armed insurgency.

For nearly two decades, the group has sought to challenge the Somali state and establish its own interpretation of Islamic governance, while maintaining links to the broader jihadist movement.

Another important aspect of the emerging debate is the reported interest among some Al-Shabaab members in developments in Afghanistan and Syria.

Sources indicate that senior members and sympathisers are closely following questions surrounding governance, military affairs, state administration, security and economic management in those countries.

In some Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, including Jilib, Bu’aale and Kunyoo Barrow, discussions are reportedly becoming more open about whether the organisation could transform itself into a governing authority.

Some members and sympathisers are said to be comparing Al-Shabaab’s existing administrative structures with armed groups that emerged during the Syrian conflict.

The argument reportedly advanced by some of them is that Al-Shabaab already possesses taxation systems, administrative structures and mechanisms for controlling territory that could potentially be adapted into a broader system of governance.

Al-Shabaab remains one of the most powerful jihadist organisations in Africa. Its manpower is difficult to establish with certainty, but available assessments have placed its overall strength at around 20,000 members, including approximately 12,000 armed combatants.

The organisation has also developed significant revenue-generating mechanisms, including taxation, extortion and illicit economic activities.
Estimates of its annual revenue have exceeded $100 million, although such figures are difficult to independently verify.

At the same time, the group has faced growing financial pressure over the past three years as the Somali government, supported by regional and international partners, has intensified efforts to disrupt its financial networks.

The pressure could be contributing to internal discussions about the sustainability of prolonged armed conflict.

If the reported discussions are eventually confirmed by independent sources, they could represent one of the most significant strategic debates within Al-Shabaab since its emergence as Somalia’s dominant jihadist insurgency.

A transition from armed jihad towards negotiations and political participation would fundamentally alter the security landscape in Somalia and potentially across the wider Horn of Africa.

However, the comparison with the Taliban should be treated cautiously. The Taliban’s eventual return to power was shaped by a unique combination of military, political, diplomatic and regional circumstances. Al-Shabaab operates in a different political and security environment, and there is no guarantee that its internal debate will produce a similar outcome.

More importantly, discussions about negotiations do not necessarily mean that the group has abandoned its jihadist ideology.

Militant organisations have historically used political engagement, negotiations and ceasefires for a variety of strategic purposes, including gaining time, reducing military pressure or improving their bargaining position.

Perhaps the most consequential issue is whether Al-Shabaab is genuinely reconsidering the transnational jihadist ideology that has guided its activities for years. Reports suggesting that elements within the organisation are studying governance models in Afghanistan and Syria may indicate an attempt to rethink the group’s long-term political identity.
But this remains an area requiring substantial corroboration.

There is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that Al-Shabaab as an organisation has formally abandoned its jihadist ideology or decided to enter negotiations with Mogadishu.

The writings attributed to Eng. Kurtun Hassan are therefore important less because they constitute an official policy declaration, and more because they provide a window into a debate that may be taking place within the group’s wider media and ideological environment.

The key question now is whether the debate will remain an intellectual discussion among Al-Shabaab’s members and sympathisers or evolve into an actual political strategy endorsed by the group’s senior leadership.

Several indicators will be important to watch: changes in Al-Shabaab’s public messaging, statements from senior commanders, shifts in its relationship with foreign jihadist organisations, changes in its taxation and governance practices, and any indications of contact with Somali authorities or foreign intermediaries.

For now, the evidence points to an emerging debate rather than a confirmed political transition.

Nevertheless, the fact that questions about negotiations, governance and engagement with the international community are reportedly being discussed within Al-Shabaab’s own media environment deserves close attention.

If the debate eventually moves from discussion to policy, it could mark the beginning of a fundamentally different phase in Somalia’s long-running conflict — one in which the battlefield may increasingly give way to negotiations over power, governance and the future of the Somali state.

Al-Shabaab and the Emerging Debate Over a Taliban-Style Political Transition

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