Ecological Distress in the Horn of Africa: Ethio‑Egyptian Hydropower Relations and the Strategic Significance of Hydropower Investments

By: Yechale Degu

Over the past two decades, Ethiopia has invested heavily on hydropower as a means to accelerate energy access, economic growth, and development and ensure control of its water resources. Though not without political costs affecting its diplomatic ties, hydropower was planned as a central pillar of the country’s energy security. Despite persistent domestic shortfalls in extending electricity to rural communities, the initiative has achieved notable success. Ethiopia has emerged as a regional hydroelectric hub, supplying power to nearly all neighboring states, with prospects for expansion beyond the region, generating significant hydro-dollar in return.

The hydropower strength more acquired following the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represents a landmark achievement, overcoming colonial-era restrictions that limited upstream countries such as Ethiopia in managing their water resources. The dam’s completion, financed largely through domestic means, marked a breakthrough against financial constraints imposed by global financial architectures over financing of controversial projects like GERD.

Withstanding sustained diplomatic challenges from Egypt, a country with deeper international entrenchment than Ethiopia, and its allies and organizations Egypt associated with such as Arab League/AR and Organization of Islamic Cooperation/OIC, Ethiopia emerge as a regional or continental hydropower. The dam becomes a new magna carta governing water relations for the future to come between Ethiopia and Egypt in particular and all Nile riparian states in general signaling the possible dominance of states in the head of the water systems.

Although Ethiopia constructed and filled the dam without any formal framework of agreement with downstream states such as Egypt, the hydropower rivalry between the two countries was largely settled following Ethiopia’s near completion and filling of the GERD in August 2024 and its inauguration on 9 September 2025. In this process, Ethiopia’s argument that the dam would not diminish the volume of water flowing to downstream countries gained political acceptance among diplomatic communities. Ultimately, Egypt, albeit reluctantly and painfully, acknowledged Ethiopia’s effective control over the Nile. However, the recent weather and environmental developments in the Horn of Africa/HoA will shape the Ethio-Egyptian water relations and put a question over the sustainability of hydropower investments as weather would affect the water volume and energy generations significantly.

The weather and environment intelligence report recently released by a USA based organization called Famine Early Warning Systems Network/FEWS-Net indicated that El Niño, a periodic warming of the ocean surface, related dryness is already emerging in the HoA. According to the report the HoA countries including Ethiopia has experienced a delayed and below-average rainfall season in the months between March to September. Prolonged dry spell is also expected in the months to come. The same report indicated that the Above-Average Temperatures Most Likely into Early 2027 increasing likelihood of extreme warm temperatures, affecting streams and water volumes. The region is expected to register a likely 0.5-3°C temperature rise and it will be hotter than typical level of temperature in the region. This significant rainfall deficits, rising temperature and dry spell is an indicative of drought conditions in the HoA and significantly shaping the Ethio-Egyptian relations and putting a strategic question over the sustainability of hydropower.

The FEWS‑Net report, though primarily directed at humanitarian actors such as World Food Program/WFP to prompt immediate interventions in response to rising temperatures and declining rainfall, the issue extends far beyond humanitarian concerns. It constitutes a fundamental driver of instability and a critical factor shaping future investments and reliance on hydropower. In addition to exacerbating humanitarian crises and inflating food prices, the projections underscore that climate‑induced reductions in water availability could reignite hydropower rivalries between lower and upper Nile riparian states. These climatic conditions are likely to intensify Ethiopia‑Sudan‑Egypt tensions over the Nile, as reflected in recent complaints by Sudan and Egypt regarding water releases from GERD. While the GERD can generate near‑optimal hydropower without causing significant downstream deficits under wet, average, or short‑term drought scenarios, this balance can be disrupted during prolonged dry seasons in Ethiopia and the wider HoA. Egypt, in particular, may seize upon such environmental developments not as temporary misfortunes but as strategic opportunities to reintroduce drought‑contingent operating principles into diplomatic negotiations.

Compounding the ecological pressures in the HoA are the high‑intensity conflicts in Ethiopia’s three northern regions, where the government has alleged that Egypt is playing a critical role and declared persona non grata over one Egyptian diplomat who ordered to leave in 48 hours on October 1, 2026. Therefore, these environmental stresses are likely to reignite regional controversies at a time of heightened tension and looming conflict in Northern Ethiopia, particularly between the Cooperation of Ethiopian People’s Forces for Survival and the federal government. The convergence of ecological strain, political instability and tit-for-tat actions between Ethiopia and Egypt one expelling the diplomat of the other carries significant security implications for Ethiopia and the wider HoA. Egypt, in this context, may exploit the situation to exert diplomatic and coercive pressure on the Ethiopian government, seeking operating agreements over Nile and GERD that include concessions favorable to its interests.

The prevailing environmental trends and ecological pressures in the HoA underscore the urgency of a strategic shift away from over‑reliance on hydropower investments toward a diversified energy portfolio that is less vulnerable to climatic variability. It signal the need to reconsider development pathways that depend heavily on electricity generated from water sources. While hydropower will remain a cornerstone of the global renewable energy transition, its reliability is increasingly undermined by climate change‑induced shifts in hydrological cycles, imparting new dimensions to its strategic significance.

For Ethiopia, this ecological distress raises critical questions about the sustainability of its heavy reliance on hydropower and highlights the necessity of diversifying national energy sources. Pursuing a balanced energy mix strategy, supported by adaptive planning and management, will be essential to ensure hydropower continues to play a pivotal role in the country’s power infrastructure while meeting the rising national demand.

Climate change has triggered significant shifts in hydrological patterns, profoundly affecting the hydropower rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt and raising broader questions about the reliability of hydropower investments across Africa, particularly in Ethiopia. Diplomatic tensions between the two states over water access and control are increasingly shaped by environmental and climatic dynamics. Concerns are mounting that the previously near‑settled hydropower rivalry will re-surface due to escalating ecological pressures. These developments have the potential to fundamentally alter relations between upper and lower riparian states and heighten the strategic importance of the Nile River. Egypt, framing the Nile as a matter of national security, has repeatedly issued televised warnings that any disruption of water flows would be regarded as an ‘act of war.’ This extension of the Nile discourse from civilian politics to military commitments underscores the gravity of the regional security threat as a result of environmental distress. In light of recent environmental and climatic shifts, Egypt is likely to intensify efforts to re‑internationalize the Nile issue, presenting itself as a vulnerable downstream state while pursuing a diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia. The objective would not necessarily be to compel Ethiopia to relinquish its upstream dominance or release additional water, but rather to impose greater political and reputational constraints on Ethiopia’s exercise of its headwater rights.

In conclusion, extreme weather events are expected to disrupt streamflow and create significant variability in water volumes, leading to substantial reductions in availability. In this context, any future water allocation treaties between Ethiopia and the major downstream states should avoid rigid prescriptions of fixed allocations. Given the region’s environmental vulnerabilities, such agreements must be guided by adaptive strategies that prioritize flexibility and responsiveness to hydrological variability in the headwaters. This approach stands in contrast to colonial‑era frameworks that imposed predictable spheres of utilization while disregarding the impacts of environmental fluctuations. A modern treaty framework should therefore embed adaptive principles, ensuring that water governance reflects ecological realities rather than static allocations.

He is an independent Horn of Africa security analyst and researcher and can be contacted at Ziyinyechale@gmail.com

Ecological Distress in the Horn of Africa: Ethio‑Egyptian Hydropower Relations and the Strategic Significance of Hydropower Investments

NIS enrols 2,296 Nigerians in first week of UK passport intervention

By: Michael Mike

The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) has enrolled 2,296 applicants in the first six operational days of its Special Passport Intervention Exercise in the United Kingdom, with the Manchester Centre recording the higher number of enrolments.

The exercise, which commenced on September 7, 2026, recorded 1,709 applicants at the Manchester Centre and 587 at the London Centre, as Nigerians with confirmed appointments continued to turn out for passport services.

Daily enrolment figures across the two centres stood at 245 on September 7, 401 on September 8, 396 on September 9, 429 on September 10, 406 on September 11 and 419 on September 12.

The Service said the sustained turnout reflected steady progress in the processing of applicants with confirmed appointments, adding that passport production and dispatch for those already enrolled had commenced and were progressing steadily.

As part of efforts to ensure effective oversight and quality service delivery, the Comptroller-General of the NIS, Kemi Nanna Nandap, undertook working visits to the intervention centres in Manchester and London.

The visits, according to the Service, were aimed at assessing the exercise firsthand, engaging with members of the Nigerian community and ensuring that the intervention provided efficient, responsive and seamless passport services to applicants.

The NIS said the exercise would continue at both centres, assuring applicants with confirmed intervention appointments of service.

The Service said it appreciates members of the Nigerian community in the UK for their patience, understanding and cooperation, urging all applicants to continue working with officials on the ground to ensure the smooth and efficient delivery of the intervention.

NIS enrols 2,296 Nigerians in first week of UK passport intervention

China’s $2.3bn Nigerian Buy-Up: Beijing Opens Bigger Market for Abuja

By: Michael Mike

Nigeria may be on the verge of a major shift in its trade relationship with China as the Asian economic giant imported almost $2.3 billion worth of Nigerian goods in just six months, marking an almost 80 per cent increase over the same period in 2025.

The sharp rise, disclosed by the Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, Zhou Hongyou,on Thursday in Abuja, comes as total trade between both countries surged by 75 per cent year-on-year to $18 billion.

The figures are significant for Nigeria, which has long struggled to translate its enormous agricultural, mineral and manufacturing potential into sustained export earnings.

Zhou, speaking at the Nigeria-China Food Festival at the China Cultural Centre, said Beijing’s zero-tariff policy for African countries with diplomatic relations with China presented Nigeria with an opportunity to dramatically expand its exports to the Chinese market.

“This is a great chance for Nigeria to expand exports to China,” the diplomat declared.

The statement effectively puts the spotlight on Nigeria’s ability to exploit preferential access to one of the world’s biggest consumer markets at a time when the Federal Government is under pressure to increase non-oil exports, generate foreign exchange and create jobs through expanded domestic production.

The nearly $2.3 billion already purchased by China from Nigeria in the first half of the year suggests that demand exists. The bigger question, however, is whether Nigerian producers can scale up production, meet international standards and consistently supply the Chinese market.

The latest development also gives fresh significance to efforts to diversify Nigeria’s trade beyond crude oil.

For decades, Nigeria’s export earnings have been heavily dependent on petroleum, while China has emerged as one of Nigeria’s most important trading partners. The latest figures indicate that the relationship is expanding beyond the traditional pattern of trade and could provide a platform for Nigerian agricultural products, processed foods, solid minerals and manufactured goods to gain wider access to China.

Zhou said the growing economic relationship was being matched by increasing cultural and people-to-people exchanges, noting that 2026 marks 55 years of formal diplomatic relations between Nigeria and China.

He urged both countries to deepen cooperation in education, culture, technology, the arts and youth affairs, arguing that stronger people-to-people ties would help sustain the bilateral relationship for future generations.

The Chinese envoy’s remarks came against the backdrop of the Nigeria-China Food Festival, where food was used to demonstrate the potential of cultural exchange and the economic value of Nigeria’s culinary heritage.

Representing the Minister of Arts, Culture, Tourism and the Creative Economy, Hannatu Musawa, the Permanent Secretary, Abdulkarim Ibrahim, said Nigeria’s food industry represented a major economic opportunity, particularly through tourism, hospitality and job creation.

He said food and beverages constituted the largest subsector of Nigeria’s tourism economy and called for greater Nigeria-China collaboration in gastronomy, tourism, hospitality, culinary education and creative entrepreneurship.

The Director-General of the National Institute for Hospitality and Tourism, Aare Abisoye Fagade, said Nigeria’s diverse culinary traditions could be transformed into a globally competitive food-tourism industry if properly packaged, standardised and commercialised.

The event also demonstrated the potential of cultural diplomacy, with Nigerian and Chinese artistes combining traditional Nigerian drums with Chinese percussion instruments.

The National Troupe of Nigeria’s Director-General and Artistic Director/CEO, Hajia Kaltume Bulama Gana, said such collaborations could deepen mutual understanding and open opportunities for Nigerian artistes to perform in China.

Former NIHOTOUR Director-General, Alhaji Munzali Dantata, who studied in Beijing decades ago, also urged stronger cooperation, particularly in education and cultural exchanges.

But beyond the colourful displays of food, music and culture, yesterday’s event highlighted a far bigger economic proposition: Nigeria now has an expanding Chinese market, and the scale of future gains will depend largely on what the country can produce and export.

With Chinese imports from Nigeria already approaching $2.3 billion in six months and bilateral trade reaching $18 billion, the emerging challenge for Abuja is to ensure that the growth translates into more Nigerian-made products, stronger local industries, foreign-exchange earnings and jobs rather than merely higher volumes of trade.

For Nigeria, the opportunity presented by Beijing’s zero-tariff policy could therefore become a test of whether the country can finally convert its vast productive capacity into sustained export power.

China’s $2.3bn Nigerian Buy-Up: Beijing Opens Bigger Market for Abuja