The Plateau State Government cannot continue to pretend that violence becomes a crisis only when there is a reprisal

The most disturbing part of the worsening insecurity in Plateau is not only the killings themselves, but the selective outrage and apparent institutional silence that follows them. When Fulani civilians are killed in their hamlets, the response from government often appears muted, or completely absent.

But the moment there is a reprisal, the government suddenly finds its voice, its condemnation becomes loud, and the incident becomes the centre of attention. Thats when everybody wants America and Isreal to know.

That is a dangerous double standard.

A government cannot afford to treat the death of one community as routine while treating the death of another as a national emergency. Every innocent life lost in Plateau should carry the same weight, whether the victim is Fulani, Berom, Mwaghavul, Hausa or any other community.

The continued silence surrounding attacks on Fulani communities is particularly dangerous because it creates the perception that some victims do not matter. Once communities begin to believe that government will not protect them or seek justice for them, they naturally lose confidence in the state. And that is where the cycle of violence becomes almost impossible to stop.

Government cannot condemn the fire while ignoring who lit the match. It is unacceptable for authorities to condemn reprisal attacks without equally confronting the attacks that preceded them. You cannot keep condemning the smoke while refusing to investigate the fire. If a farmer is killed, arrest the killers. If a herder is killed, arrest the killers. If a village is attacked, investigate it. If livestock are destroyed deliberately, investigate it. If innocent civilians are massacred, bring those responsible to justice. The identity of the victim should never determine the urgency of the government’s response.

Silence is not neutrality

The state government’s apparent reluctance to speak forcefully when Fulani civilians are killed is not helping reconciliation. If anything, it risks convincing affected communities that they have been abandoned. That perception is combustible. A government that genuinely wants peace must be prepared to tell its own supporters uncomfortable truths. It must condemn wrongdoing even when the perpetrators come from communities considered politically sympathetic.

Leadership is not defending your people when they are right. Leadership is confronting them when they are wrong too. Anything less is political convenience masquerading as peacebuilding.

The Plateau Government should wake up before the situation deteriorates further. Every unresolved killing becomes another grievance. Every unpunished attack becomes another justification for revenge. Every selective statement from government deepens suspicion.

And eventually, the state risks becoming an observer in a conflict it has a constitutional duty to prevent. It is not the responsibility of the Military alone all the time. The government must stop waiting for reprisals before becoming interested in violence.

The Plateau State Government cannot continue to pretend that violence becomes a crisis only when there is a reprisal

Dioura falls as Mali’s security crisis spreads south while Kati tightens its grip

By: Zagazola Makama

The reported fall of the military position at Dioura in Ténenkou Circle, Mopti Region, is more than another battlefield setback for Mali. It is a warning that the country’s security crisis is increasingly spreading beyond the traditional conflict zones and putting pressure on the military’s ability to maintain a permanent presence outside major garrisons.

According to the analysis, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has claimed control of the Dioura position through its media platform, Az-Zallaqa. No independent confirmation of the claim, casualty figures or the extent of the group’s control was immediately available. But Dioura’s strategic importance goes beyond the size of its military installation.

Dioura: a small post with a big strategic value

Dioura is positioned in a critical part of central Mali, linking areas around the Inner Niger Delta, Ténenkou and wider Mopti, with routes extending towards Niono and the Mauritanian frontier. The position therefore functions as a forward security point rather than simply another military barracks. Its repeated targeting is significant.

The post was attacked in March 2019, when dozens of soldiers were killed and military equipment seized. It was attacked again in May 2025, in another major assault that reportedly left about 40 soldiers dead and saw the military position overrun for an extended period.

If the latest reported capture is confirmed, the pattern raises a fundamental question about the ability of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) to hold isolated positions in contested territory.
The problem is not necessarily the loss of one military post. The problem is what happens when several such posts begin falling at the same time.

The JNIM strategy: weaken the network, not necessarily capture Bamako. JNIM does not need to seize Bamako to demonstrate that the state is losing control of its territory. It can achieve strategic effects by progressively attacking the network of forward military positions, disrupting roads, targeting supply convoys and forcing the army to concentrate its forces around major urban centres.

That creates a dangerous choice for FAMa.
They can reinforce remote positions and expose troops and supply convoys to ambushes, or withdraw from vulnerable locations and concentrate their forces in larger towns. Either way, the insurgents gain. If troops remain, they become isolated targets. If they withdraw, the insurgents gain greater freedom of movement.

The result is what could be described as territorial attrition a gradual erosion of effective state presence without the need for a conventional military offensive against major cities.

Mali’s security crisis is no longer confined to the north The wider concern is the geographical spread of violence. For years, Mali’s insecurity was largely associated with the northern and central regions. That picture has changed.

The JNIM threat has increasingly demonstrated the ability to operate around major transport corridors, agricultural areas and economically important zones. The southern regions are particularly important because they contain major agricultural production areas, mining operations and transport routes connecting Mali with neighbouring countries. Any sustained disruption in areas around Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Bougouni or along key commercial corridors would have consequences far beyond military security. It would affect food supplies, fuel distribution, mining revenues, commercial transport and government revenue.

When insecurity reaches the economic arteries of a country, it stops being merely a counter-insurgency problem. It becomes a state survival problem.

The developments therefore raise renewed questions about Mali’s reliance on Russian security assistance. The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps was presented as part of a broader strategic partnership intended to strengthen Mali’s sovereignty and military capacity. But the latest battlefield developments raise questions about how effectively that partnership is translating into sustained territorial security. The reported withdrawal of Russian personnel from Kidal, cited in the original analysis, has further fuelled debate about the limits of the Russian model.

The central issue is not whether Russia has military capabilities. It does. The question is whether those capabilities are being deployed as part of a coherent national strategy capable of securing Mali’s enormous territory.
A foreign force can provide specialised support, intelligence, aviation and protection for strategic locations. It cannot permanently substitute for a professional national army capable of holding territory, securing roads and maintaining relationships with local communities.

The Kati problem

The most troubling argument raised by the analysis concerns the growing distinction between protecting the regime and protecting the country. If the government’s most reliable security arrangements are concentrated around Bamako and Kati while peripheral military positions remain increasingly vulnerable, the security architecture risks becoming centred on regime protection rather than national territorial defence. That would be a serious strategic distortion.

Kati is important because it is closely associated with Mali’s military leadership and has become a major centre of political and military power.
But securing Kati does not secure Dioura.
Protecting the leadership does not secure the routes between Mali’s agricultural and commercial centres. And protecting the capital does not prevent JNIM from expanding its influence in remote communities.

A state can maintain political control over a capital while gradually losing effective control over its periphery. That is one of the most dangerous phases of an insurgency.
The government continues to function. The military continues to issue statements. The national flag continues to fly over administrative buildings. But outside major population centres, armed groups increasingly determine who moves, who trades and which roads can safely be used.

This is why Dioura matters. It is not because the position itself is large. It is because every abandoned or overrun forward position expands the space in which armed groups can operate.

Mali is also confronting several overlapping security challenges. The state is fighting JNIM and Islamic State-linked groups while dealing with the continuing northern conflict involving Tuareg-led armed movements, local militias and communal tensions. This creates a fragmented security environment in which the military cannot concentrate exclusively on one enemy.
At the same time, the reliance on civilian militias and local armed groups carries its own risks, particularly where communal tensions and allegations of abuses are involved.

A security strategy built around multiple armed actors can produce short-term tactical gains while creating longer-term problems of accountability and command cohesion.

The growing restrictions on independent reporting add another layer to the crisis.
When governments restrict journalists and control the flow of information, they may temporarily reduce politically damaging narratives. But censorship does not restore lost territory. In fact, prolonged information restrictions can make strategic decision-making harder by preventing uncomfortable realities from reaching policymakers and the public.
A government fighting an insurgency needs accurate information more than it needs flattering information.

The reported fall of Dioura should therefore be viewed as part of a wider strategic trend rather than an isolated tactical incident. If the Malian military continues to lose forward positions while concentrating increasingly around major urban centres, the country risks developing a security structure in which the state controls the cities while armed groups dominate the spaces between them. That is precisely the environment in which insurgencies thrive.
The real test for Bamako is not whether it can defend Kati. It is whether it can keep Dioura, secure the roads to it, protect the communities around it and maintain a credible military presence across the territory. If it cannot, then the question facing Mali is no longer simply how to defeat JNIM. It is how to prevent the gradual disappearance of effective state authority beyond the major cities.

Dioura may be a small military post. But strategically, it is a warning light. And if the warning is ignored, the next battlefield may not be another remote barracks. It may be the economic corridors, supply routes and southern regions that Mali depends on to keep the state functioning.

Dioura falls as Mali’s security crisis spreads south while Kati tightens its grip

Niger’s Refoundation faces internal fractures as calls grow for political reset

By: Zagazola Makama

Three years after the overthrow of President Mohamed Bazoum, Niger’s transition is reaching a critical juncture, with growing questions over the security situation, governance, national cohesion and the direction of the military-led administration.

A new political analysis argues that the authorities of the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) now face the difficult task of correcting the course of the transition without deepening the divisions that have emerged within the country.

The argument comes as Niger continues to confront a persistent jihadist threat while dealing with the political and military consequences of the reported attempted coup of Aug. 29, 2026.

The military authorities justified the July 26, 2023 takeover on the grounds of worsening insecurity, failures of governance and the need to fundamentally reform the Nigerian state.
Three years later, however, many of those challenges remain. Insecurity continues to affect several parts of the country, while concerns over governance, corruption and patronage remain.

The analysis argues that the transition should therefore be judged not by the circumstances that brought the military to power, but by its ability to deliver the reforms and security improvements promised to Nigeriens. At the same time, the authorities appear to have moderated some of the most confrontational positions adopted during the early months of the transition, particularly in their international posture. That shift, according to the analysis, should be consolidated rather than reversed.

The most serious challenge now confronting the CNSP may, however, be inside the security establishment itself. The reported Aug. 29 attempted coup exposed serious tensions within Niger’s military and raised questions about the level of confidence between the political leadership and sections of the armed forces.

The response to the crisis reportedly involved Russian personnel and drone capabilities against mutinous Nigerien soldiers. The development has generated controversy because the confrontation was fundamentally an internal dispute involving Nigerien security forces. The analysis argues that the episode could have lasting consequences for military cohesion, particularly among special forces personnel. The concern is not simply that the army is divided between the Presidential Guard and special operations units. The deeper problem is that mistrust could begin spreading across the wider military institution.

That would create a dangerous situation for a country already fighting JNIM and Islamic State-linked groups across multiple theatres. The central warning is that the authorities could gradually shift their priority from protecting the state to protecting the regime.

An army designed primarily for counter-terrorism requires initiative, professional autonomy, battlefield experience and strong command cohesion. An administration primarily concerned with preventing another coup may instead prioritise loyalty, surveillance and political reliability. Such a transformation could weaken precisely those capabilities Niger needs most against jihadist groups.

The reported replacement of Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou by Brig. Gen. Mamane Sani Kiaou as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces therefore takes on added significance. If the change forms part of a wider restructuring of the military, the authorities will face a delicate balancing act between restoring political control and preserving combat effectiveness.

Another major concern raised by the analysis is the increasingly polarising language used to define political loyalty. Attempts to divide Nigeriens into “patriots” and “traitors” could deepen social divisions rather than strengthen national unity. Criticism of the government should not automatically be equated with hostility to Niger. Likewise, defending national sovereignty should not require treating every political disagreement as evidence of foreign manipulation.

The analysis argues that a state becomes more vulnerable when legitimate internal grievances are consistently explained through the actions of external enemies. Foreign pressure and geopolitical competition are real. But they cannot explain every internal weakness.

The country’s growing relationships with Russia and other international partners have fundamentally altered the strategic environment. But foreign partnerships cannot substitute for national institutions. Russia, France, the United States, China and other global actors pursue their own interests in the Sahel.

The analysis therefore warns Niger against assuming that any external power will permanently protect the interests of the current leadership. International partners support states and regimes when their interests converge.

If a government loses the ability to maintain stability, cohesion and effective governance, its external partners can adjust their calculations.

The real strategic objective should therefore be to build enough national strength and institutional legitimacy that foreign powers compete to work with the country — rather than compete to control its political direction. The proposed alternative is not a return to the political system that existed before 2023 without reform. Instead, the analysis calls for a broader national dialogue capable of bringing different sections of Nigerien society into the transition process. It proposes four principal measures.

First, the creation of a Council of Elders composed of respected former national leaders, retired senior military officers, traditional rulers, intellectuals and other figures with broad moral credibility. Such a body could provide independent advice on the country’s institutional future.

Second, reforming the existing Consultative Council for the Refoundation into a broader National Council of the Refoundation with a stronger legislative role and wider representation of Nigerien expertise.

Third, adjusting the government team to focus more directly on national service, institutional credibility and delivery. Fourth, establishing a realistic timetable for the restoration of pluralistic political life. The objective would be to provide Nigeriens with a clear political destination rather than an open-ended transition.

For the military authorities, this is ultimately a security question as much as a political one.A divided country provides opportunities for jihadist groups. A divided military creates operational vulnerabilities. A population that increasingly distrusts government institutions becomes harder to mobilise against insurgents.
And a security establishment preoccupied with internal political threats has less capacity to concentrate on the enemy in the field.

Niger’s vast territory and its position at the heart of the Sahel make this particularly dangerous.
The country borders Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria, Libya and Chad. Instability inside Niger therefore has consequences far beyond Niamey.

A crossroads for the CNSP

The central message is that the CNSP still has an opportunity to correct course.
The transition does not necessarily have to end in confrontation between the authorities and their opponents. Nor does political opening necessarily mean surrendering the gains the military authorities claim to have made in restoring sovereignty and restructuring the state. But sustainable stability will require moving beyond slogans and confronting the country’s internal problems directly.

Niger cannot build national unity by demanding uniformity of opinion. It cannot defeat terrorism while weakening the cohesion of its own security forces. And it cannot protect sovereignty by becoming excessively dependent on foreign partners.

The challenge before Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani is therefore bigger than maintaining control. It is to build institutions capable of surviving beyond the personalities currently occupying power. The proposed “rectification” is ultimately a call to turn the refoundation from a project of political control into a genuinely national process. Because the fundamental choice facing Niger is increasingly clear:

A state secured by force may survive for a time. A state secured by legitimacy, institutional cohesion and national consensus has a far better chance of enduring.

Niger’s Refoundation faces internal fractures as calls grow for political reset