News
Benin’s Failed Coup: Russian Shadows, Weaponised Disinformation, and a Warning to West Africa
Benin’s Failed Coup: Russian Shadows, Weaponised Disinformation, and a Warning to West Africa
•How pro-Russian, coup supporting “activists” were exposed, discredited
•Why Nigeria, ECOWAS deployed troops
•Waning democratic governance, a threat to West Africa
By Oumarou Sanou
Shortly after dawn on Sunday, December 7, 2025, Benin’s usually calm capital, Cotonou, woke to the crackle of gunfire. A small group of mutinous soldiers launched a coordinated assault on President Patrice Talon’s private residence in the Guézo district before attempting to seize the presidential palace. Around the same time, another team stormed the national broadcaster, ORTB, where they announced the formation of a “Committee for Military Refoundation” under the little-known Lieutenant-Colonel Tigri Pascal.
Within three hours, the rebellion had collapsed. By 10 a.m., loyalist forces had retaken the palace and reclaimed the broadcaster. At exactly 12:30 p.m., Benin’s Interior Ministry appeared on television to declare the coup “completely defeated.”
The mutineers scattered. Several fled toward the borders. Calm returned. But the significance of the failed coup does not lie in its short duration. It lies in what it revealed.
This was not just the misadventure of a handful of soldiers—it was a case study in how foreign influence, digital manipulation, and democratic fragility intersect to create windows of vulnerability across West Africa.
A Suspiciously Synchronised Disinformation Burst
Even before official channels confirmed what was happening, the online information environment lit up—not organically, but with remarkable coordination.
A chorus of pro-Russian “pan-Africanist” activists, many previously linked to Moscow’s information networks, sprang into action, including Kémi Seba, a prominent figure in Russia’s Africa outreach, who hailed the attack as a “day of liberation,” then quietly deleted the post once the plot was unravelled.
Another was Nathalie Yamb, a Swiss-Cameroonian activist closely aligned with Russia and the Sahel’s military juntas, who spread unverified claims and insinuations. Her silence during the post-election unrest in her own country stood in stark contrast to her sudden interest in Benin.
Additionally, accounts linked to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—a military-led bloc comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—circulated doctored videos, fabricated images, and claims of “two million protesters” supporting the mutineers.
Recycled footage from old patriotic rallies was falsely presented as real-time mobilisation in Cotonou. This was not random noise. It was an information peration primed for exploitation—one that appeared ready-made and waiting for a trigger.
The speed and uniformity raised serious questions: Were these influencers briefed in advance? Were the AES-linked accounts acting on instructions? And were external actors anticipating a successful overthrow?
Russian Warships and Unanswered Questions
Perhaps the most puzzling development came from the sea. At the exact time the coup attempt was underway, two Russian naval vessels were detected approaching the Port of Cotonou. Witnesses say the ships abruptly turned away once it became clear the coup had failed.
Coincidence? Routine deployment? Something else? No conclusive evidence ties Moscow directly to the putsch. However, as security analysts often note, patterns matter. For instance, pro-Russian influencers quickly championed the coup, AES-aligned accounts amplified disinformation, and Russian ships moved in synchrony with the events.
In the same vein, the coup took place on the eve of a major pan-African meeting in Lomé—a moment of heightened strategic visibility. If not coordination, then convenient alignment.
However, one fact is apparent: the ecosystem that cheered the mutiny was overwhelmingly pro-Moscow.
Benin’s Institutions Held Barely
The most remarkable part of the story is not that the coup happened, but that it failed so quickly.
The Beninese Armed Forces, long regarded as professional and disciplined, remained united. Only a tiny and poorly organised faction joined the mutiny. Command structures held firm. President Talon remained secure under guard.
Public support was also decisive. Citizens came out in defence of the constitutional order. The attempted junta found no social base. This unity was reinforced by rapid signals from regional powers as Côte d’Ivoire alerted troops to stand by for intervention if Benin requested help. Gabon, despite its transitional military government, also indicated readiness to mobilise. Nigeria, as ECOWAS Chair, put regional standby units on alert.
For the first time in recent memory, West African states appeared willing to actively prevent a coup, not merely condemn one after the fact.
Nigeria and ECOWAS React
Fearing a repeat of what happened in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria and ECOWAS took immediate and proactive steps to foil the coup with show of force and military deployment.
In response to the directive from President Ahmed Bola Tinubu, the Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a firm statement within hours:
“Nigeria condemns in the strongest terms the attempt to subvert the constitutional order in the Republic of Benin. Any unconstitutional change of government is unacceptable in West Africa. Nigeria stands ready to support Benin in safeguarding its stability, democracy, and territorial integrity.”
In the same vein, the ECOWAS followed with an emergency communiqué:
“The Authority of Heads of State and Government denounces the coup attempt in Benin and reaffirms its zero-tolerance stance on unconstitutional changes of government. ECOWAS urges all member states to strengthen democratic governance, address underlying grievances, and guard against external interference.”
These statements were backed by quiet but real military readiness, as some of the coupists were reportedly bombed and neutralised. The region clearly understood the stakes.
How Fragile Democracies Invite External Interference
The attempted coup exposed uncomfortable truths about West Africa’s democratic health.
Across the region, several trends make coups enticing—or at least easy to justify for populists, extremists, and foreign opportunists —such as the erosion of public trust in elections due to disputed polls, weak institutions, and corruption, which fuels cynicism.
Rising living costs and inequality, where economic hardship provides fertile ground for anti-government mobilisation, often commandeered by foreign-backed narratives. This is exacerbated by the shrinking civic space, where citizens cannot express their grievances peacefully, and unconstitutional actors step in. Then, the failure of regional early-warning systems, particularly within the ECOWAS and AU frameworks, focuses more on punishment than prevention.
Into these cracks enter foreign powers—Russia most aggressively—offering military partnerships, anti-West rhetoric, and propaganda support to coup-friendly actors.
In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, Moscow-backed networks have reshaped the political environment, helping legitimise military rule under the guise of “sovereignty.”
Benin’s failed coup fits neatly into this pattern of attempted destabilisation—whether Moscow orchestrated it or exploited it.
A Region at a Dangerous Crossroads
The lesson from Cotonou is not one of triumph, but of caution. Benin narrowly escaped a crisis. Another West African state might not.
Suppose governments do not strengthen democratic governance, close civic space gaps, improve economic management, and maintain civilian control over the military. In that case, external and internal opportunists will likely attempt to do so again.
ECOWAS faces its most significant test yet: Can it restore deterrence and democratic credibility after years of failed interventions and weakened institutions?
The answer depends on whether it moves from reactive sanctions to proactive democratic peer review, as some experts have long advocated.
A Final Warning
Benin’s failed coup is more than a contained incident. It is a mirror held up to the region.
The Sahel’s coup contagion was not accidental—it was the result of democratic decay, citizen mistrust, security failures, and foreign manipulation. If these conditions remain unaddressed, West Africa will continue to be a playground for geopolitical proxies and destabilising forces.
Benin survived because its institutions held. But no country in the region today can claim immunity. West Africa must act—urgently, decisively, and collectively—before the next coup succeeds.
Oumarou Sanou, who contributed this report is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, regional stability, and the evolving dynamics of African leadership. Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com
Benin’s Failed Coup: Russian Shadows, Weaponised Disinformation, and a Warning to West Africa
News
Troops repel bandits’ attack in AgatuBenue
Troops repel bandits’ attack in Agatu
Benue
By Zagazola Makama
Troops of the Nigerian Army, in collaboration with the police, repelled an attack by suspected armed bandits on a joint patrol team in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State.
Security sources said the incident occurred at about 9:00 a.m. on April 4, when the troops on routine patrol encountered the armed bandits.
According to the sources, the bandits opened fire on sighting the troops, leading to a gun duel.
“The troops responded decisively, forcing the bandits to retreat after a brief exchange of fire,” the source said.
The attackers reportedly fled through a nearby river, taking advantage of the difficult terrain.
The sources confirmed that no casualty was recorded among the troops during the encounter.
Following the incident, troops have intensified patrols and commenced combing operations in surrounding bushes to track down the fleeing suspects.
The operation is part of ongoing efforts by the military to curb banditry and sustain peace in the area.
Troops repel bandits’ attack in Agatu
Benue
News
Six more top bandit leaders eliminated alongside Ado Allero’s son in Zamfara offensive
Six more top bandit leaders eliminated alongside Ado Allero’s son in Zamfara offensive
By Zagazola Makama
Additional details have emerged on the identities of notorious bandit leaders eliminated during the recent military offensive in Tsafe Local Government Area of Zamfara State, where the son of feared kingpin Ado Allero and scores of fighters were neutralised.
At the heart of the operation was the elimination of Kachalla Iliya Sarki, the son of Ado Allero, alongside more than 65 fighters and several high-ranking commanders who had long orchestrated attacks, kidnappings, and cattle rustling across Zamfara and neighbouring states.

For years, the forests of Tsafe, Shinkafi, and Zurmi have served as operational bases for heavily armed groups, with Allero’s network emerging as one of the most feared. The death of his son, widely regarded as a rising figure within the hierarchy, is not just a tactical success, it is a symbolic strike at the core of the group’s command structure.
Security sources confirmed that the offensive, which targeted multiple camps in Munhaye and surrounding forest enclaves, led to the elimination of several key commanders.

Among them was Kachalla Biyabiki, a notorious kidnapping kingpin linked to numerous abductions in the western Tsafe axis. Intelligence indicated he had at least 10 victims in captivity at the time of his death, with ransom negotiations ongoing.
Also killed was Kachalla Dogon Bete, a feared field commander known for leading violent raids on rural communities and coordinating cattle rustling operations.
Other commanders neutralised include Kachalla Dan Bakolo, believed to be responsible for arms supply and logistics; Kachalla Na’Isa, a sub-commander involved in enforcement operations; Kachalla Yellow, linked to reprisal attacks; and Kachalla Mudi, associated with kidnapping activities along rural transit routes.

Together, these figures formed a critical part of the operational backbone of banditry in the Tsafe–Shinkafi corridor.
“These individuals were key actors within the network. Their neutralisation has disrupted command and control structures in the area,” a security source said.
The offensive, which targeted multiple camps in Munhaye and surrounding forest enclaves, also resulted in the destruction of hideouts and recovery of weapons and other logistics.
However, security experts warn that the killing of such high-profile figures—particularly the son of Ado Allero—may provoke retaliatory attacks by fleeing elements seeking revenge.
Troops have consequently intensified clearance operations, aerial surveillance, and aggressive patrols across Tsafe, Shinkafi, and adjoining areas to prevent regrouping and forestall possible reprisals.
Efforts are ongoing to track down remaining loyalists and dismantle residual cells operating within the wider Zamfara-Katsina forest corridor.
In Zamfara’s forests, where power shifts quickly and alliances are fluid, today’s victory can only be secured by tomorrow’s vigilance.
Six more top bandit leaders eliminated alongside Ado Allero’s son in Zamfara offensive
News
Why truth, not narratives, will end the killings in Plateau’s endless cycle of bloodshed
Why truth, not narratives, will end the killings in Plateau’s endless cycle of bloodshed
By Zagazola Makama
In Plateau State, the sound of gunfire is no longer shocking. It is expected. What follows each incident has also become predictable outrage, media attention, blames and accusations, as well as a rush to frame the tragedy within familiar narratives.
The latest reports of miners lynched by unknown gunmen have once again drawn national and international attention. Youth leaders, clerics, and advocacy groups are already describing the incident in sweeping terms, some branding it as genocide.
But beneath the headlines lies a more complicated and more troubling reality. Plateau is not witnessing isolated acts of violence. It is caught in a deeply entrenched cycle of reprisals, where attacks and counter-attacks have become the norm, and where truth is often buried beneath sentiment and selective narratives.
In the early hours of April 3, troops responded to a distress call from Sabongida village in Jos South Local Government Area. What they found was grim: the lifeless, beheaded body of a 30-year-old herder, identified as Shafiyu, lying in the bush. Security sources indicated that the killing was allegedly carried out by suspected Berom youths. Before the shock of that incident could settle, retaliation came swiftly.
Later that same day, armed men attacked an illegal mining site in Gyel village, Riyom Local Government Area. Three miners, including Samuel Davou, were killed in cold blood, while others fled for safety as troops moved in to secure the area. What might appear as separate incidents are, in reality, part of a continuous chain of violence, one feeding directly into the other.
Across Plateau, recent events reveal a troubling pattern that has defined the conflict for years.
On March 25, the body of Abdullahi Mohammed , a Fulani boy, was discovered in a shallow grave in Mangu Local Government Area, raising suspicions of targeted killing. On the same day in Riyom, irrigation farms belonging to several farmers were destroyed, by Fulani herdsmen, an act capable of provoking immediate retaliation.
Three days later, on March 28, gunmen assassinated Alhaji Bilyaminu Julde, a prominent Fulani community leader and Ardo of Gindiri, in Barkin Ladi. The attack, carried out at his residence, sent ignited tensions through the Fulani community and set off alarm bells across the state.
That same day, another flashpoint emerged in Riyom, where stray cattle destroyed farmlands in Tahoss village an incident that further strained relations between farmers and herders.
By April 2, violence had escalated again. In Bokkos Local Government Area, troops foiled an attack by suspected armed herders following a clash with vigilantes over grazing disputes. One vigilante sustained gunshot injuries.
Then came April 3, a day that encapsulated the crisis. Aside from the killing of the herder in Sabongida and the retaliatory attack on miners in Gyel, more killing were reported in Jos South.
On the same day, troops in Barkin Ladi recovered suspected rustled cattle reportedly taken by the Birom armed militia, while in Riyom, another Fulani youth was allegedly killed in an isolated attack. Each of these incidents is not just an entry in a security log. They are links in a chain, each one strengthening the justification for the next.
The Plateau conflict has increasingly been framed through singular lenses, often ethnic or religious. While these dimensions exist, they do not fully capture the complexity of what is happening on the ground. What emerges from security reports and field accounts is a cycle of reciprocal violence involving armed elements across communities. Fulani herders have been attacked and killed. Berom farmers and miners have also been targeted in deadly reprisals.
Yet, public discourse often pointing fongers only one side of the suffering.
This selective framing creates a dangerous distortion. It fuels anger, deepens divisions, and makes reconciliation even more difficult. More importantly, it prevents a clear understanding of the crisis one that is essential for any meaningful solution.
As observed by Simon Kolawole, the conflict has become a cycle of “attacks and counter-attacks, reprisals and counter-reprisals.”
In such an environment, violence becomes normalized. Communities begin to see retaliation not as a crime, but as justice.
Without accountability, peace remains elusive,”he said in his latest article, titled The Killing fields in plateau State.
In Plateau State, the search for peace has become a long, uncertain journey with no immediate destination in sight. Despite sustained military deployments and repeated calls for calm, deadly attacks continue to rage across communities, reinforcing a grim reality: this is a conflict deeply rooted in cycles of violence, mistrust, and silence.
For many residents, the first instinct after every attack is to look toward the government, Security forces and President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Questions are asked why were the troops not there? Why was the intelligence not acted upon? Why are communities left exposed?
These concerns are valid. The primary responsibility of any government is the protection of lives and property. Yet, beneath these criticisms lies a difficult truth that is often left unspoken. In many cases, the same communities that demand protection are unwilling to confront the problem from within.
Across flashpoints in Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, and Mangu, patterns have consistent which suggest that perpetrators of violence are not faceless outsiders operating in isolation. They are often known by name, by face, by affiliation. But they are rarely exposed. Instead, a culture of silence prevails. Fear, loyalty, and sometimes complicity prevent communities from identifying or handing over those responsible for attacks.
This silence creates a protective shield around perpetrators, allowing them to strike repeatedly without consequences. The result is a dangerous cycle: attacks occur, blame is assigned externally, and the real actors remain embedded within the communities.
There have been instances where youth leaders publicly blamed Fulani groups for atrocities even in cases where the victims themselves were Fulani. Such claims stretch logic and risk undermining credibility. The argument that a group would attack itself, rustle or poison its own livestock, and transport it into rival territory solely to assign blame raises fundamental questions.
While misinformation is a powerful tool in conflict, it cannot fully explain away patterns that are repeatedly documented by security agencies. These narratives, rather than promoting justice, deepen mistrust and inflame passions, making reconciliation more difficult.
This cycle has blurred the lines between victim and aggressor. Communities that mourn their dead today may be accused of launching attacks tomorrow. In such an environment, truth becomes contested, and justice becomes subjective. A herder is killed, reprisal follows.
Miners are attacked, revenge is planned.
Cattle are rustled, retaliation is inevitable. Each incident becomes both consequence and justification.
Intelligence gathering, the backbone of effective security operations depends heavily on local input. When communities withhold information, protect suspects, or distort facts, security agencies are left to operate in the dark.
This creates gaps that perpetrators exploit.
Blaming the government alone, without acknowledging this dynamic, presents an incomplete picture of the crisis.
Security forces have remained active, responding to distress calls, conducting patrols, and attempting to stabilize volatile areas. Yet, their presence has not been enough to stop the killings. The reality is that no amount of military deployment can fully secure a population that is unwilling to cooperate.
One of the most dangerous drivers of the conflict is impunity. For decades, perpetrators of violence in Plateau have rarely been brought to justice. Killings are recorded, condemned, and eventually forgotten until the next incident occurs.
Community, religious and youths leaders, who should serve as stabilizing forces, are increasingly unable to control armed youth groups. Such interventions are rare and often overshadowed by more powerful forces of anger and revenge. In many cases the leaders are the once directly fueling the crises and encouraging the youths to take up arms to carry out reprisals attacks.
The nature of the Plateau conflict makes it resistant to purely military solutions. This is not a conventional war with clear battle lines. It is a fragmented conflict driven by local grievances, economic competition, and historical mistrust.
Calls for heavy-handed interventions, including suggestions of foreign military involvement, fail to recognize this reality. Force alone cannot resolve a conflict that is rooted in social and communal dynamics.
If Plateau is to break free from this cycle, the first step must be honesty. The violence must be acknowledged for what it is a series of interconnected attacks involving multiple actors, not a one-sided campaign. Only then can meaningful solutions emerge.
This is not just a story of victims and aggressors. It is a story of a society caught in a loop of vengeance, where yesterday’s victim can become today’s perpetrator. Until the truth is confronted in its entirety without bias, without omission peace will remain elusive.
The government must move beyond reactive security measures and take decisive steps to address the root causes of the conflict. This includes ensuring accountability, strengthening intelligence capabilities, and facilitating genuine dialogue among communities.Equally important is the role of local leaders. They must rise above partisan interests and work actively to restrain their followers, promote peace, and reject all forms of violence regardless of who commits them.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region
Why truth, not narratives, will end the killings in Plateau’s endless cycle of bloodshed
-
News2 years agoRoger Federer’s Shock as DNA Results Reveal Myla and Charlene Are Not His Biological Children
-
Opinions4 years agoTHE PLIGHT OF FARIDA
-
News12 months agoFAILED COUP IN BURKINA FASO: HOW TRAORÉ NARROWLY ESCAPED ASSASSINATION PLOT AMID FOREIGN INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
-
News2 years agoEYN: Rev. Billi, Distortion of History, and The Living Tamarind Tree
-
Opinions4 years agoPOLICE CHARGE ROOMS, A MINTING PRESS
-
ACADEMICS2 years agoA History of Biu” (2015) and The Lingering Bura-Pabir Question (1)
-
Columns2 years agoArmy University Biu: There is certain interest, but certainly not from Borno.
-
Opinions2 years agoTinubu,Shettima: The epidemic of economic, insecurity in Nigeria
