French Govt to Support NDLEA in Training, Capacity Building, Logistics

By: Michael Mike

The French government has assured the leadership of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) of more robust support in the areas of training, capacity building and logistics to further boost the operational capability of the anti-narcotics agency in its ongoing effort to curb the scourge of substance abuse and illicit drug trafficking.

The assurance was given on Tuesday during a meeting between a French delegation led by the Director, Security and Defence Cooperation at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Lt. Gen. Regis Colcombet, and the Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Brig. Gen. Buba Marwa (Rtd) at the agency’s headquarters in Abuja.

Colcombet said the meeting with the NDLEA Chairman and his team is a follow up to bilateral agreements reached between President Emmanuel Macron of France and President Bola Tinubu of Nigeria during his recent state visit to Paris.

He recalled that he had also met Marwa in a similar meeting in France about two years ago on areas of support for the NDLEA.

He said: “It’s important for us to be here, because it’s now three months after the very successful state visit of your president to France, which has a lot of developments. We’ve been requested to come, develop, follow up and see how we can go further on the development of this cooperation. It’s very important.”

Responding to requests on areas on more support for the agency, Lt. Gen. Colcombet assured that apart from the trainings to be provided for selected NDLEA officers across commands and formations on tactical operations, slots will be given for more personnel on cyber security at the French Regional Academy in Cote d’ Voire. He added that some logistics that will aid the practicability of the trainings will also be provided to the agency.

In his remarks, Marwa expressed delight in the advancement and growth of the relationship between Nigeria and France following the good rapport between President Tinubu and President Macron.

He added that this has provided a lot of leverage for NDLEA to deepen its relationship with its counterparts in France. He appreciated the support the French government has been providing the while listing more areas of need for assistance.

He requested for more manpower development and capacity building for NDLEA personnel at the French Regional Academy in Cote d’ Voire especially in tactical operations, cyber and crypto investigation, among others.

Others on the French delegation include: Lt Col Pierre Yves Dupe; Philippe Baurreau; Colonel Oliver Ductet, and Philippe Crespo.

French Govt to Support NDLEA in Training, Capacity Building, Logistics

Inside Niger’s Intelligence Agency: Corruption, Influence Peddling, and Moral Decay at the Heart of the DGDSE

By: Our Reporter

For nearly two years, Niger’s Direction Générale de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGDSE) has been plagued by corruption, influence trafficking, and a shocking decline in ethical standards. What should be a fortress of national intelligence and security has instead become a breeding ground for bribery, favoritism, and moral misconduct.

The recent dismissal of the powerful Director of Operations, Colonel Issa Yacouba, is just the tip of the iceberg. A deeper investigation reveals a well-oiled system of financial extortion, unethical recruitment, and even sexual blackmail all unfolding under the leadership of Bala Arabe.

Colonel Issa Yacouba’s dismissal is not an isolated case. Having served in the DGDSE since the Issoufou era, he was previously removed and jailed under President Mohamed Bazoum’s administration for selling a government-seized vehicle for 11 million CFA francs.

However, following the July 26, 2023 coup led by General Abdourahmane Tiani, he was reinstated as Director of Operations only to be dismissed again, along with several other agents, including National Guard officer Oumarou Kadadé, known as “O.K.”, and an officer named Dan Jouma. Reports indicate that a third constable is also implicated.

Yet, the deeper problem extends beyond individual dismissals. Under Bala Arabe’s leadership, recruitment into the DGDSE has become a business venture, where competence and qualifications no longer matter. The real power lies with his Chief of Staff, Loukman, who operates an extensive recruitment network with the help of a man named Mounkeila Sanda, also known as “PRIM.”

During this investigation, we posed as a security officer seeking recruitment into the DGDSE. The response was chilling: Since July 26, the DGDSE belongs to us, and we do what we want. Oga’s Chief of Staff will do the needful; if you pay the price, you will be recruited!”

This blatant admission confirms the allegations that financial bribery, rather than merit, now determines who gets into the country’s top intelligence service.

Sexual Blackmail in the Intelligence Ranks

Beyond financial corruption, our investigation uncovered disturbing cases of abuse of power, including sexual blackmail. One such case took place within the Groupe d’Appui et de Reconnaissance (GAR), a specialized DGDSE unit.

A lieutenant, who is reportedly close to Bala Arabe, developed an obsession with a female officer, Roumana, a National Guard member. When she rejected his advances, he waited for an opportunity to exploit her. That opportunity came when Roumana accidentally lost her service pistol. As per protocol, she reported the incident to her superiors. Instead of following standard procedures, the lieutenant saw this as leverage and offered to cover up the incident—on the condition that she sleep with him.

When she refused, he made a false report, portraying her as negligent and unfit for service. As a result, she was dismissed from GAR and reassigned to the National Guard (GNN). To further punish her, she was abruptly transferred to Zinder, with only three days to report to her new post.

The DGDSE is supposed to be Niger’s first line of defense against external threats, terrorism, and espionage. Instead, it has been turned into a marketplace for corruption, where positions are sold to the highest bidder and officers abuse their power for personal gain.

Under the leadership of Bala Arabe, merit has been replaced by financial transactions, influence peddling, and moral decay. The implications for national security are grave—when an intelligence agency is compromised from within, the entire country becomes vulnerable.

As these revelations come to light, the people of Niger and the country’s leadership must ask themselves: can the DGDSE still be trusted to protect the nation? Or has it become one of the biggest security risks Niger faces today?

Inside Niger’s Intelligence Agency: Corruption, Influence Peddling, and Moral Decay at the Heart of the DGDSE

Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?

By: Zagazola Makama

Mali stands at a critical turning point as fresh negotiations between the Tuareg rebels of northern Mali and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) gain momentum. According to sources close to both groups, these talks represent a significant shift in strategy that could fundamentally reshape the security and political landscape of the Sahel.

For the Tuareg rebels, these negotiations are a response to Mali’s recent national consultations, which called for dialogue with jihadist groups but excluded northern armed factions from the process. Additionally, Tuareg leaders argue that grassroots communities who have been caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict are pushing for a settlement to avoid further bloodshed.

On the other hand, the rebels say they are keen to avoid the mistakes of 2012, when the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) initially seized control of northern Mali, only to be overpowered by jihadist forces, leading to a rapid escalation of violence and the subsequent 2013 French military intervention.

A Shift in JNIM’s Strategy

A key factor encouraging the Tuareg rebels to engage in talks is the shifting approach of JNIM itself. Over the years, the group has evolved in its tactics, messaging, and governance strategy. Unlike the extremist brutality displayed in 2012, JNIM has refined its policies, making it a more pragmatic and structured insurgency.

According to sources close to the Tuareg rebels, JNIM’s leadership began reassessing its position following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s ability to consolidate power while maintaining Afghanistan’s territorial integrity served as a model. Additionally, recent jihadist dynamics in Syria further influenced JNIM’s approach, leading to a reconsideration of its long-term objectives in Mali.

Statements from key JNIM figures, including Amadou Koufa, leader of Katiba Macina, and Jafar Dicko, head of JNIM operations in Burkina Faso, indicate a growing willingness to compromise. Their recent declarations have emphasized political and governance issues rather than outright military conquest.

Most notably, a recent JNIM communiqué framed the military juntas in the region as obstacles to regional stability. The statement called for international intervention against these governments, signaling that JNIM sees an opportunity to reposition itself as a legitimate actor rather than a purely insurgent force.

This convergence of interests between Tuareg rebels and JNIM has laid the groundwork for negotiations, with both sides willing to soften their positions for mutual benefit.

Key Points of Negotiation

JNIM sources have confirmed that discussions are ongoing, with a primary focus on governance and the role of Sharia law. Historically, one of the main points of contention between the two factions has been JNIM’s strict interpretation of Islamic law, which led to the breakdown of their alliance in 2012.

However, the current negotiations propose a new governance model in which Sharia law would be implemented at the local level, but administered by community-based religious authorities rather than JNIM operatives. This compromise, according to sources, has been accepted by JNIM’s leadership.

Another major shift is JNIM’s perspective on Mali’s territorial integrity. Rather than supporting the Tuareg rebels’ long-standing push for an independent Azawad, JNIM has reportedly argued that regional and international actors would be more likely to tolerate an Islamic governance structure within a unified Mali rather than outright secession.

JNIM’s ability to convince Tuareg leaders to focus on governing northern Mali rather than seeking full independence represents a major ideological shift. The jihadist group is prepared to support Tuareg fighters in taking control of key territories, but with the understanding that these areas would be governed under an Islamic framework rather than an independent Tuareg state.

A New Governance Model for Northern Mali?

Sources close to JNIM say that if the alliance moves forward, the group is ready to coordinate and administer territories alongside Tuareg rebels. However, lessons from the 2012 conflict have prompted a change in strategy.

Rather than raising the black flag of al-Qaeda over captured cities a move that led to international military intervention in the past—JNIM plans to allow Tuareg governance structures to manage administrative affairs. This means that while JNIM would retain influence, it would avoid direct control over urban areas, instead allowing local Tuareg leadership to take the forefront.

Such a strategy could serve multiple purposes: Reducing the risk of foreign military intervention by keeping governance in the hands of local Tuareg leaders, JNIM would present a less overt threat to international powers. Legitimizing its role in Mali’s political landscape rather than being seen purely as an extremist group, JNIM could position itself as a political and security partner in the region. Avoiding the mistakes of 2012 The rapid downfall of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 was largely due to its inability to maintain control. By working together with the rebels rather than sidelining them, JNIM aims to ensure a more sustainable presence.

The Question of Al-Qaeda Affiliation

One of the most sensitive aspects of the negotiations revolves around JNIM’s relationship with al-Qaeda’s central command. According to sources, there is ongoing internal debate about whether the group should formally distance itself from al-Qaeda.

For JNIM leaders, the question is not just ideological but also strategic. Some within the group believe that dissociating from al-Qaeda could open doors to direct negotiations with Western governments. Others argue that such a move would require religious justification, possibly linked to a major political development such as the formal independence of Azawad or the collapse of the Malian government in Bamako.

Interestingly, sources indicate that JNIM is more willing to negotiate its future with Western powers directly rather than through Tuareg intermediaries. The concern within JNIM is that Tuareg leaders could use any potential al-Qaeda split as leverage in their own diplomatic engagements with France and other international actors.

Conclusion: A Game-Changer for Mali?

If these negotiations result in a formal agreement, the implications for Mali and the wider Sahel could be profound. A coordinated Tuareg-JNIM alliance would not only reshape local power dynamics but could also alter the trajectory of jihadist movements across West Africa.

The shift in JNIM’s strategy from ideological extremism to pragmatic governance signals a broader recalibration of jihadist operations in the region. Whether this shift leads to long-term stability or another round of conflict remains to be seen.

What is clear, however, is that Mali’s security landscape is on the brink of another transformation one that could redefine the balance of power in the Sahel for years to come.

Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region

Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?