Features/Analysis
INCREASED RIVALRY BETWEEN AL-QAEDA/ISIS AFFILIATED GROUPS WITHIN THE SAHEL
INCREASED RIVALRY BETWEEN AL-QAEDA/ISIS AFFILIATED GROUPS WITHIN THE SAHEL
By: Zagazola Makama
From 20 Oct – 02 Nov 22, trends of terrorist attacks covering the republics of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger worsened unprecedentedly.
The region faces rapid escalation of violent attacks against civilian and military targets resulting in large-scale of humanitarian consequences.
On 24 Oct 22, reports indicated that al-QAEDA-affiliated group, Jama’at Nasirl Nusrat al-Islam Muslimeen (JNIM) unleashed a massive attack on BURKINABE troops base at DJIBO, BURKINA FASO and carted away large cache of weapons.
Intelligence Sources told Zagazola Makama, a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region that the JNIM fighters have taken control of major towns along the BURKINA FASO- NIGER border, especially SOLENZO.

Zagazola Understand that the emboldened JNIM group carried out the attacks on ISIS-affiliated group, IS SAHEL, possibly to sustain dominance within the region.
Between 28 – 29 Oct 22, JNIM and IS SAHEL attacks took place at AGAZRAGANE, TAMALAT, CHINNANA and MENAKA in BURKINA FASO and MALI, respectfully were several casualties were recorded.
IYAD AG GHALI, the JNIM leader is said to have lost his son in one of battles at MENAKA. Indications are heavy fighting between both groups ensued that could spread to other parts of the SAHEL.

Equally, both groups have intensified media propaganda stunts to outwit one another over control of the SAHEL REGION. JNIM has used al-ZALLAQA, a subsidiary MINBAR al-TAWHID, as part of the rehabilitated media wing infrastructure to make remarks.
On 1 Nov 22, SITREP indicated the media covering the northern regions circulated locally-gathered footages on the attack on DJIBO military base and other narratives, claiming victories. JNIM also claims to have killed many IS SAHEL fighters.
In reply, on 2 Nov 22, the IS SAHEL branch released images of its battle with JNIM fighters in AGAZRAGEN, MALI, indicating that its allied militia were massacred. Both groups have intensified both physical and psychological warfare within the SAHEL.

Attacks within the SAHEL remains interrelated with no coincidences attached. Premised on several possibilities, ISIS core and al-QAEDA/AQIM rival have drawn the battle line against each other, intent on establishing superiority over the SAHEL with their seperate radical ideologies.
Also, noted is that directives to affiliated groups have been specifically coded through media propaganda outreaches to intensify attacks against rival groups, Govt and Govt forces.
Noteworthy is that both international terrorist groups take advantage of the deteriorating situations in the AFRICAN continent to further discredit Govt authorities.

This has also exacerbated coups and countercoups in mostly FRANCOPHONE countries within the region.
Autonomous intent to have immense coverage of the SAHEL are tilting towards a probable selection of leadership within the SAHEL and new battle ground in WEST AFRICA to launch terrorists campaigns across the globe.
Both terrorist organisations have not clearly announced new leadership but operates via the SHURA. For instance, Al-QAEDA is yet to declare a new leader after the demise AYMAN al-ZAWAHIRI, while ISIS leader ABU HASSAN al-QURASHI was allegedly apprehended in INSTABUL.

Both leaders are said to have desires to make their individual terrorist organisations operate headquarters in the SAHEL. Hence, an unstable intent to sustain the agenda by their subordinates.
The militant jihadist groups in the region are already pursuing expansion into the Golf of Guinea, with a focus on Cote d’Ivoire and Benin.
READ ALSO: https://dailypost.ng/2022/11/02/demand-accountability-improved-healthcare-from-your-leaders-group-tells-borno-community/
A France’s tip spy Chief, Bernard Emié, head of the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), recently revealed an intelligence report, purportedly showing a meeting between top al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb commanders.
Bernard said that Fighters have also been sent to the borders of Nigeria, Niger and Chad, where groups linked to the hardline Islamist sect Boko Haram operate.
SUPREMACY FIGHT BETWEEN BOKO HARAM AND ISWAP
In NIGERIA, the JAS and ISWAP have also replicated same, nullifying possibilities of a merger.
In what appeared to be a continuation of their sustained inter-rivalry feuds, the fighters of the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) and the Jamā’at Ahlil Sunnah lid-Da’wah wal-Jihād, Boko Haram groups had carried out many attacks that caused the groups huge casualty and losses of war assets in Gajibo in Dikwa, Banki, Gaizuwa, Mantari, Gabchari, Tumbuns and Maimusari in the North East of Bama.
From 25 Oct 22 till date, attacks between both rival groups have intensified. A JAS video released on 1 Nov 22 is instructive!, showcasing battle with ISWAP counterparts.

These worsening of inter-rivalry clashes between jihadist groups may lead them to irreversible self-destruction as the revolting ISWAP had vowed to battle more with members of its former main body than even with the Nigerian troops.
Al-QAEDA has accepted pledge of allegiance by ANSARU who is currently in careful partnership with JAS
Jamā’at Ahlil Sunnah lid-Da’wah wal-Jihād(JAS) had currently decentralised leadership attempt to prove its worth and could have obtained new weapons with the recent show of prowess against ISWAP dominance.
On Oct. 25 2022, The Boko Haram terrorists Conveyed hundreds of fighters in 18 gun trucks and motorcycles from Gargashe, Bula Ggufdoye, Ngori, kote, Tangalanga, kulo gomna, Bulamarwaye, Garje, Wuta and Mordo to carry out a deadly attack in Cameroon where they carted away dozens of arms and ammunition including five Anti Aircraft Guns.
This is albeit intelligence reports on planned impending attacks to be carried out on troops locations for weapons at, BANKI, DAMBOA, MALLAM FATORI and MONGUNO as well as MNJTF locations in CHETTIMARI, BOSSO and NGUIGUIMI in NIGER.
The group also recently claimed attack on troops in REPUBLIC of CHAD showcasing weapons on their local media wing (pictures attached).
ISIS/ISWAPs strong ideological base is backed by finances leading to a constant recruitment cycle. In disparity, ANSARU/JAS intends to revive the group from surrendered ex-BHT members and freeing others incarcerated in several detention centers within the Country. Please note this dose not contradict ISIS directives but rather a counter against al-QAEDA so as to champion freedom of incarcerated inmates.
The rivalry attacks between ISIS and al-QAEDA affiliated groups could spread to other areas. Consequences expected include spread of weapons, mercenaries and other support base to partners in other countries.
Refugee situation has already worsened with the population in affected areas fleeing to seek solace in other countries. This could heighten epidemic diseases and other health issues.
Economically, there could also be immense shortages of food and and other supplies emanating from the instability with attacks on farmers and abandoned large farmlands witnessed within the SAHEL.
Already, terrorist organisations seek to discredit existing authorities by establishing parallel rule over the populace. Regional stability is further worsened orchestrated by recent terrorist attacks, which have been on the increase.

Rather unnoticed the world view is currently tilted towards the RUSSIA/UKRAINE War and its attendant consequences. As such, with global attention of individual States diverted, international terrorist organisations like ISIS and al-QAEDA have taken advantage of this void to wreak havoc since such groups have no stake attached.
It is imperative for AFRICAN States to uphold regional stability by strengthening security apparatuses put in place to checkmate these trends.
In these views, MNJTF and G5 SAHEL should be robust to counter affiliated terrorist cells in REPUBLICS of BENIN, MALI, BURKINA FASO, NIGER, CHAD, CAMEROON and NIGERIA.
Synergy with outfits, particularly INTERPOL, is necessary to truncate existence of funding terrorist cells in MAURITANIA and MAHGREB as a whole. It is imperative that ONSA brings this to light in executive conferences in AU and ECOWAS summits with a view to enhancing modalities against the spate of terrorism in WEST AFRICA and AFRICA as a whole.
INCREASED RIVALRY BETWEEN AL-QAEDA/ISIS AFFILIATED GROUPS WITHIN THE SAHEL
Features/Analysis
Caught Between Terrorists and the State: How Insider Mediators Face the Greatest Risks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
Caught Between Terrorists and the State: How Insider Mediators Face the Greatest Risks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
By: Hon Aliyu Gebi
In every conflict, there are soldiers who fight, governments that formulate policy, and humanitarian agencies that provide relief. Yet hidden between these visible actors exists another category of individuals whose contribution is rarely acknowledged but whose absence could make many humanitarian breakthroughs impossible. They are the insider mediators.
Across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, where insurgencies by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to challenge state authority, these mediators quietly occupy one of the most dangerous positions in modern conflict.
Unlike diplomats protected by embassies or international organisations operating under diplomatic privileges, insider mediators are ordinary members of the communities engulfed by violence. They include respected Islamic scholars, traditional rulers, village elders, women leaders, businessmen and community influencers whose greatest qualification is not political office but trust.
It is that trust that allows them to speak to men carrying assault rifles in the forests while retaining enough credibility for governments and security agencies to listen. Yet it is the same trust that places them permanently between fire and ice.
Officially, most governments in the Sahel reject negotiations with designated terrorist organisations. Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all adopted counter-terrorism policies centred on military pressure, intelligence operations and criminal prosecution.
Publicly, there is little room for political dialogue with organisations responsible for mass killings, kidnappings and attacks on civilians. Yet conflict realities are rarely as absolute as official policy suggests. When humanitarian workers require safe passage into besieged communities. When hundreds of women and children are trapped in insurgent-controlled territory. When local ceasefires become necessary to allow farmers cultivate their land.
When abducted civilians require negotiation before release. Formal diplomacy often gives way to quiet engagement. That engagement is rarely conducted by ambassadors. Instead, governments frequently rely directly or indirectly on trusted intermediaries capable of reaching actors that official representatives cannot approach. These mediators become the invisible bridge connecting two parties who publicly deny any relationship.
Why outsiders often fail
It was argued that foreign diplomats and international organisations rarely possess the cultural legitimacy required to engage violent extremist groups operating in deeply localised environments. For groups such as JNIM or Boko Haram, international actors are frequently viewed through ideological lenses.
Western governments may be seen as enemies.
United Nations personnel may be viewed as extensions of foreign influence. International NGOs may become intelligence suspects or lucrative kidnapping targets. Local mediators enter the same environment with entirely different credentials. Many speak the same dialect. Some belong to the same ethnic group.
Others share religious traditions or ancestral relationships with insurgent commanders.
In central Mali, traditional Fulani values such as Pulaaku often provide a social framework through which dialogue becomes possible. In the Lake Chad Basin, respected Islamic scholars frequently possess a deeper understanding of the ideological and theological arguments influencing Boko Haram factions than external negotiators. More importantly, insider mediators understand local grievances. They know which disputes are ideological. Which is economic.
Which stem from historical land conflicts. Which fighters joined voluntarily. Which joined because of poverty, coercion or revenge. Such nuanced understanding is often beyond the reach of external actors.
Unlike foreign mediators who return to secure compounds after negotiations, insider mediators remain inside the conflict. Their homes remain exposed. Their families remain exposed.
Every of their secrete remain exposed. Every negotiation they undertake carries consequences that follow them back into their villages. One Negotiator who undertook series of engagement with some Nigerian non state actors to secure the release of captured victims, said they came under ambush more than five times in separate encounter. In one instance, a gun was pointed at his head.
If negotiations collapse. It is not an embassy that is attacked. It is often the negotiators, their own home. If insurgents suspect betrayal. Their wives and children or any of their relatives may become legitimate targets. If security agencies question their motives. They themselves risk detention or prolonged investigation. Few occupations carry such immediate personal consequences.
Perhaps the greatest burden insider mediators carry is that neither side fully trusts them. Security agencies frequently question why a civilian should maintain contact with terrorists.
Some mediators have reportedly faced accusations of collaboration simply because they delivered humanitarian messages or attempted to negotiate community access. From the insurgents’ perspective, however, the suspicion is equally intense. A mediator carrying government proposals may easily be branded an intelligence asset or a mile. If military operations occur shortly after meetings, insurgents may assume information was leaked. The consequences can be fatal.
This creates “double suspicion” a condition in which mediators are simultaneously viewed as potential traitors by both the state and the armed groups they seek to engage.
The legal grey zone
Another challenge identified by the report lies in counter-terrorism legislation. International sanctions and domestic anti-terrorism laws understandably prohibit providing material support to designated terrorist organisations.
However, conflict mediation often operates in ambiguous spaces. Suppose a mediator delivers medicine to secure the release of kidnapped civilians. Or transports communication equipment required to arrange humanitarian access. Or facilitates financial arrangements connected to hostage negotiations. Do such actions constitute humanitarian engagement? Or do they amount to material support under anti-terrorism laws? The report argues that many insider mediators now operate without clear legal protections despite performing functions that governments quietly acknowledge are sometimes necessary. The absence of legal clarity increases both operational and personal risk.
Lessons from JNIM
The report draws heavily from developments in Mali and Burkina Faso. In several communities, local mediators successfully negotiated temporary arrangements allowing farmers to cultivate their fields under agreed conditions.
Some agreements reduced attacks. Others facilitated humanitarian access. Yet these agreements often proved fragile. Military offensives sometimes resumed without warning.
Insurgent commanders interpreted such developments as betrayal. The mediator rather than the state often bore the consequences.
Even more challenging has been the inconsistency of government policy.
During one administration, dialogue may receive quiet encouragement. A subsequent administration may criminalise similar contacts.
Several mediators reportedly found themselves under investigation for activities previously tolerated.
Lessons from Boko Haram: Two Different Negotiation Landscapes
The report notes that mediation efforts in Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin are further complicated by the internal fragmentation of Boko Haram. Although often viewed as a single insurgent movement, Boko Haram today comprises two principal factions with markedly different organisational structures and negotiation dynamics: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
JAS presents perhaps the most perilous environment for insider mediators. Unlike more structured insurgent organisations, JAS has historically operated through highly decentralised command structures, where individual field commanders exercise considerable autonomy. This lack of central authority often makes negotiations unpredictable, with agreements depending largely on the disposition of local commanders rather than institutional policy. For mediators attempting to secure the release of abducted civilians or establish safe exit routes for fighters seeking to surrender, every mission carries extraordinary personal risk.
Many are required to travel into remote forest enclaves controlled by commanders whose interpretation of Islamic law, tribal customs and military discipline varies widely. Traditional norms that ordinarily protect emissaries or peace envoys are frequently ignored, leaving mediators vulnerable to detention, execution or prolonged captivity if they are suspected of deception or espionage. The report argues that engaging JAS is therefore less a process of structured negotiation than an exercise in navigating constantly shifting personal relationships, ideological rigidity and battlefield uncertainty.
Engaging ISWAP: Structure Without Flexibility
Negotiating with ISWAP presents a different, though equally demanding, set of challenges.
Unlike JAS, ISWAP maintains a comparatively organised governance system overseen by a Shura Council, with clearer chains of command and administrative procedures. This institutional framework can provide mediators with more predictable points of engagement and a greater likelihood that agreements reached with senior figures will be respected across the organisation.
The group’s strict ideological doctrine therefore leaves very limited room for compromise, and mediators often face intense pressure to produce humanitarian outcomes without violating either the insurgents’ religious expectations or the legal and ethical obligations imposed by the state. This delicate balancing act requires exceptional credibility, deep religious understanding and an ability to maintain the confidence of both sides while making no promises that cannot be fulfilled.
The Quiet Architects of Mass Defections
Despite operating under these extraordinary pressures, insider mediators played a pivotal role during one of the most significant developments in Nigeria’s counter-insurgency campaign. Following the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, tens of thousands of fighters, women and children began surrendering to Nigerian authorities.
While military pressure created the conditions for this unprecedented wave of defections, the report argues that it was trusted local intermediaries who transformed opportunity into reality. Many insurgents seeking to abandon the conflict distrusted formal government institutions and feared immediate execution or imprisonment. Insider mediators became the first point of contact.
They reassured frightened fighters that surrender pathways existed, explained rehabilitation programmes, communicated with military authorities and community leaders, and helped facilitate safe movement from insurgent-controlled territories to designated reception centres. Without these trusted intermediaries, the report suggests, many potential defectors might never have taken the first step toward disengagement. In this sense, insider mediators became the human bridge between years of violent insurgency and emerging opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Protecting the Bridge-Builders
The report concludes that if governments across West Africa hope to move beyond perpetual military confrontation toward sustainable peace, they must provide greater institutional support for insider mediators.
Foremost among its recommendations is the establishment of clear legal frameworks that recognise verified mediators operating for humanitarian purposes. Such protections, the author argue, would reduce the risk of arbitrary arrest or prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation while preserving accountability.
The study also calls on regional organisations and international peacebuilding partners to establish dedicated duty-of-care mechanisms, including emergency security assistance, psychosocial support and evacuation arrangements for mediators facing credible threats. Given the psychological burden associated with prolonged engagement in conflict environments, the report argues that mental health support should become an integral component of mediation programmes rather than an afterthought.
The report ultimately presents insider mediators as one of the least visible yet most indispensable pillars of conflict resolution in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. They receive little public recognition, enjoy few institutional protections and often operate without formal legal safeguards. Yet they continue to facilitate hostage releases, humanitarian access, civilian evacuations, local ceasefires and pathways for surrender in places where official diplomacy cannot reach. Their work demonstrates that while military operations remain essential in degrading terrorist capabilities, lasting peace is seldom achieved through force alone. It also depends on trusted local relationships, cultural legitimacy and the courage of individuals willing to engage where others cannot.
As governments refine their counter-insurgency strategies across the region, the report argues that protecting these “bridge-builders” is not merely a humanitarian obligation but a strategic necessity. Without them, opportunities for dialogue, disengagement and civilian protection may diminish, leaving military victories without the social foundations needed to secure enduring peace.
Caught Between Terrorists and the State: How Insider Mediators Face the Greatest Risks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
Features/Analysis
My Binoculars: What has Remi Tinubu got to do with Akara, Kulikuli, Boli, Dodo and Ekpa
My Binoculars: What has Remi Tinubu got to do with Akara, Kulikuli, Boli, Dodo and Ekpa
By: Bodunrin Kayode
There are three types of community enterprises that can never fail in Nigeria if residents know how to utilize them for life. Theses are food vending, washing of clothes and hair cutting businesses. These have stood the tests of time over the years because of its relevance in the daily lives of residents in the country. Services rendered around these local enterprises have generated a lot of resources in the non real sector making it a shining avenue for tax hunters to begin to look around to generate revenue. Nobody does food business like “Akara” production in Nigeria and regrets regardless of his or her source of fuel to produce the food stuffs in question.
It is with this background that I don’t see anything offensive in the suggestion of the first lady of Nigeria Senator Remi Tinubu urging young idle people to take Akara production which is a very common food stuff to the next level. Akara frying has always hidden in the non real sector of the economy but it can be taken to the next level for even export if food scientists can research further on how to expand its lifespan without too much preservatives.
For as long as there is life in the body of a young person, he or she can never become a liability to his family, if he takes to food business early in life. And when I talk of Nigerian food I am talking about varieties which includes heavy African cuisine like “foofoo” or light snacks such as “Akara” which can be found in any corner of West Africa and even Nigeria. Akara is made from African beans which makes it the cream of all snacks in the region because of its high protein contents.
In my opinion akara has always been a life saving snack delicacy which started from South West Nigeria and has now spread to all the crannies of the country. It is both a physical and a spiritual food in most parts of the country that modern genzee’s have turned it into several flavors inserting all manner of spices into the processed beans to bring about exciting results. Some people wrongly contextualize it as a cake but I don’t think it qualifies to be a cake other than the light snack it has been since the beginning of time. Akara is fried and not baked like cakes. It is also an African delicacy as such we don’t need to give it a foreign label. It will always remain our light snack. Mark you Akara business is a very honorable business like any other snack enjoyed by both the genzee’s and the rest of us. It has existed long before Remi Tinubu was born and will outlive her if Jesus doesn’t return before the end of contemporary times.
I have watched the online space sadly as a lot of confused genzees make uninformed derogatory comments about Akara business as if it is beneath them. They make it look as if Akara production cannot be taken to the next level by transforming it from a petty trading business to a small scale business. And when it becomes a small scale business, it can be used to feed hundreds of people in form of breakfast in a food bank. Madam Tinubu obviously knows what she is doing as a home management strategist. This is because Akara business will become a major support in her national community food bank program meant to feed the poorest of the poor. This is a program meant to combat child malnutrition and food insecurity in Nigeria. Akara also called kosai in some parts of the north of Nigeria targets vulnerable households, children under six years and pregnant women to at least have a semi balanced diet in the country every morning. With Akara of five hundred naira and corn “pap”, hundreds of families that go hungry in the morning utilizing the 011 system will now have breakfast of less than 1000 naira daily per child. So why look down on such a wonderful delicacy when it can bring money into the hands of many young girls who believe in using what they have to get what they want in the name of “runs” or organized office prostitution for the highest bidder.
But out of experience in living in this world, I know that there is nothing wrong with that kind of enterprise because a lot of people were raised in their homes by food vendors and they are proud to say it anywhere they go that it was due to the Akara, aadun or dundun snack their mum sold that made them to acquire Western education today. Hundreds are standing on their two legs today because they took Akara or even Boli and cooked beans to the next level. There is nothing demeaning in her suggestions that even the jobless can take to cooking. Afterwards Hilda Baci who has a world record in cooking did not make it big in just a day. She started at a very low level and proceeded to the level she found herself now. People now consult her to cook for them as a consultant.
Young people can always make it big from starting Akara business in a small way. And this to me is why the recent suggestion that the poorest of the poor should resolve to mini income generating ventures like Akara production is never an absurd suggestion. Only sick minds will find something wrong in this by my opinion.
My Binoculars: What has Remi Tinubu got to do with Akara, Kulikuli, Boli, Dodo and Ekpa
Features/Analysis
Kashim Shettima: The Imperative of Agricultural Revitalization and the Case for the Niger Delta’s Agrarian Future
Kashim Shettima: The Imperative of Agricultural Revitalization and the Case for the Niger Delta’s Agrarian Future
By: Dr. James Bwala
The Vice President of Nigeria, Kashim Shettima, has declared open the Niger Delta Agricultural Development and Investment Summit, co-convened by his office and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This event marks a decisive step toward rekindling the agricultural heritage of the Niger Delta, anchored by the launch of the $500 million Niger Delta Agricultural Investment Fund.
Kashim Shettima’s eloquent remarks as they reverberated through the crowd pointed out that while nations rely on a variety of resources, their endurance hinges on their capacity to feed themselves. His assertion that agriculture serves as both the foundation of civilization and the foremost guarantor of political stability forms a compelling argument for an urgent and strategic investment in this sector.

The call for agricultural revitalization in the Niger Delta, emphasizing its critical role in national stability, economic diversification, and sustainable development, speaks volumes of the impact of the Tinubu and Kashim Shettima administrations in this sector. The VP’s message can better be appreciated through the lens of history and economic identity. Prior to the discovery of oil, Nigeria’s economy was fundamentally agrarian. The fertile soils of regions like the Niger Delta were the backbone of local livelihoods and a vital source of revenue. Agriculture provided employment for the majority and supplied food both for domestic consumption and export. Yet, decades of oil dominance have shifted national focus and investment away from agriculture to the detriment of the sector and overall economic resilience.
This shift has had profound consequences. Dependency on oil exports has rendered Nigeria vulnerable to volatile global oil prices and external shocks, leading to economic instability. Adding to this is the neglect of agriculture. This has exacerbated rural poverty, especially in the Niger Delta regions, where environmental degradation and limited economic diversification have compounded socio-economic challenges. The vice president’s emphasis on reinvigorating agriculture is therefore not only a nod to history but also an urgent strategy to reclaim sustainability and inclusive prosperity.

One of the most persuasive points made by Vice President Shettima is the intrinsic link between agriculture and political stability. Agriculture provides food security, which is foundational to societal peace. When a nation struggles to feed its population, social unrest, economic disparity, and political volatility often follow. In contrast, countries that maintain a robust agricultural base tend to enjoy greater internal peace and cohesion because their citizens’ basic needs Countries with a strong agricultural base tend to experience greater internal peace and cohesion, as they meet their citizens’ basic needs..
In the context of the Niger Delta, a region that has experienced significant unrest and militancy largely due to economic marginalization and environmental degradation, leveraging agriculture can act as a transformative stabilizing force. By creating jobs, improving incomes, and enhancing food self-sufficiency, agricultural development can reduce desperation and conflict drivers. It offers a tangible pathway for empowerment and reconciliation, fostering a positive cycle of peace and progress.

Shettima pointed out that Nigeria’s over-reliance on oil is widely recognized as a central challenge to long-term economic sustainability. The global energy transition and fluctuating oil markets make diversification imperative. Agriculture, with its extensive value chains spanning production, processing, marketing, and export, presents a promising avenue for economic diversification.
The $500 million Niger Delta Agricultural Investment Fund represents a bold commitment to capitalize on the region’s natural endowments. Strategic investment in modern farming techniques, infrastructure, agribusiness, and market access will unlock vast opportunities. It will stimulate rural economies, expand the industrial base, and create resilience against external shocks. Moreover, integrating agriculture with technology and innovation can position Nigeria as a competitive player in global agricultural markets.

The Niger Delta has suffered ecological harm from decades of oil exploration, including pollution and land degradation. These environmental issues have compromised agricultural productivity and public health. Consequently, a renewed agricultural focus must also embrace environmental restoration and climate adaptation strategies.
Investing in sustainable farming methods, soil rehabilitation, and water management will restore the land’s fertility and mitigate adverse environmental impacts. Furthermore, agriculture can play a vital role in climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. Thus, the agricultural revitalization agenda aligns with Nigeria’s broader commitments to environmental stewardship and sustainable development goals.
For the vision articulated by Vice President Shettima to materialize, coordinated action and steadfast commitment from all stakeholders are indispensable. The government must provide enabling policies, facilitate access to finance, improve rural infrastructure, and support farmer education and research. Equally, private sector participation and community engagement will be critical in ensuring the fund translates into meaningful ground-level outcomes.

Public-private partnerships can accelerate technology transfer and market integration, while local communities’ involvement ensures culturally sensitive and inclusive development practices. Transparency and accountability in fund management will safeguard the initiative’s efficacy and public trust.
The Niger Delta Agricultural Development and Investment Summit, and the historic launch of the $500 million Agricultural Investment Fund, represent a moment in Nigeria’s quest for sustainable development. Vice President Kashim Shettima’s insightful declaration highlights the unassailable importance of agriculture as the bedrock of civilization, political stability, and economic resilience. For a nation whose foundations were rooted in agrarian prosperity before oil, the time to rekindle that legacy is now.
The Niger Delta, endowed with rich soils and a hardworking populace, can lead Nigeria’s agricultural renaissance. Through deliberate investment, environmental restoration, and strategic partnerships, the region can emerge stronger, more stable, and more prosperous. Embracing agriculture not as a fallback but as a frontline driver of national progress is not merely an option—it is an imperative for the enduring well-being of Nigeria and its people. The Niger Delta Agricultural Development and Investment Summit symbolizes hope and determination, signaling that Nigeria will no longer take its agricultural promise for granted but will harness it fully to feed its future.
James Bwala, PhD, writes from Abuja.
Kashim Shettima: The Imperative of Agricultural Revitalization and the Case for the Niger Delta’s Agrarian Future
-
News2 years agoRoger Federer’s Shock as DNA Results Reveal Myla and Charlene Are Not His Biological Children
-
Opinions4 years agoTHE PLIGHT OF FARIDA
-
News1 year agoFAILED COUP IN BURKINA FASO: HOW TRAORÉ NARROWLY ESCAPED ASSASSINATION PLOT AMID FOREIGN INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
-
News2 years agoEYN: Rev. Billi, Distortion of History, and The Living Tamarind Tree
-
Opinions5 years agoPOLICE CHARGE ROOMS, A MINTING PRESS
-
ACADEMICS2 years agoA History of Biu” (2015) and The Lingering Bura-Pabir Question (1)
-
Columns2 years agoArmy University Biu: There is certain interest, but certainly not from Borno.
-
Politics1 year ago2027: Why Hon. Midala Balami Must Go, as Youths in Hawul and Asikira/Uba Federal Constituency Reject ₦500,000 as Sallah Gift
