OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor

OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor

By: Zagazola Makama

The Jan. 29 attack on Niger’s Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey has exposed a dangerous evolution in jihadist cooperation across West Africa: a tightening operational axis between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin and Islamic State affiliates operating across the Sahel.

Beyond the symbolism of striking a capital-city airport, intelligence indicators point to something more consequential, the emergence of a transnational fighting concept that seeks to fuse manpower, logistics and media operations from Lake Chad through Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.

For years, ISWAP’s Lake Chad network and Sahel-based Islamic State factions operated on largely parallel tracks. That boundary is now blurring. Recent intelligence indicates ISWAP elements are travelling westward from the Lake Chad Basin into Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions, while Sahelian militants rotate into Borno and neighboring areas for logistics, training and media coordination.

The signature of this cooperation was first visible in northeastern Nigeria in early 2025, when ISIS released a video showing some foreign fighters training ISWAP fighters in the Lake Chad shores of Marte and Kukawa. In 12 Aug 25, about 200 ISWAP elements, including ISIS affiliated members from BURKINA, MALI, NIGER, CAR and MOZAMBIQUE were sighted near Lake Chad.

To consolidate their cooperations 8 foreign fighters (5 light skinned ARABS, and 3 non-ARAB dark skinned foreigners) infiltrated the LCRBA some months ago. Another top ABU YASIR, an ARAB, later arrived. The foreign fighters are said to have infiltrated unnoticed into the North East to gain access to ISWAP Camps via ungoverned borders of DIFFA (NIGER Republic) into the LCRBA. In November, about 63 foreign fighters arrived the Lake Chad through Kusuri in Cameroon with armed drones.

According to the arrangement, these ISIS-linked ARABs are to be in full control of coordinating major operations like specifying targets, timings for attacks, training on new tactics using armed drones and overseeing conduct of attacks.

Since then, ISWAP had launched a series of attacks involving rudimentary drones, a capability believed to have been supported by technical expertise from Sahel-based ISIS affiliates. Separate intelligence streams also point to the movement of non-African Islamic State fighters into the Lake Chad theatre, particularly around Monguno, Kukawa and the Timbuktu Triangle.

Footage released by Amaq on Jan. 2, showing militants infiltrating Niamey, burning a Bayraktar TB2 drone in a hangar and damaging other air platforms, suggests a coordinated, multi-cell operation. Notably, the cameraman’s use of Kanuri dialect dominant in ISWAP’s Lake Chad heartland, implies ISWAP’s hand in logistics, operational security and media. Most fighters appear to have been Nigerien, but ISWAP’s role in enabling and packaging the attack points to command-and-control integration.

Assailants reportedly entered through Niamey 2000 a critical access node evading layered security and nearby community watch structures. This indicates pre-attack reconnaissance and possible sleeper support.

At least five attackers were neutralised at the scene, while others escaped northwards through the Tiloa area. On the side of Niger’s forces, casualties were heavy. Security sources say 27 personnel were killed, 24 Nigerien soldiers and three African Corps members while 18 others were wounded and evacuated to the Military Garrison and the Referral Hospital in Niamey. Several drones and about five aircraft were destroyed in the attack.

Nigerien authorities initially claimed higher terrorist losses, but sources say the damage appears to have fallen more heavily on government forces and infrastructure. This points to a coordinated, multi-cell operation with ISWAP providing command-and-control functions. It’s no longer just ideological alignment, it’s operational integration.

The attack lands amid a widening rift between the Alliance of Sahel States (AES Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso) and ECOWAS. Niamey’s leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tiani, publicly accused Côte d’Ivoire’s Alassane Ouattara, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Benin’s Patrice Talon of sponsoring the attack charges those governments deny. Abidjan’s summoning of Niger’s ambassador illustrates the rapid diplomatic deterioration.

The raid has brought to the fore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in Sahelian capitals. The fact that militants could strike an international airport in the heart of Niamey and degrade aviation assets is deeply worrying. Airports are economic lifelines. Attacks like this ripple through tourism, trade, investor confidence and humanitarian logistics.

Given the Islamic State network’s history of targeting high-profile facilities, other airports, military airstrips and energy installations across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin could be next.

Diplomatic cold war has continued to result in security consequences as counter-terrorism coordination is eroding in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, regional polarisation is deepening while Jihadist narratives are gaining traction. Mutual suspicion between Niger Republic and other countries had reduced intelligence sharing and cross-border security cooperations which is exactly what a mobile jihadist alliance is exploiting. Niger’s pivot toward Russia, and the growing role of the African Corps, also complicate unified regional responses. Accusations of foreign interference feed recruitment and justify attacks on “collaborators.”

Against this backdrop, Washington’s decision to send a senior official to Mali to “reset ties” is telling the U.S. is recalibrating from heavy security conditionality toward pragmatic engagement that emphasises sovereignty, economic development and stability.

Mali has increasingly been viewed as the “COG” (centre of gravity) of the AES. Access to Bamako, therefore, is seen as a gateway to broader engagement with the bloc and a means to counter expanding Russian and China influence while safeguarding interests in critical minerals. Whether this reset can translate into improved regional security cooperation remains uncertain, especially as AES states bristle at Western pressure and ECOWAS sanctions.

For Nigeria, It is clear that the Lake Chad Basin is no longer just a local insurgency theatre; it is becoming a launchpad for Sahel-wide operations. If ISWAP fighters can move westward to Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions and Sahelian militants can cycle into Borno for training, logistics and media, then the basin risks becoming the connective tissue of a transnational Islamic State corridor. Nigeria and its Lake Chad partners needs a renewed joint tasking framework that anticipates mixed cells, foreign fighter inflows and media-enabled operations.

For the region, (NIGERIA) the choice is urgent, rebuild cooperative security despite political rifts with NIGER or allow insurgents to exploit the fractures. The cost of delay will be paid across capitals, at airports, bases, regional hubs and cities across West Africa.

Cross-border intelligence must be rebuilt, not just within ECOWAS but with pragmatic channels to AES states. Form a fushion of Information cell with representatives of all controls for prompt intelligence sharing on terrorists activities. Ideological divides should not trump the common threat. If left unchecked, this alliance could stitch together the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel into a single battle-space, multiplying the reach, resilience and propaganda power of jihadist networks.

Zagazola is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region.

OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor