The challenges with IEDs at the “Hadin Kai” theater will soon be history – Former TC General Ali

The challenges with IEDs at the “Hadin Kai” theater will soon be history – Former TC General Ali

Before becoming the 10th Commander of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in Chad, General Ibrahim Ali was the last theater commander (TC) of Operation Hadin Kai in North-East Nigeria. He succeeded in getting three Chibok girls and their children out of the Sambisa and vowed to get Lear Sharibu anywhere credible intelligence could locate her. He spoke with Bodunrin Kayode just before proceeding to his present command in N’djamena. Excerpt:

Q: General, before I proceed to matters of this war theater, I would like you to compare and contrast your last command with “Hadin Kai,” which you are about to leave after only 6 months.

The level of threat in the Jos. 3 Division area is quite different from the one in the North East Theatre Command. We know that the threats in the theater Command are more. This is because in the 3 division area, the threats are more like intercommunal clashes—you know, farmers and herders crises, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and things like that—but here in the Northeast, it is insurgency and terrorism. Which is higher in terms of mortality than those ones. So it was not easy, but I came with the experience I had from Jos, and before getting to Jos, I had been to the Northeast five times, and this will be my sixth time coming here. So I came with all those experiences I had earlier, and it really helped me. I had a fair knowledge of the modus operandi of the insurgents and the terrorists, and I was able to counter them. And this time around, we had better equipment to confront the insurgents than we used to have when I came earlier in the five times I mentioned. So, with the additional and improved equipment level and other platforms, we were able to degrade them to a very appreciable level.

Q: Is it true that the rule of engagement in the 3D theater was that soldiers were not allowed to take out anybody, even if the bandit was the aggressor messing around with ancestral lands and you were seeing him live?

A: No! No! That is not true. Because I remember the former President, commander in Chief, shortly after I went to Jos, especially the early period of my stay there. There was a directive from the Presidency in which the President said that “any person seen with an AK-47 rifle should be taken out. I remember that vividly, and it trickled down the Chain of Command and came to us. Which was equally sent to all my troops. Any person carrying an AK-47 rifle and attacking another community will be taken out. This is because he is an aggressor. And I can tell you, if you check the record, that there were a couple of militants that we took out, in Plateau and in Sabon Kaduna. I lost, during my stay as a junior officer in 3 divisions, about 3 to 4 soldiers, if I remember well. So, we cannot sit down and see them eliminating our troops, and we say that we are not supposed to fire because of the rule of engagement. It’s not true; any person carrying a weapon, at least an AK-47 rifle, is an aggressor, and he should be taken down. And that is what I was doing. The only peculiarity of the Jos area, of course, was when you talked about the inter-communal crisis. Communities or tribes fighting themselves, we had to come in between. And in that situation, as long as they are not carrying arms, we cannot start shooting them. Unless, of course, any of the other groups are carrying arms, then you definitely have the go-ahead to take them down.

Q: But is it true that mostly in the night beyond Mangu, Riyom, Ganawuri, etc.,troops were non-operational just pinned down, which is why the senator representing Plateau South, a retired general, was saying recently that he wants the defense chief to re-enact the rule of engagement to make them operational during the night too, to counter the bandits who operate mostly in the night or the wee hours of the morning?

No, we carried out patrols when I was the GOC. You know, I left there almost six months ago. When I was a GOC, we carried out patrols in the daytime and at night. We did carry out our night patrols. So, I am not aware of the fact that troops just stay confined to their locations. We carried out our patrol both day and night when I was there.

Q: Do we have night patrols or operations here in Operation Hadin Kai?

A: ….. Cuts in. Off course we do.

Q: Except that certain areas are shut down as early as 4 p.m., like the Maiduguri-Damaturu road, because of the aggression of the insurgents.

A: Yes, those are supply routes, main supply roads. We shut them down for security reasons, and that has been going on for a long time. You know. It’s for the security of the civil populace that plys the route that we can control the movement. And we make sure that people are not exposed to attacks.

Q: So, looking at the Northeast theater that you managed for about 6 months before shipping out, What, in your own perception, are achievements?

A: I will just mention a few; there are quite a lot of achievements, several achievements in the 6 months I have stayed. First of all, I, my staff, and my officers and men conducted Operation Desert Sanity 2 and Lake Sanity 2. We conducted Operation Mountain Sanity as well. So, these operations have to a large extent degraded the terrorist. 

Q: Cuts in. Mountain sanity is the Mandara stretch in Gwoza.

That is right, Mandara Mountains; we made a lot of recoveries. In Ukoba, Sambisa, we made a lot of recoveries. We were able to get very sound intelligence on where they have stashed their arms, ammunition, and weapons. The records are there, the photos are there, and I am very happy to say that I was able to rescue three out of the many Chibok girls that were abducted several years ago. I was able to rescue three of them from the operations we conducted. And there were two non-governmental organizations (NGO) staff that we rescued. Three others have not been seen, and we heard that they were killed by the terrorist. So, I am happy that we were able to rescue those two as well. I am talking about those that were picked up in Gamboru Ngala. Also, we were able to at least reduce the frequency of attacks on people. You can attest to the fact that the attacks that we used to experience in the past have been reduced by the terrorist attacks. We don’t have such attacks as we are used to any more. So, what they are trying to do now is attack farmers. Now that they have been degraded to an appreciable level, they are trying to get soft targets like the farmers. And we are taking adequate measures to counter that. You will know the terrorists once you are able to degrade them. They will look for other exit routes to cause damage. We are happy that we are able to degrade them, even though they will always change tactics. So now the tactics that were adopted were that they were trying to kill farmers to stop them from farming this year. And they intensified the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and bombs along our routes of movement. So we are contending with that as well.

Q: So, what about Lear Shaibu? Did you get close to her?

Lear Sharibu; we are not sure where she is. We have been getting conflicting information about where exactly she is. But we have not lost hope yet; we think she is alive, and if we get good intelligence, we will definitely try to rescue her.

Q: So, what were some of the operational challenges that clogged the progress of troops in sectors 2 and 1?

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The challenges I experienced were, first of all, the issue of equipment. Another challenge is the high attrition rate of the equipment. So, it’s not that the equipment is not available. What I am saying is that the equipment is available, but before you know it, it is damaged. How? Because of the bombs encountered and the IEDs on the way, ok. A lot of Emeralds were bombed. Before you know it, when we go out for any major operation and come back with the troops, those vehicles will have gone over mines, which will damage most parts of the vehicle. We have the time to repair it, so we can deal with the subsequent operations. However, some of them are not going to be repairable at all. So, we need replacements, and this thing takes time. So, these are some of the challenges that we faced.

Q: IEDs have been a major challenge since your predecessor was here. Now you are facing them as a major challenge too. Is there any long-term plan to deal with these IEDs once and for all because the insurgents will still do them anyway?

A: Of course, that is the most preferred weapon for terrorists and insurgents. Especially now that they don’t have vehicles, they lack arms and ammunition. They have resorted to the widespread use of IEDs. We have just identified counter-IED equipment, which the Nigerian Army has purchased and will very soon deploy in the theater.

Q: Sector 3 is very peculiar. Lots of meshes: the Tunbus, the Timbuktu triangle. So how did you handle those challenges in Sector 3? Are they still IEDs, or are there other natural issues other than IEDs and flooding?

A: Of course, one of the major issues in Sector 3 is flooding. So now that we have had some experience in some areas, we have worked out ways to counter it the next time so that it doesn’t happen. By creating dykes, water floods areas to channel the water when it comes back. So, these are some of the things we have done. And we are clearing the waterways of the hyacinths and the giant grasses. So, this thing will also allow us to freely go through the channel linking the Lake Chad Basin area.

Q: And were you satisfied with the cooperation from your colleagues in the air?

A: Yes, absolutely yes.

Q: Cuts in. At times we see them bombing and producing their own reports outside the theater, or are those bombing under your command?

A: Yes, we plan everything with joint operations; you know, we plan together. You know, we mostly get the intelligence, and we pass it on to them to carry out the air rides. Yes,  they do conform to our directives here.

Q: What about the Navy guys in Baga and your amphibious troops? What’s next for them? What is their plan to end all of this?

A: The Navy, like I said, is involved in actively clearing the waterways that have been overtaken by the water hyacinths and going forward. They are going to be carrying out more serious amphibious operations in the Lake Chad Basin area.

Q: I believe that when you get over there in Chad, there will be a correlation between that side and this side, so that they will be able to weed out the criminals. This is because I learned that even on Tumbus Island, there are so many that nobody actually knows the number of them for effective planning. But I believe you people will take each day as it comes. Is that correct, General?

A: Yes, that is it.

Q: What then is your message to the people of this whole theater as you are leaving, especially concerning the defected insurgents surrendering daily? We have heard so many reports about them, you know, especially now that you are going to the other side of Lake Chad to do the same job in conjunction with foreign troops.

A: What I will tell them is that they should not look backwards. Of course, they shouldn’t lose hope either; they should continue to give support in times of information and intelligence. They should continue to talk to their brothers who are out fighting and tell them to lay down their arms and come out. I think the Governor has a good heart and wants the best for them. They should give him a chance and listen to him. They should come out of the bushes and lay down their arms. Now we have over 100,000 who have surrendered. Over 100,000. I think that is a sign that we are getting to the end of the tunnel. The crisis is coming to an end. Of course, there will be some die-hards. But of course, such die-hards will find themselves to blame at the end of the day. That is my message to them.

Q: My mind is on the wounded soldiers at the 7th Division hospital. Are you satisfied with the facility, having spent just six months managing the troops? In case you were here for another 6 months. What would you have done differently with the functional medical facility in the barracks?

A: Of course, it is to improve the hospital by buying more equipment. We can increase and buy more. Even though what we have is adequate and there is a system whereby we move some of them to 44 in Kaduna, you know, And even in Damaturu now, we have a few hospitals there. So, we have the capability to take care of the strength of the troops here.

Q: And we believe the new Chief will take care of the tertiary one being built here to ease the pressure on the UMTH and 44?

A: Of course.

Q: Thank you very much, General Ali. I wish you the best.

A: Thank you.

The challenges with IEDs at the “Hadin Kai” theater will soon be history – Former TC General Ali