Troops neutralise terrorist, recover phones and cash in Zamfara

By: Zagazola Makama

Troops of Sector 2, Operation Fansan Yamma (OPFY), have neutralised a suspected terrorist during a counter-terrorism and anti-banditry operation in Shinkafi Local Government Area of Zamfara State.

Zagazola Makama gathered from military sources that the troops, deployed in the Galadi area of Sokoto State, sighted suspected terrorists riding motorcycles while attempting to cross a road in Shinkafi LGA.

The troops engaged the suspects with fire, neutralising one of them, while others reportedly fled the area.

Upon inspection, the deceased suspect was found wearing a woodland camouflage vest underneath his traditional kaftan.

Further exploitation of his mobile phone reportedly revealed photographs of the deceased wearing camouflage and allegedly brandishing a PKM machine gun.

The troops recovered four mobile phones and N30,350 in cash from the suspect.

The operation is part of ongoing efforts by security forces to disrupt terrorist and bandit activities across the North-West.

Troops neutralise terrorist, recover phones and cash in Zamfara

Correctional Service, Army Intelligence deepen collaboration on custodial security

By Zagazola Makama

The Nigerian Correctional Service (NCoS) and the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps have agreed to strengthen intelligence sharing and inter-agency cooperation to enhance custodial security and contribute to national security.

The commitment was made when the Chief of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Hedima, led a delegation on a courtesy visit to the Controller-General of Corrections, Sylvester Nwakuche, in Abuja.

The Service Public Relations Officer, Jane Osuji, disclosed this in a statement on the outcome of the meeting.

Nwakuche said the Correctional Service currently manages about 81,000 inmates across its custodial facilities, with approximately 65 per cent awaiting trial, while more than 4,000 inmates are on death row.

He stressed the need for stronger collaboration among security agencies, noting that the increasing complexity of security threats required improved intelligence coordination and timely information sharing.

The Controller-General said enhanced cooperation with the Army Intelligence Corps would strengthen the Service’s ability to identify and respond to emerging security threats within custodial facilities.

In his remarks, Maj. Gen. Hedima called for closer operational collaboration between the two institutions, particularly through joint training, designation of intelligence focal officers and prompt exchange of actionable intelligence.

He said effective intelligence sharing was essential to preventing security breaches and addressing threats that could originate from or affect custodial facilities.

The proposed joint training is also expected to enhance the capacity of personnel from both institutions to detect, assess and respond to emerging security challenges.

Beyond custodial security, the two institutions are expected to strengthen cooperation in areas relating to inmate rehabilitation and reintegration.

The Correctional Service said the partnership would support existing rehabilitation programmes, including education, vocational training and deradicalisation, as part of broader efforts to reduce recidivism and address security threats.

The Service emphasised that rehabilitation remained an important component of national security, particularly in preventing vulnerable inmates from being influenced by extremist or criminal networks.

The engagement between the NCoS and Army Intelligence Corps comes amid growing emphasis on stronger inter-agency intelligence cooperation as a critical tool for tackling Nigeria’s evolving security challenges.

The two institutions are expected to sustain the partnership through structured intelligence-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening custodial security and supporting the broader national security architecture.

Correctional Service, Army Intelligence deepen collaboration on custodial security

Sudan war spills into Chad, Nigeria emerges as critical buffer against widening Sahel insecurity

By Zagazola Makama

The war in Sudan is increasingly taking on a regional character, with its consequences extending beyond the immediate battlefield into neighbouring Chad and creating a widening security arc stretching from the Sahara and Central Africa toward Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea.

The convergence of Sudan’s protracted conflict, the deepening instability across the Sahel and competition over strategic resources such as gold, uranium and oil is creating a volatile security environment in which Nigeria could increasingly find itself serving as the critical buffer between the conflict-ridden Sahel and the relatively more stable coastal West African states.

What is emerging is no longer a collection of isolated crises, but an interconnected security ecosystem involving armed groups, illicit trafficking networks, displaced populations, foreign interests, mercenary formations and competing external powers.

Sudan lies at the heart of this emerging crisis where fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces since April 2023 has increasingly affected neighbouring states.

Chad has borne one of the heaviest humanitarian consequences of the Sudan conflict, receiving a large population of Sudanese refugees, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira and Ennedi-Est.
But the security dynamics are changing.

The eastern Chad is no longer merely a humanitarian rear area for the Sudan conflict. It is progressively becoming a frontline, transit and commercial zone where weapons, fighters, minerals and other illicit commodities can move across poorly controlled desert corridors. The Tiné axis, in particular, has become increasingly vulnerable to cross-border violence.

Recent assessment cites a series of reported incursions and attacks along the Chad-Sudan frontier, including clashes involving Chadian forces and civilians, as well as drone attacks around Tiné and Mourdi.

The situation has forced Chad to take increasingly stringent measures along its eastern frontier, including the closure of its border with Sudan following deadly incidents.

The danger, according to the assessment, is that continued fighting in Darfur could progressively transform eastern Chad from a buffer zone into an extension of Sudan’s battlefield. That development would have consequences far beyond Chad.

One of the most troubling dimensions of the emerging crisis is the alleged expansion of an illicit corridor linking Libya, Sudan and Chad, through which weapons, ammunition, fighters and valuable commodities can move across vast areas where state control remains limited.

Security sources identifies routes running from southern Libya through areas such as Kufra and Faya before extending toward Darfur and eastern Chad. Border towns and commercial centres, including Adré, Iriba and Tiné, are identified as important nodes in this expanding regional network.

From there, the illicit flows can connect with routes leading toward Niger, Cameroon and ultimately Nigeria. This is where the crisis becomes particularly important for Nigeria.

Nigeria does not share a border with Sudan, yet developments thousands of kilometres away could eventually affect its security environment through a chain of interconnected corridors.
The most serious concern is the southward movement of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Sources warns that weapons originating from conflict zones and illicit markets in the Sahara could increasingly move through Niger and Cameroon before entering Nigeria. For Nigeria, the concern is not simply the quantity of weapons entering the country, but who eventually gains access to them.

The country is already confronting multiple armed threats, including Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorism in the North-East, large-scale banditry in parts of the North-West and other forms of organised criminal and separatist violence. An influx of additional weapons, explosives, drones and trained foreign fighters could therefore provide criminal and extremist organisations with new capabilities.

The danger is particularly acute because Nigeria’s northern and eastern borders are connected to a wider regional environment in which armed groups can exploit difficult terrain, informal crossings and established smuggling networks.

Cameroon represents another potential pathway for regional spillover. Sources identifies Kousséri, close to the Chadian border, as well as Garoua-Boulaï and Kentzou along the Central African Republic frontier, as important transit areas in the wider regional security architecture.
For Nigeria, the concern is especially significant in the Far North and along the Lake Chad Basin.

The porous nature of borders across the region means that the movement of weapons, criminals, extremist ideology and displaced populations cannot be treated as separate phenomena. What begins as a conflict in Sudan can therefore generate secondary effects in Chad, Niger and Cameroon before eventually reaching Nigerian territory. Beyond the movement of weapons and fighters lies another increasingly important factor: competition for natural resources. Gold in Darfur and eastern Chad, together with uranium and other strategic minerals in the wider Sahel, has acquired growing geopolitical significance.

It was argued that control of resource-rich areas is becoming intertwined with the financing of armed groups and the deployment of foreign security actors. Where valuable minerals are controlled by armed groups or criminal networks, proceeds from illicit extraction can potentially be converted into weapons, vehicles, communications equipment and other military capabilities.

This creates a dangerous cycle: conflict produces displacement; insecurity enables illicit mining; illicit mining generates revenue; revenue purchases weapons; and weapons prolong conflict. The result is a conflict economy that becomes increasingly difficult for governments to dismantle.

The emerging regional configuration presents both a security challenge and a strategic responsibility for Nigeria, Nigeria is geographically positioned between the troubled Sahel and the Atlantic-facing states of the Gulf of Guinea. Its territory therefore sits downstream of several potential routes for the movement of weapons, fighters, drugs, illicit minerals and extremist networks.

Nigeria is therefore a potential security buffer whose stability could have a decisive influence on whether the current crisis remains concentrated in the Sahel and Central Africa or gradually penetrates deeper into coastal West Africa. But Nigeria is itself under considerable internal security pressure.

In the North-East, troops continue to confront Boko Haram and ISWAP under Operation HADIN KAI. In the North-West, security forces are battling armed bandit networks, while other parts of the country face separate security challenges. This means Nigeria has limited room for complacency.

A major deterioration in Chad, Niger or Cameroon would not necessarily produce an immediate military threat to Nigeria. The more likely danger would be gradual: more illicit crossings, more weapons, more criminal networks, more displaced people and greater opportunities for extremist groups to establish relationships with existing local actors.

The humanitarian consequences could prove as significant as the military implications. Chad is already under substantial pressure from the large number of Sudanese refugees it hosts. Any major deterioration in Darfur or eastern Sudan could trigger another wave of displacement.

Should Chad’s capacity to absorb additional refugees become overwhelmed, displaced populations could seek alternative routes through Niger, Cameroon and potentially toward Nigeria. For the North-East, which continues to deal with the humanitarian consequences of years of Boko Haram and ISWAP violence, another major displacement crisis would place additional pressure on communities, local authorities and humanitarian organisations.

The risk is therefore not simply about where refugees settle. Large, sudden population movements can also create competition over land, water, food, employment and other scarce resources, potentially producing tensions that armed groups can exploit.

Perhaps the most consequential conclusion of the assessment is its characterisation of the emerging situation as the architecture of a possible “Second Africa War” not necessarily a conventional war involving clearly defined opposing armies, but a fragmented conflict system involving states, insurgent groups, criminal networks, mercenaries, foreign interests and resource competition. Such a conflict would be difficult to contain precisely because it would have no single battlefield.

Its frontlines would include desert routes, border communities, mining sites, refugee settlements, trafficking corridors and increasingly the digital and financial spaces used to facilitate illicit networks. The Sudan conflict would remain one of its principal drivers, while instability in the Sahel would provide an existing network through which the effects could travel southwards.

What Nigeria must watch

The immediate priority for Nigeria should therefore be early warning rather than waiting for spillover to become a domestic crisis.
Greater intelligence cooperation with Chad, Niger and Cameroon would be crucial, particularly concerning movements of weapons, foreign fighters, organised criminal groups and illicit commodities. Nigeria would also need stronger surveillance of vulnerable border areas, improved information sharing between security and intelligence agencies, and closer cooperation with regional institutions.

The objective should not be to militarise every border community, but to ensure that authorities can detect emerging trafficking and extremist networks before they acquire sufficient capacity to threaten Nigerian communities. The Lake Chad Basin remains particularly important because it already connects Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon through a security environment shaped by terrorism, displacement, trafficking and environmental pressures.

The warning for Abuja

Nigeria cannot afford to view the Sudan war as a distant conflict. The geographical distance between Sudan and Nigeria may create an illusion of strategic separation, but the region’s informal economies, porous borders and transnational armed networks have repeatedly demonstrated that distance is not necessarily protection. The greater danger may not be a dramatic invasion or a sudden mass movement of fighters.

It could instead be the gradual accumulation of seemingly disconnected developments a new weapons route here, an illicit mining network there, a foreign fighter entering through an informal crossing, a criminal group acquiring military-grade equipment, or displaced communities moving further south.

Individually, each development may appear manageable. Collectively, they could reshape Nigeria’s security environment. Therefore, the strategic objective should be to interdict the crisis upstream rather than fight its consequences downstream. That requires Nigeria to look beyond its immediate borders and treat developments in Sudan, Chad, Niger, Libya and Cameroon as interconnected components of one evolving regional security problem.

The ultimate test will be whether Nigeria can prevent the instability spreading southward while simultaneously strengthening the resilience of its own vulnerable communities.
If it succeeds, Nigeria could remain the buffer that prevents the Sahelian and Central African security crises from reaching the Gulf of Guinea.

If it fails, the country risks becoming not merely the downstream recipient of regional instability, but one of its principal theatres.

Zagazola is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region

Sudan war spills into Chad, Nigeria emerges as critical buffer against widening Sahel insecurity