Uranium, Sovereignty and the Sahel’s New Chains

By Oumarou Sanou

Sovereignty is not declared. It is exercised. And in today’s Niger, the uranium convoy rumbling toward Russia tells a story far removed from the revolutionary rhetoric echoing through Niamey.

The now-infamous “Madmax Uranium Express,” carrying 1,000 tons of Nigerien uranium to Russia, has been presented as proof of emancipation from Western domination. To its proponents, it symbolises a clean break from France and a reclaiming of national dignity. In reality, it exposes a far more uncomfortable truth: Niger has not escaped dependency—it has merely changed its custodian.

Russia is not “doing business” in Niger in any classical sense. Business implies choice, negotiation, competition, and mutual benefit. What is unfolding instead is extraction under constraint. By systematically isolating Niger and its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) from Western, regional, and multilateral partners, Moscow has cornered them into an exclusive and profoundly unequal bilateral relationship.

This is the modern face of neo-colonialism. Not flags or governors, but exclusivity. One dominant partner. No alternatives. No leverage.

True independence rests on multilateralism—the ability to balance partners against one another, to extract the best terms from each relationship, and to preserve freedom of action. Niger once practised this imperfectly but pragmatically. Under previous arrangements, uranium was sold to France at above-market prices, while political influence was diluted through diversified diplomatic and economic partnerships. The relationship was unequal, but Niger retained some room to manoeuvre.

That strategic balance has now collapsed.

Data recently published by EITI Niger (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) reveals the scale of the reversal. While global uranium prices have surged by more than 30 per cent since March 2025, Russia is purchasing Nigerien uranium at prices significantly below what France paid just two years earlier.

The figures are striking. In 2023, France paid approximately $275 million for 1,400 tons of uranium—about $196,500 per ton. In 2025, Russia is paying $170 million for 1,000 tons, or roughly $170,000 per ton. At current market rates, Niger could have earned well over $250 million for the same quantity.

What was once a strategic asset is now being discounted—sold cheaply to a new patron under the banner of sovereignty.

Sovereignty, however, cannot be sold off by the ton.

By accepting a below-market deal, Niger has surrendered not only revenue but leverage and dignity. The uranium shipped to Russia will power nuclear reactors for years, generating energy worth billions of dollars. Niger, meanwhile, receives a marginal fraction—barely enough to justify the long-term strategic cost of locking itself into a new dependency.

Even the symbolism of the transaction is revealing. The convoy itself was stalled for weeks, exposed to insecurity, insurgent threats, and logistical paralysis. It became an unintended metaphor for the AES project itself: loudly defiant, rhetorically sovereign, yet strategically immobilised.

General Abdourahamane Tiani insists, “Our uranium belongs to us.” Ownership, however, is meaningless without control over price, partners, and conditions. Selling under duress to a single power, especially one engaged in a prolonged and costly war, does not reflect autonomy. It reflects captivity.

The rhetoric may have changed, but the underlying logic remains the same. Niger has not dismantled unbalanced agreements; it has merely reoriented them. The exclusive links now forming between the Sahel States Alliance and Moscow risk creating the most severe relationship of subordination Africa has witnessed since independence—one defined not by development or technology transfer, but by extraction and political loyalty.

This is the great paradox of the current moment. In the name of sovereignty, Niger has narrowed its options. In the name of dignity, it has accepted a discount. In the name of independence, it has entered a relationship defined by dependency.

The Sahel does not need new masters. It needs options.

Absolute sovereignty lies in freedom of action—the ability to say yes, no, or renegotiate. It lies in multiple partnerships, competitive markets, and strategic ambiguity. It lies in refusing exclusivity, whether imposed by former colonial powers or embraced by new ones claiming anti-imperial credentials.

Until Niger and its neighbours reclaim the freedom to choose, negotiate, and diversify, sovereignty will remain a slogan rather than a lived reality. One can only hope that the Sahel will rediscover a simple but enduring truth: independence is not found in replacing one dependency with another—but in refusing dependency altogether.

Oumarou Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, regional stability, and African leadership dynamics.

Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com

Uranium, Sovereignty and the Sahel’s New Chains

Harnessing Cultural Leadership to End Violence Against Women And Girls

Op-Ed | By Maxime Houinato

As Africa stands at a crossroads in the fight against violence targeting women and girls, the continent’s traditional leaders hold a uniquely powerful key to unlocking lasting change. Their influence—rooted in culture, authority and community trust—positions them not just as custodians of heritage, but as essential partners in redefining norms, protecting rights and leading a continental shift toward safety, dignity and equality for every woman and girl.

In the coming week, traditional leaders from across Africa will meet in Lagos to explore how culture can advance dignity, safety, and equality. Their convening could not be timelier. Violence against women and girls remains widespread, underreported, and a major obstacle to achieving Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. Recent UN and WHO findings confirm that intimate partner and sexual violence persist at alarming levels, underscoring the need for strong, locally led prevention and accountability.

This important convening in Lagos is made possible through the valued support and partnership of the Ford Foundation, whose long-standing commitment to gender justice, human rights, and community-led solutions continues to strengthen efforts across Africa to end violence against women and girls.

Sub-Saharan Africa records some of the world’s highest rates of intimate partner violence, with studies showing that over 40% of women surveyed have experienced emotional, physical, or sexual abuse. Regional data platforms confirm that both lifetime and recent intimate partner violence remain alarmingly common. The effects also span generations: research across 37 African countries links mothers’ experiences of violence to higher risks of illness, undernutrition, and even death among children under five, highlighting IPV as a major threat to child survival and public health.

Where culture must evolve
Africa has made notable strides, yet harmful practices still put millions of girls at risk. West and Central Africa remain the global epicentre of child marriage: nearly 60 million women and girls in the region were married before 18, with Nigeria bearing the largest absolute numbers. These figures, drawn from UNICEF’s databases, remind us that while progress is possible, it is not guaranteed without sustained, community-anchored change.

There are bright spots. In Kenya, the latest Demographic and Health Survey shows FGM prevalence fell to about 15% in 2022, down from 21% in 2014, a testament to policy commitment and local norm change. Yet prevalence remains extremely high among several communities, and sustained vigilance is required to prevent medicalisation or cross-border practices.

Nigerian realities, African momentum
Nigeria mirrors the continental picture: national surveys and administrative data point to widespread physical, sexual and emotional violence, with thousands of cases reported to authorities each year, figures that almost certainly undercount the true burden. The Government’s National GBV Data Collation Tool is an important step toward standardising reporting and improving coordination; scaling it nationwide and linking it to survivor-centred services will save lives.

Encouragingly, the upcoming Conference of African Traditional Leaders in Lagos, already drawing commitments from eminent leaders, signals growing recognition that cultural authority can be mobilised to protect women and girls. UN Women’s work with traditional councils across Africa has shown that when custodians of culture publicly denounce harmful practices, backed by evidence and community dialogue, norms shift and laws gain legitimacy. It is why we helped catalyse platforms like the Council of Traditional Leaders of Africa to champion the abandonment of child marriage and FGM.

Law works best when culture leads
Africa’s legal architecture has advanced. The Maputo Protocol, our continental bill of women’s rights, has spurred reforms, and the African Commission recently moved to develop a Model Law to accelerate domestication and harmonisation across countries. These instruments matter: they provide standards, remedies and budgets. But their power is realised when interpreted through community values that affirm women’s dignity.

Evidence from the Spotlight Initiative, the EU-UN partnership with the African Union, shows that multi-sector, locally-led approaches can reduce harmful practices, strengthen services, and improve prevention.

Traditional and religious leaders who champion public declarations, alternative rites of passage, and community bylaws help convert state law into lived practice.
A practical agenda for traditional leaders
I urge traditional leaders to make clear, practical commitments that have been proven to drive change: publicly and repeatedly denounce harmful practices such as child marriage, widowhood rites and FGM, backing declarations with community bylaws aligned with national law; promote survivor-centred justice in customary systems through strong referral pathways, bans on forced reconciliation, and proper case documentation; safeguard girls’ childhoods by ensuring birth and marriage registration, enforcing 18 as the minimum age of marriage, and supporting re-entry to school for married or parenting girls; encourage alternative rites of passage and positive models of masculinity that reject violence; and use their influence to push for stronger laws, adequate funding, and community engagement to address all forms of violence against women and girls.

Culture is not a relic; it is a living promise we renew with each generation. As guardians of that promise, Africa’s traditional leaders can be the champions of a continental transformation: from harmful silence to protective speech, from permissive norms to zero tolerance. If we act with urgency and unity, a life free from violence can become every African woman’s and girl’s lived reality.

Maxime Houinato is the UN Women Regional Director for West and Central Africa, providing strategic leadership across 24 countries to advance gender equality, strengthen women’s rights, and accelerate the elimination of violence against women and girls. In this role, he guides UN Women’s regional programmes on women’s economic empowerment, governance and political participation, humanitarian action, and the prevention and response to gender‑based violence.

Harnessing Cultural Leadership to End Violence Against Women And Girls

NIGERIA’S 2027 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

By: Austin Aigbe

Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election is emerging as one of the most consequential political moments since the return to civilian rule in 1999, with the potential to shape Nigeria’s democratic future and influence regional stability in West Africa. Far more than a routine electoral cycle, the contest is a decisive test of democratic resilience, institutional credibility, and national cohesion.

Against the backdrop of persistent insecurity, economic hardship, elite realignments, and widespread public disillusionment with governance, the election will shape not only Nigeria’s political future but also the trajectory of democratic governance in West Africa. At stake is whether Nigeria’s democracy can transcend entrenched patronage politics and elite domination, or whether elections will continue to function primarily as instruments for redistributing power among competing political elites.

Political Context and Elite Realignments
As preparations for 2027 intensify, Nigeria’s political landscape is already characterised by
heightened elite manoeuvring. Defections across party lines, coalition-building, and strategic repositioning dominate the political space. These developments reveal a persistent feature of Nigeria’s political system: weak party institutionalisation. Political parties often operate less as ideologically coherent organisations and more as platforms for elite negotiation and personal ambition.

This pattern reflects Nigeria’s broader political economy, where access to state power is closely tied to access to resources, protection, and influence. Patronage networks remain central to political competition, with loyalty to powerful individuals rewarded through appointments,
contracts, and informal privileges. In such a system, electoral victory is existential. Frequent office losses often translate into political marginalisation, loss of access to resources, and vulnerability to prosecution or exclusion.

Consequently, elections are framed as “do-or-die” contests. This mindset not only distorts
democratic competition but also incentivises practices—such as vote-buying, institutional
manipulation, and violence—that undermine democratic norms. The intense elite realignments ahead of 2027, therefore, signal not ideological contestation, but a struggle for survival within abpatronage-driven political order.

Electoral Integrity and Institutional Challenges Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election’s credibility will depend on how effectively institutions like INEC implement reforms such as the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic result transmission, which aim to enhance transparency and accountability amidst ongoing institutional challenges.
However, technology alone cannot resolve deeply embedded structural challenges.

Institutional capture remains a major concern. Allegations of selective enforcement of electoral rules, politicised deployment of security forces, and inconsistent judicial outcomes continue to erode public confidence. For many citizens, elections appear procedurally democratic but substantively compromised, with outcomes perceived as negotiated through elite influence rather than determined by voter choice.

This gap between form and substance is critical. While electoral processes may meet technical benchmarks, democratic legitimacy depends on whether institutions act independently and impartially. Without credible enforcement of rules and sanctions, electoral reforms risk becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

Security, Violence, and Political Intimidation
Security challenges threaten to undermine the election, and raising awareness of the risks of violence can motivate the audience to prioritise stability and safety in the electoral process.

Historically, electoral violence in Nigeria has been instrumental rather than incidental. Political actors have used intimidation, thuggery, and inflammatory rhetoric to suppress opposition strongholds and manipulate outcomes. The persistence of armed non-state actors further complicates the environment, as elections can become flashpoints for broader conflicts.

The normalisation of violence reflects the high stakes of patronage politics. Where political office determines access to resources and protection, violence becomes a rational—though destructive—strategy. Without credible deterrence and accountability, the risk remains that insecurity will again undermine the integrity of the 2027 election.

Economy, Governance, and Public Discontent
The 2027 election will take place amid widespread economic hardship. Rising inflation, unemployment, fuel subsidy reforms, and declining purchasing power have intensified public frustration. For many Nigerians, democratic governance has failed to deliver tangible improvements in living standards, deepening scepticism toward political institutions.

This socio-economic context presents both risks and opportunities. On one hand, economic vulnerability increases susceptibility to vote-buying and inducements, reinforcing patronage politics. On the other hand, sustained hardship may fuel demands for accountability and reform, particularly among young and urban populations increasingly exposed to alternative political narratives.

Public discontent thus represents a volatile variable. Whether it translates into apathy, protest, or meaningful political engagement will significantly shape the character of the 2027 election.

Youth, Civil Society, and Democratic Agency
Nigeria’s youthful demographic plays a vital role in the electoral landscape. Energised by social media and civic engagement, young voters are increasingly prepared to confront established political norms.

Their advocacy for electoral transparency, good governance, and institutional reform has shifted public conversations, even though significant structural obstacles persist. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and election monitors are crucial for protecting the integrity of elections. Their ability to oversee campaigns, track provocative statements, document violations, and collaborate with security agencies will significantly affect public confidence in the electoral process.

Nonetheless, civil society faces significant challenges, including regulatory constraints, funding shortages, and potential intimidation. The success of civil society’s involvement in the 2027 elections will hinge on its capacity to extend its oversight beyond election day, including ongoing monitoring of party primaries, campaign financing, institutional conduct, and postelection accountability.

Regional and International Implications
Nigeria’s 2027 election has regional implications: a credible, peaceful process could strengthen democratic norms across West Africa, while instability could embolden authoritarian tendencies in neighbouring countries already facing coups and democratic erosion.

While international observers will monitor Nigeria’s 2027 election, the limited scope of external influence underscores that the country’s democratic consolidation primarily depends on domestic institutions, political elites, and citizen engagement, raising questions about sovereignty and
legitimacy.

Conclusion: A Defining Moment
Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election represents a defining moment in the country’s democratic journey. It will test whether electoral reforms can transcend elite manipulation, whether institutions can assert independence, and whether political competition can occur without violence.

More fundamentally, it will determine whether Nigeria’s democracy can evolve from a system dominated by patronage and power struggles into one anchored in accountability, participation, and the rule of law.

The outcome of the election will shape not only Nigeria’s political future but also broader regional perceptions of democratic viability. For Nigeria, 2027 is not merely an election—it is a referendum on the credibility and sustainability of the democratic project itself.

Austin Aigbe, a Development and Electoral Specialist, writes from Abuja, where he closely observes the intricate dynamics of politics and governance in

Nigeria. With a keen interest in the intersections of development, democracy, and
electoral processes, Aigbe analyses the challenges faced by Nigeria since its transition to civilian rule in 1999. His insights
highlight the persistent militarisation of political systems and its implications for democratic consolidation in the country

NIGERIA’S 2027 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR DEMOCRACY