News
As South-East Progressively Aligns With The Tinubu Administration
As South-East Progressively Aligns With The Tinubu Administration
By Stanley Nkwocha
The political ground is shifting beneath Nigeria’s most historically assertive and politically independent region: the South-East. Since 2015, when the All Progressive Congress ( APC) took over governance the region became the home of opposition politics and often the dissenting conscience of the federation. However, it is rife to state that the region is now undergoing a profound realignment.
What seemed impossible a decade ago is now the new political reality, with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), once hegemonic across the entire South-East geopolitical zone, being completely uprooted from all five states. In its stead, the All Progressives Congress (APC) is progressively emerging as the new centre of gravity.
This transformation did not happen overnight. It is the outcome of long-term structural grievances, shifting political incentives, generational changes in Igbo political strategy, and the deliberate alignment of the region with the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu.
The South-East Vision 2050 Regional Stakeholders’ Forum in Enugu last Wednesday, which was organised by the South-East Development Commission (SEDC) and attended by the governors from the region, federal representatives, regional elites, and diaspora technocrats, provided the clearest symbolic marker yet that a new chapter is unfolding. The speech delivered by Vice President Kashim Shettima, and the reception it received, captured the undeniable truth that the South-East is no longer positioning itself outside the national structure. The region is seeking to co-author its future within it.
The region’s movement away from the PDP began slowly but decisively. The first major rupture came in Ebonyi in 2020, when Governor David Umahi defected to the APC, citing the PDP’s unwillingness to treat the South-East with fairness and its persistent refusal to consider a presidential ticket for the region. His argument resonated with an electorate that had long supported the PDP but gained little in exchange.
Far from being a mere personal political manoeuvre, Umahi’s decision exposed the simmering disenchantment many Igbo elites felt toward a party they believed had taken their loyalty for granted. His successor’s eventual victory under the APC in 2023 confirmed the permanence of the shift and, in hindsight, marked the beginning of the end of PDP dominance.
Earlier that year, the Supreme Court’s decision that replaced Emeka Ihedioha (PDP) with Senator Hope Uzodimma (APC) reconfigured Imo overnight. Since then, Uzodinma has become one of the most strategic political actors in the region, using his office to build the APC’s regional infrastructure and eventually chairing the Progressive Governors’ Forum.
But the most symbolic collapse of the PDP occurred in Enugu in 2025. For twenty-six years, Enugu had remained a PDP citadel and a state where the party had never lost a governorship election and where its political machinery was so deeply entrenched that change seemed unimaginable.
Yet when Governor Peter Mbah defected to the APC alongside nearly all members of the State House of Assembly and over two hundred local government officials, the PDP’s fate was sealed. His explanation that it was impossible for Enugu to remain in opposition and still hope to secure meaningful development echoed a sentiment increasingly shared across the region, which is that the politics of perceived regional isolation had become too costly to sustain.
Elsewhere, the transition of Abia State to Labour Party control under Alex Otti in 2023 and Anambra’s steadfast allegiance to APGA meant that by early 2026, the PDP no longer held a single governorship in the South-East. A party that once thrived on the emotional loyalty and historic grievances of Ndi Igbo has found itself displaced not by a single alternative, but by a coalition of political forces, in particular, the APC, that recognised the region’s desire for relevance and inclusion.
To understand why this shift occurred, one must consider the deep historical backdrop. The South-East’s political identity has long been shaped by post-war marginalisation, structural inequities, and the undercurrents of resentment that followed the federal policies of the 1970s, including the economic dislocations that left many Igbo communities struggling to rebuild.
This opinionated sense of betrayal fed seamlessly into the Peter Obi wave that swept through the region in the 2023 general elections. For decades, the PDP had enjoyed a grassroots monopoly in the South-East, but the emotional resonance of Obi’s candidacy broke that monopoly in a single election cycle. People who had voted for the PDP generation after generation now shifted their allegiance to the Labour Party. Although the movement did not translate into gubernatorial wins for the LP across all states, it decisively fractured the PDP’s foundational base. The heart had left the party, even if the structures remained. By the time Mbah defected in 2025, there was no ideological resistance left strong enough to stop him.
Yet the story of the South-East’s alignment with the Tinubu administration is not simply a reaction to PDP failures. The movement is equally shaped by what the APC-led federal government has done to court the region at a moment when Nigeria is experiencing meaningful macroeconomic repositioning. Under President Tinubu, the economy has witnessed a notable shift in direction.
International institutions such as the World Bank have upgraded Nigeria’s growth prospects, estimating GDP expansion at 4.4% for 2026—far higher than global projections. Inflation, once spiralling at crisis levels, has begun a steady decline, dropping from over 21% in 2025 to a projected 12.94% this year, while foreign reserves and FX turnover have surged to their strongest levels in recent years. These indicators have strengthened the region’s perception that federal economic stewardship is stabilising, making political alignment more attractive.
This is especially relevant for the South-East because the region thrives on private enterprise, trade, manufacturing, and diaspora remittances, which are, in fact, sectors that benefit from macroeconomic stability.
At the same time, the government’s push for refining independence, which has allowed Nigeria to transition into a net exporter of refined petroleum products, has reduced pressure on the naira, bolstered reserves, and improved trade balances. These economic shifts are not abstract technocratic achievements; they are tangible developments that resonate with the everyday realities of traders in Onitsha, importers in Aba, manufacturers in Nnewi, and transport entrepreneurs across the region.
But perhaps the most profound factor in the South-East’s realignment is President Tinubu’s deliberate political strategy toward the region. Rather than relying on rhetoric or symbolic gestures, the administration has taken concrete steps that respond to longstanding Igbo demands for structural economic inclusion.
One such step is the establishment of the South East Investment Company Limited, a federally supported vehicle designed to mobilise diaspora capital, attract development finance, and channel private investment into the region’s infrastructure and industrial base. This mirrors the calls within academic and policy circles for a modern equivalent of the defunct Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation, which was once responsible for some of the region’s most impressive economic achievements in the pre-war era. President Tinubu’s approval of this initiative signalled not only recognition of the region’s unique entrepreneurial strengths but also a willingness to anchor long-term federal policy on the region’s aspirations for economic integration.
This strategic engagement was on full display at the Enugu Vision 2050 Summit. Vice President Shettima’s remarks, emphasising that the South-East is a central pillar of Nigeria’s economic future, carried special significance in a region where historical memory of exclusion is deep and often painful. His acknowledgement of the region’s global diaspora networks, its tradition of innovation under pressure, and its role in shaping Nigeria’s economic imagination tapped into a broader intellectual history that sees the Igbo as a migrant race, resilient, adaptive, and global in orientation.
The audience’s response to VP Shettima’s speech was not merely polite; it was markedly receptive. It reflected a regional elite increasingly interested in the language of development, investment, and long-term planning, and less committed to the confrontational political posture of previous decades. The symbolism of the moment was unmistakable: the federal government came not as a paternalistic overseer or political conqueror, but as an engaged partner offering a platform for integration into Nigeria’s long-term economic framework. This shift is not driven by naivety. The South-East’s political class understands that genuine alignment with the centre must translate into tangible gains.
In effect, the South-East is recalibrating; not abandoning its identity, grievances, or aspirations, but repositioning itself within the Nigerian power structure to negotiate those aspirations more effectively. The PDP’s downfall is merely the political expression of this deeper transformation. What is emerging is not blind loyalty to the APC but a regional strategy rooted in the understanding that power must be engaged directly if economic and political development is to be massively achieved.
The Vision 2050 Summit has, perhaps, demonstrated that the South-East has looked beyond its grievances. The region is not merely aligning with the President Tinubu administration out of weakness or opportunism. It is doing so out of a recognition that political relevance and economic transformation are best secured not from the margins but from the centre of national decision-making.
Nkwocha is the Senior Special Assistant on Media and Communications to The President (Office of the Vice President) and wrote in from Abuja.
As South-East Progressively Aligns With The Tinubu Administration
News
Parliamentarians in Sierra Leone mourn colleague Lucinda Kelly
Parliamentarians in Sierra Leone mourn colleague Lucinda Kelly
By: Bodunrin Kayode
Following the distressing announcement of the sudden death of Lucinda Kelly, representing Kono District, of Sierra Leone proceedings in the Parliament empathically came to a halt last week and was adjourned to this week in memory of the late politician.
During their last sitting, opposition leader Abdul Kargbo moved a motion, seconded by Deputy Opposition Leader Aaron Koroma, that all businesses on the Order Paper be suspended for the House be adjourned thereby allowing members to pay a condolence visit to the family of the bereaved.
“The remains of our colleague are currently at the mortuary, and I do not believe we can continue with the Sittings,” Kargbo said solemnly.
Acting Leader of Government Business, Bashiru Silikie joined the Opposition in extending condolences and requested that Acting Speaker Ibrahim Conteh adjourn Sittings to allow Members to mourn the late parliamentarian Lucinda Kelly.
Silikie noted that Kelly would have been present to form a quorum for last week’s Sittings, but death had sadly snatched her away from legislative businesses.
He proposed that the Parliament adjourns until tomorrow Tuesday for further deliberations pending announcement of her interment rites.
Acting Speaker Ibrahim Tawa Conteh then called on the House to observe a moment of silence in honour of the late Kelly.
Lucinda Kelly was an All People’s Congress (APC) Opposition Member of Parliament representing Kono District of the Republic of Sierra Leone.
She was a vocal and formidable debater who took her parliamentary responsibilities of representation, lawmaking, and oversight very seriously.
Parliamentarians in Sierra Leone mourn colleague Lucinda Kelly
News
Kashim Shettima: Of Betrayal, Power, and Survival.
Kashim Shettima: Of Betrayal, Power, and Survival.
By: Inuwa Bwala.
“March has returned, and with it the Ides. Beware the men who call you brother.”
Julius Caesar was perhaps Rome’s most trusted general. He crossed the Rubicon for Rome, conquered Gaul for Rome, and pardoned enemies for Rome.
Yet it was neither Gaul nor Pompey: his avowed rivals, that killed him. It was Brutus: his friend, and confidant yet his protégé, who was described as “the noblest Roman of them all.”
Julius Caesar did not slump and died because the daggers were too many, rather, bacause he noticed the person he least expected could betray him amongst those stabbing him: Brutus. In utter shock and disbelief, Caesar slumped, but not before he uttered the word,”And you too Brutus?”.
There is no doubt that, Kashim Shettima was Borno’s most tested governor. He walked into boiling areas, when others fled the state. He rebuilt schools bombed by Boko Haram. He chose to stay in Maiduguri when Abuja offered comfort.
As Vice President, he has carried himself as a true statesman abs the face of the Tinubu administration at national and international meets.
He always speaks of “the sanctity of human life” and calked for swifter and total mobilisationagainst terror.
Yet today, whispers from Borno and Abuja suggest the daggers are not in the bush like that of Boko Haram, they are in the hands of his kinsmen, those he hold family meetings and political meetings with.
Those who could read between the line, may be able to tell, when Shettima gave an anecdote at a recent public function, about the visit by his kinsmen to his boss, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, just three months into the life of the administration.
Like Brutus and the conspirators of the Shakespearean fame, who claimed they did not hate Caesar, but loved Rome more, those who visited Tinubu claimed to love Nigeria more and her President, abd not brcause thry hated Shettima.
Brutus in particular played on a so-called republican pride and his fear of tyranny, which he used in convincing himself that betrayal was patriotism. He struck to “save” Rome.
Shettima’s own “Brutuses” use a different script, relying on Shetyima’s perceived ambition and the attendant battle to keep himself in the balance of power as an alibi.
And in the face of contending forces, they recruited people to plsy out the cards, while remaining in the shadows. The charges may appear different with that if Caesar, but the intents are same. And while still smarting from the Muslim-Muslim debacle, Shettima had hradly setyled in office when they began to spread rumours of him, being too Borno, not enough to be a northerner. Too ambitious, fetish, independent minded and growing too popular. One thing they could not take away from him though us the fact that Shettima is intelligent, shrewd and a master schemer, which his boss knows too well.
I had cause to warn of this years ago seeing Shettima’s passive refusal to pick between kinsmen in place of statesmen to work with him.
I could see through the plots to denigrate a fine emergent nationalist by linking him with Boko Haram, painting him as fetish, portraying him as a religious and ethinic checkbox, all in a bud to undo him. The weapon when he was govetnor was insurgency, but the weapon now is political naivity and stereotyping . The tactic includes convincing his Kanuri kinsmen to fight him, so that “when Kanuri fights Kanuri, others will win. But beyond that, even his Kanuri brothers seem to have an axe to grind with him.
The painful truth remains, that, Caesar’s killers were senators in the Capitol, but Shettima’s challengers may be his own kinsmen: some of whom, he nentored snd no one can ever convince him that, they could ever work against him. In both cases, the dagger is dipped in familiarity.
It cuts deeper because the hands holding it, are either those he mentored or once broke bread with him.
Caesar died because he ignored omens. Not even Calpurnia, his wife’s dream could deter him. He ignored the soothsayer, and shunned the Senate’s mood, thinking goodwill was a good sheild and armor.
Shettima’s March 2027 is loaded with omens too, arising from fresh attacks by vested interests, intrigues amongst political players, betrayal by kinsmen, espionage by aides and attachees, dissertion by hitherto close allies, manipulations in the media, ethnic or religious profiling, clandestine meetings that without communiqués, but with lethal intents, contending forces in the party who whisper that 2027 needs a “new pairing.” indeed, the ides are here, because a second term is near, and second terms birth daggers.
As governor, perhaps Shettima survived by moving rather faster than conspiracy. He outrun, those who want to either even scores or shake off his dominace, and those people have remained at daggers drawn with him
How Shettima Survives, will definitely be a refrence point in power struggles in Nigeria.
But unlike Caesar who never learnt, Shettima is a good student of Robert Greens 48 Laws of Power, and must have drawn lessons from the falls of others before him.
To survive, Shettima must learn to trust, but audit the Praetorians. Caesar trusted Brutus with his life. Shettima cannot afford blind trust. The INEC database compromise and probe shows how insider access kills. Shettima must do what he did as governor: forensic audits, no sacred cows. As I earlier said, he must have his own policy, which must not be changed simply because some people want to determine its content.
He must learnt to keep the people, his own trusted people, and must not loose, as Caesar lost Rome due to his belief in his personal prowess and capacity. Shettima still owns Borno’s streets and still conttols the larger and more lethal political forces in the North.
He should be able to name the Brutus, but should not become an Antony, whom at Caesar’s funeral sparked civil unrest. Shettima cannot afford chaos. He should have a machinery on ground that will expose the plot, without burning the Forum. He should expedite action in uniting the North, and rally the support of kinsmen, even as a counterforce, or risks allowing the real enemies to win.
Importantly, he should bear in mind, that, the parabolical March is not the end, the ides pass. For Caesar, it ended at Pompey’s statue, but for Shettima, March can end with a stronger alliance. He must do what he told the nation: “We choose light over shadow, and hope over despair”.
The Verdict of History, had
Brutus dying on his own sword, muttering, “Caesar, now be still.” Betrayal did not save the Republic, rather it buried it.
Shettima’s kinsmen face the same choice. They can strike and wait for the verdict of history, or they can sheathe the dagger and remember: the real enemy still sleeps someehere else.
Twelve years ago, I wrote that Shettima’s ides would test Borno. In 2026, I state without fear of contradiction, that, they will test Nigeria.
Caesar ignored the soothsayer because he was in so much hurry. Shettima, as always, may not be in a hurry, but should he decide to, that hurry may yet save him.
Kashim Shettima: Of Betrayal, Power, and Survival.
News
FACT CHECK: No School Attack, No Student Abduction in Kautikari — What Really Happened During the ISWAP Raid
FACT CHECK: No School Attack, No Student Abduction in Kautikari — What Really Happened During the ISWAP Raid
By Zagazola Makama
A wave of alarming reports circulating across social media and some online platforms has claimed that Boko Haram insurgents attacked a school and abducted students in Kautikari community of Chibok Local Government Area, Borno State.
The claims, predictably amplified by emotionally charged references to the 2014 Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction, have generated anxiety among Nigerians following developments in the troubled region.
However, a detailed fact-check by Zagazola Makama, based on assessment from field sources, and video evidence from the scene, has found the claims to be entirely FALSE.
According to sources, the incident occurred at about 7:30 p.m. on June 13 when ISWAP terrorists launched an attack on a hunters’ patrol base located within the premises of a disused primary school in Kautikari.
The facility being used by the hunters was not functioning as a school at the time of the attack, nor were students present at the location. Rather, local hunters had established a patrol outpost within the structure, using some of the classrooms as temporary accommodation and operational shelters while supporting troops of Operation HADIN KAI’s efforts in the area.
The terrorists specifically targeted the hunters’ base and not a school populated by students as widely claimed. Initial resistance by the hunters successfully repelled the first assault.
However, the terrorists later regrouped in larger numbers and launched a second attack, forcing the hunters to temporarily withdraw after running low on ammunition.
Military sources disclosed that reinforcement teams comprising troops of the 117 Task Force Battalion from Kwada, supported by a Quick Response Force, local hunters and vigilante personnel, rapidly mobilized to the scene and engaged the terrorists. The coordinated response eventually overwhelmed the attackers and forced them to retreat.
No Student Was Abducted
Contrary to viral claims, there is no evidence that any student was abducted during the attack. Operational reports from the scene recorded no missing students, no reports of schoolchildren being taken away, and no indication that the terrorists targeted an educational institution in session.
Security sources confirmed that accountability checks conducted after the attack found no cases of student abduction.
In fact, the only confirmed casualties were one civilian who was reportedly struck by a stray bullet fired by the terrorists and one member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) who sustained a gunshot wound to the arm.
Sources said also that the terrorists set fire to clothing and personal belongings belonging to the hunters stationed at the outpost. No troops were killed or injured during the engagement.
Further undermining the false reports is video footage obtained by Zagazola Makama from the aftermath of the attack. In the footage, one of the affected hunters is seen showing the damaged facility and burnt belongings while lamenting the destruction caused by the terrorists.
The hunter can be heard explaining that the location served as their place of accommodation and operational base.
“This is where we sleep,” he says while pointing to the affected section of the building.
The footage clearly supports military accounts that the target was a hunters’ outpost and not an occupied school hosting students.
The confusion likely arose because the hunters’ base was situated within the premises of a primary school building.
Photographs and videos showing damaged classrooms were subsequently circulated online without context, leading some platforms to incorrectly conclude that a school had been attacked and students abducted.
The result was the rapid spread of misinformation that failed basic verification standards.
Given Chibok’s painful history, any report involving schools and abductions naturally attracts national and international attention. This makes accurate reporting even more important.
FACT CHECK: No School Attack, No Student Abduction in Kautikari — What Really Happened During the ISWAP Raid
-
News2 years agoRoger Federer’s Shock as DNA Results Reveal Myla and Charlene Are Not His Biological Children
-
Opinions4 years agoTHE PLIGHT OF FARIDA
-
News1 year agoFAILED COUP IN BURKINA FASO: HOW TRAORÉ NARROWLY ESCAPED ASSASSINATION PLOT AMID FOREIGN INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
-
News2 years agoEYN: Rev. Billi, Distortion of History, and The Living Tamarind Tree
-
Opinions4 years agoPOLICE CHARGE ROOMS, A MINTING PRESS
-
ACADEMICS2 years agoA History of Biu” (2015) and The Lingering Bura-Pabir Question (1)
-
Columns2 years agoArmy University Biu: There is certain interest, but certainly not from Borno.
-
Politics1 year ago2027: Why Hon. Midala Balami Must Go, as Youths in Hawul and Asikira/Uba Federal Constituency Reject ₦500,000 as Sallah Gift
