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Hamza Suleiman NAN: How ‘Christian genocide’ label distorts Nigeria’s conflict reality

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6 months ago

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Hamza Suleiman NAN: How ‘Christian genocide’ label distorts Nigeria’s conflict reality

By: Zagazola Makama

The claim that Nigeria is witnessing a state sanctioned “Christian genocide” has been trending in international discourse, amplifying domestic anxieties and sharpening an already fragile ethno-religious divide in the country.

Such narratives, when detached from the country’s complex security ecosystem, risk oversimplifying multi-layered conflicts into a single religious frame. Nigeria is constitutionally secular, and violence across its regions is driven less by faith alone than by a combustible mix of local grievances, criminal economies, identity politics, and transnational extremist agendas. When attacks occur, communities understandably interpret them through the lens of their beliefs; however, to cast the entire crisis as a binary religious war obscures root causes and hands strategic advantage to extremist groups seeking polarisation.

At the psychological level, Nigerians are highly sensitive to any perceived assault on their faith. This makes the information space a contested battlefield. Episodes in Jos, Southern Kaduna, Benue and parts of Taraba illustrate how disputes over land, grazing routes, political representation and local power can quickly acquire religious colouration once violence erupts between communities with different identities.

In the Middle Belt, Nigeria’s demographic and geographic crossroads ethnicity and religion overlap in ways that allow political entrepreneurs and armed actors to weaponise narratives. What begins as a farmer–herder clash or a dispute over local authority can be reframed as a civilisational struggle, accelerating reprisals and widening the conflict footprint.

Extremist organisations operating across Africa exploit this dynamic. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates pursue parallel-state projects by stoking fear, delegitimising national institutions and provoking sectarian backlash. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, insurgents attack civilians, displace populations and profit from the illicit flow of small arms.

Nigeria sits at the nexus of these corridors. In the northwest and north-central zones, Boko Haram offshoots and allied cells have adapted tactics—including IED use—while cultivating relationships with bandit networks. Their objective is not only territorial control but narrative dominance: to convince populations that the state cannot protect them and that coexistence is impossible.

This is why the “genocide” label, when applied wholesale to Nigeria, is analytically flawed and strategically dangerous. It compresses diverse theatres North-East insurgency, North-West banditry, Middle Belt communal violence into a single story that misreads motive and method. It also creates perverse incentives. Extremist groups thrive on publicity and polarisation; a global narrative that frames local conflicts as a religious extermination campaign can validate their propaganda and encourage copy-cat violence. Domestically, it hardens attitudes, weakens trust in institutions, and pressures political actors into zero-sum postures rather than pragmatic problem-solving.

Psychologically and historically, Nigeria’s past from the Uthman Dan Fodio jihad of 1805 to the 1966 crisis and civil war is often misunderstood and misused. These events are sometimes portrayed as purely religious campaigns, rather than complex political and social upheavals.
Against this backdrop, the U.S.-led narrative of a “Christian genocide” is not merely an analytical error; it becomes a negative description of Nigeria as a state. It suggests official neglect or complicity and projects Nigeria as a country defined by religious war rather than governance and security challenges.

More troubling are claims that the U.S. allegedly targeted Sokoto the historical seat of the Caliphate while neglecting ISWAP/ Boko Haram in the Lake Chad and JNIM offshoots near Kainji National Park. In optics and perception, this fuels suspicion that foreign powers are pursuing broader geostrategic or economic interests rather than purely humanitarian ones.

In a country that is one of the world’s highest consumers of social media content, such narratives spread rapidly. Once the idea of “Christian genocide” takes root in the national psyche, it becomes harder to reverse and easier for extremists and political actors to exploit.

The danger is not only external pressure, but internal fragmentation. Nigeria has long faced separatist and extremist ambitions from IPOB in the South-East, to Oduduwa groups in the South-West, to ISWAP/JAS in the North-East, and identity-based movements in the Middle Belt.

When international narratives suggest Nigeria is failing as a state, they unintentionally embolden these forces. The old CIA-era projection that Nigeria would break up by 2015 did not happen but the conditions for fragmentation remain visible in elite rhetoric, online mobilisation and communal distrust.

International engagement matters, but it must be calibrated to Nigeria’s realities. Security cooperation can deliver tangible benefits counter-IED capabilities, ISR assets, air mobility and training, if anchored in Nigerian ownership and intelligence-led operations. Precision, legality and accountability are essential to avoid civilian harm and the backlash that follows.

At the same time, an exclusive focus on kinetic tools misses the wider contest. Extremist ecosystems depend on recruitment pipelines, financing, social media amplification and local grievances. Disrupting these requires governance reforms, justice for victims, and economic recovery in affected communities so that civilians have reasons to resist insurgent narratives.

The information domain is just as critical. Media must be objective at all time and not to take side. From the government side, strategic communications should be proactive, not reactive: explaining the nature of threats, acknowledging failures honestly, and demonstrating progress in protecting all citizens regardless of faith. A recent failure of Stratcom was the case of the Kaduna state government for denying abduction of 171 Christians in Kajuru and later admitted that it actually took place.

When citizens see investigations, sincerity, arrests, and prosecutions alongside relief for victims and reconstruction of communities, the space for disinformation narrows. Religious and traditional also leaders have a unique role in de-escalation, offering moral authority that counters the language of collective blame.

Finally, Nigeria’s political class must treat local crises with urgency and coherence. State governments, security agencies and community structures should align around early-warning systems, mediation mechanisms and rapid response to prevent isolated incidents from spiralling into wider conflagrations.

Federal-state coordination, coupled with border management and regional diplomacy, can limit the spillover from Sahelian conflicts. None of this denies the suffering of Christian, Muslim and traditional communities alike; rather, it insists that justice and security are indivisible.

In sum, Nigeria’s security challenge is real and severe but it is not a single-story war of religion. It is a complex struggle against transnational extremism, organised crime and politicised identity. Reducing it to “genocide” rhetoric distorts policy choices and empowers those who benefit from division. A credible path forward blends precise security operations with governance, justice and narrative resilience so that Nigerians are protected not only from bullets and bombs, but also from the ideas that seek to turn neighbours into enemies.

Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region
[1/23, 11:31 AM] Hamza Suleiman NAN: Plateau authorities confirm killing of seven youths at illegal mining site in Jos South, blame night operations

By: Zagazola Makama

Plateau State Security authorities have confirmed the killing of seven youths at an illegal mining site near Kavitex, Kuru in Jos South Local Government Area (LGA), describing the incident as a tragic outcome of violations of state mining laws and unsafe practices.

A Police sources told Zagazola Makama that the victims, Dung Gyang, 19; Weng Dung, 26; Francis Paul, 25; Samuel Peter, 22; Dung Simon, 28; Pam Dung, 23; and Francis Markus, 15 were shot dead by yet-to-be-identified armed men at about 2:00 a.m. on Thursday while engaging in illegal mining activities.

The sources said that the troops of Sector 6, Operation Safe Haven (OPEP), and the police
immediately mobilized to the site and conducted a thorough sweep of the area.

At the scene, they discovered ten spent cases of 7.62mm ammunition, indicating that the attackers were heavily armed. The corpses were subsequently moved to the Primary Health Care Centre, Dabwak, Kuru, to allow the families to make burial arrangements.

Preliminary investigations by security forces indicate that the attackers may have targeted the site to seize illegally mined minerals from the closed mining location at Capitex Kuru.

Security sources said the victims’ decision to remain at the mining site late into the night in violation of Plateau State’s ban on night and illegal mining made them particularly vulnerable.

“The miners’ continued operations in contravention of the extant laws, combined with the clandestine nature of illegal mining, significantly increased their exposure and contributed to this tragic outcome,” the security sources said.

Authorities further observed that an estimated eight-hour delay in reporting the incident to the security authorities likely stemmed from fear of sanctions associated with the prohibition of night mining.

Officials warned that delayed reporting often reduces the ability of security personnel to respond quickly, giving perpetrators a tactical advantage.

In response to the attack, troops of Sector 6 OPEP have intensified both kinetic and non-kinetic operations in the area. Sustained patrols, intelligence-driven offensive measures, and community engagement efforts are being conducted to identify, track, and apprehend the perpetrators, as well as to address underlying conflict triggers in the community and forestall further attacks.

The police on the other hand reiterated its commitment to restoring law and order, stating that security would maintain a strong presence in Kuru and other mining communities to prevent breakdowns of security.

Authorities also urged residents to cooperate with security agencies by providing timely information on suspicious movements or criminal activities, warning that fear of sanctions should not prevent reporting.

On the other hand sources from the Plateau State Government reiterated that enforcement of mining laws is essential to protect both miners and the general public. Officials appealed to youths to comply with existing regulations, including the prohibition on night mining, and to operate only at officially sanctioned sites under regulated conditions.

The Kuru killings are the latest in a series of attacks across Jos South, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom LGAs, where illegal mining sites have repeatedly become targets for armed groups seeking to exploit soft target in an intensified circle of violence in Plateau state.

Meanwhile, Zagazola Makama linked the attack to the latest in a spiral of violence in plateau in what began as disputes over land and livelihoods has metastasized into a tit-for-tat pattern where cattle rustling, livestock poisoning and armed raids trigger swift reprisals, dragging entire communities into a vortex of fear. Gakok attack did not erupt in isolation. It is the tragic crest of a wave that has been rising across the Barkin Ladi–Riyom–Jos South axis for weeks.

The current escalation tracks back to Wednesday, Jan. 14, when no fewer than 102 cows were rustled at Dan Sokoto in Ganawuri District, Riyom LGA. Witnesses said armed men suspected to be Berom Militia stormed the area in broad daylight, forcing herders to flee and driving the cattle away at gunpoint. The animals reportedly belonged to two pastoral families from Jos East, but were seized in Ganawuri, an inter-LGA fault line that complicated response and recovery.

Local accounts allege the attackers came from Vom District in Jos South. The Dan Sokoto raid was not an aberration. In the same month, at least seven cows were poisoned in Kwi village (Riyom LGA), while three others were shot dead near Kuru Gadabiyu in Barkin Ladi. Each incident deepened attacks and retaliation.

Days after the Dan Sokoto rustling, violence crossed from fields to homes. In the early hours of Saturday, at about 2:30 a.m., gunmen attacked Kasuwa Denkeli village in Barkin Ladi LGA. One person was killed on the spot; two others sustained gunshot wounds and were rushed to the Jos University Teaching Hospital. Police confirmed the incident, said a team led by the DPO moved to the scene, and announced an investigation to track the perpetrators.Residents linked the assault to retaliation over the stolen cattle in neighbouring Riyom.

This pattern attack on herds, reprisal on villages has repeated with grim regularity. On Jan. 6, coordinated attacks on Jol community in Riyom and Gero in Gyel District of Jos South left three people dead. The violence followed the shooting of two Fulani youths earlier that day in Jos South, one of whom later died. Witnesses described the ambush as unprovoked. What followed was swift retaliation and counter-retaliation, with communities caught in the crossfire.

The warning signs were already flashing in December. On Dec. 12, more than 130 cattle were reportedly rustled in Nding community. Around the same period, livestock poisoning was recorded in parts of Jos East and Riyom LGAs. Those incidents were followed by deadly clashes, including the killing of four children in Dorong village, Barkin Ladi LGA, and attacks on Gero that left deaths, injuries and the loss of more livestock.

On Dec. 16, an attack on an illegal mining site in Tosho, Barkin Ladi LGA, left 12 miners dead and others abducted. Security sources linked the violence to earlier rustling of 171 cattle belonging to Fulani. Again, a familiar sequence: cattle taken, emotions inflamed, guns answer.

Across Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Jos South, residents now speak of “no-go” zones. Areas like Vwang in Jos South and parts of Fan District in Barkin Ladi are whispered about as holding grounds for rustled cattle belonging to the Fulani.The claims, wether true or not, reinforce suspicion and hinder cooperation. Recovery becomes harder; rumours spread faster than facts.

Security agencies respond to each incident, but the terrain is complex, in most cases lacked accessibility by roads. Attackers move across forested LGA lines; victims come from multiple communities; reprisals target the nearest symbol of “the other.” Investigations start, but arrests lag. In the absence of swift, impartial justice, communities seek their own.
End

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Netherlands Donates Equipment to Boost Nigeria Immigration’s Hostmanship Programme

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1 day ago

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July 28, 2026

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Netherlands Donates Equipment to Boost Nigeria Immigration’s Hostmanship Programme

By: Michael Mike

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has donated specialised equipment to the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) to strengthen its Hostmanship Unit, deepening more than two decades of bilateral cooperation aimed at improving migration management and customer service delivery.

The equipment was presented by the Repatriation and Departure Service (R&DS) of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security during a ceremony at the NIS Headquarters in Abuja on Monday.

Receiving the donation, the Comptroller-General of Immigration, Kemi Nandap, described the gesture as a significant milestone in the long-standing partnership between the Nigeria Immigration Service and the Netherlands, noting that it would bolster institutional professionalism and improve service delivery.

Nandap said the equipment represents a strategic investment in institutional excellence and would enhance the Hostmanship Unit’s training capacity and operational efficiency.

She explained that the initiative is designed to entrench the philosophy of hostmanship across the Service, encouraging immigration officers to ensure that members of the public are treated with courtesy, empathy and professionalism at every point of contact.

“The equipment will further strengthen our capacity to institutionalise the Hostmanship philosophy, where every officer is inspired to make people feel welcomed, respected and valued,” she said.

The Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Abuja, Mr. Ronald Sonnemans, described the collaboration with the Nigeria Immigration Service as a model of sustained international partnership.

He reaffirmed the Dutch government’s commitment to supporting initiatives that enhance migration management, institutional capacity and public service delivery in Nigeria.

The Nigeria Immigration Service disclosed that the partnership has already produced tangible results, including the training of hundreds of immigration officers, the establishment of a dedicated Hostmanship Unit and sustained capacity-building programmes under the European Union-funded Capacity Building and Relationship Management (CBR) Project.

According to the Service, the latest donation underscores the commitment of both countries to strengthening migration governance through innovation, knowledge sharing and institutional reforms that enhance public confidence in immigration services.

The Service expressed appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Repatriation and Departure Service for their continued support, pledging to ensure the donated equipment is effectively utilised in advancing ongoing reforms.

The Nigeria Immigration Service has in recent years intensified reforms aimed at modernising border management, improving service delivery and enhancing the professionalism of its personnel. A key component of these reforms is the Hostmanship programme, a customer service philosophy developed in Sweden that focuses on creating positive service experiences by treating every individual with respect, courtesy and empathy.

The Netherlands has remained one of Nigeria’s key international partners in migration governance, supporting capacity-building initiatives through bilateral cooperation and European Union-funded programmes. The collaboration has focused on improving migration management, combating irregular migration, strengthening institutional capacity and promoting international best practices in public service delivery.

The latest donation is expected to further consolidate these reforms as the Nigeria Immigration Service seeks to build a more citizen-focused and globally competitive immigration system.

Netherlands Donates Equipment to Boost Nigeria Immigration’s Hostmanship Programme

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Troops neutralised key bandit leaders, restored confidence along Gusau- Funtua highway

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4 days ago

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July 25, 2026

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Troops neutralised key bandit leaders, restored confidence along Gusau- Funtua highway

By Zagazola Makama

The Commander of Combat Team 7 under Operation FANSAN YAMMA, Capt. A.U. Usman, has disclosed that troops have recorded significant operational successes over the past six months, including the elimination of several notorious bandit kingpins and the restoration of security along the strategic Funtua–Tsafe–Gusau highway.

Speaking on Saturday during a visit by Defense Correspondents at the unit’s operational base in Tsafe, Zamfara State, the commander said sustained offensive operations and strategic deployment of troops at identified bandit crossing points had drastically reduced attacks on commuters and boosted public confidence.

“During the period under review, Combat Team 7 has recorded some significant successes,” Usman said.

He revealed that on Jan. 14, troops neutralised notorious bandit commanders, including Kachalla Dan Agwal and Baban Baby, alongside several of their fighters during intelligence-led operations.

“Combat Team 7 was able to neutralise the likes of Kachalla Dan Agwal, Baban Baby and many others. These successes came through carefully planned operations and the deployment of our troops to strategic locations,” he said.

According to the commander, the unit established numerous pickets along the Funtua–Tsafe–Gusau road, particularly at known bandit crossing points frequently used to ambush travellers.

“If you are driving along the Katsina–Funtua–Tsafe–Gusau road today, you will notice several military pickets. Those soldiers are strategically deployed at identified bandit crossing routes,” he explained.

He noted that the deployment had significantly curtailed the activities of armed groups that previously terrorised motorists through kidnappings and violent attacks.

“These bandits were the ones repeatedly disturbing this road. Before now, commuters could not move freely the way they do today. They stopped vehicles, abducted passengers and created fear among the people,” he said.

“Today, because of the strategic deployment of troops and the equipment made available to us, civilians are moving freely without fear. The picketing has restored confidence among road users.”

Capt. Usman further disclosed that another major breakthrough was recorded on Feb. 15 when troops neutralised additional notorious bandits, including Yunusa Dogon Ahmad, during sustained clearance operations along the same corridor.

“On Feb. 15, we were able to neutralise Yunusa Dogon Ahmad and some other key bandits who had been terrorising this route,” he said.

Beyond securing highways, the commander said the military had also created a safer environment for farming activities across communities within its Area of Responsibility (AOR).

According to him, Combat Team 7 currently operates from about 13 operational locations, including Lilo, Mada, Wanzamai, Keta, FOB Railway, Gidan Giye, Keware and several blocking positions established to deny criminals freedom of movement.

“Our troops conduct daily foot patrols from these locations into surrounding farmlands and communities to ensure that farmers carry out their activities without interference from criminal elements,” he said.

“The same pattern is replicated across our entire Area of Responsibility. Whether in Mada, Wanzamai or other locations, our troops are constantly patrolling to provide security for farmers.”

The commander acknowledged that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained one of the challenges confronting troops during operations, especially on rural access routes.

“There are places where movement is still affected because of the threat of IEDs,” he said.

“However, with support from the theatre headquarters, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams have now been deployed, and we no longer move on roads without conducting proper scanning to detect possible IED threats.”

On civil-military relations, Capt. Usman described cooperation from residents as encouraging but said more support was needed to deny criminals access to information.

“The locals are cooperating to some extent, but there is still room for improvement,” he said.

“Without informants, terrorists cannot operate effectively. Unfortunately, there are still a few bad elements within some communities who pass information about our movements and activities to the criminals.”

Despite the challenge, he commended the majority of residents for their support and expressed confidence that stronger collaboration between security forces and communities would further weaken the activities of bandits across the region.

The commander reaffirmed the commitment of Combat Team 7 and Operation FANSAN YAMMA to sustaining offensive operations and ensuring that communities, farmers and travellers continue to enjoy improved security across Zamfara and adjoining areas.

Troops neutralised key bandit leaders, restored confidence along Gusau- Funtua highway

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Operation FANSAN YAMMA to Deploy Dedicated Drones as Theatre Commander Unveils New Force Protection Measures

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4 days ago

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July 25, 2026

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Operation FANSAN YAMMA to Deploy Dedicated Drones as Theatre Commander Unveils New Force Protection Measures

By Zagazola Makama

The Theatre Commander, Joint Task Force North West, Operation FANSAN YAMMA (JTF NW OPFY), Major General W.B. Idris, has disclosed that the theatre will soon receive its own dedicated fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as part of an ongoing military modernisation programme aimed at strengthening force protection, intelligence gathering and offensive operations against terrorists across the North-West.

Major General Idris made the disclosure on Thursday during an interactive session with defence correspondents in Gusau, Zamfara State, while responding to questions following a comprehensive operational briefing on the activities of Operation FANSAN YAMMA.

The announcement came in response to a question from Defence Correspondent who sought clarification on measures being adopted by the military to improve force protection, particularly in view of the growing use of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by terrorist groups operating within the North-West and the wider Sahel region.

The Theatre Commander acknowledged that the threat posed by IEDs has continued to evolve, requiring corresponding improvements in surveillance, intelligence and technological capabilities.

According to him, the Nigerian Armed Forces have already commenced a major expansion of their unmanned aerial capability, with Defence Headquarters and the Service Headquarters investing heavily in drones designed to enhance reconnaissance, surveillance and operational response across all theatres of operation.

“It still comes down to the answer I gave earlier,” the commander said.

“The military hierarchy is doing a lot. We have commenced the acquisition of drones, and we are aware that the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Army Staff and the Honourable Minister of Defence are doing everything possible to provide drones with wider operational coverage across the country.”

He explained that the acquisition programme forms part of a broader effort to integrate modern technology into military operations, enabling commanders to detect threats earlier, improve situational awareness and respond rapidly to terrorist activities in difficult terrain.

Major General Idris disclosed that several operational theatres have already begun receiving unmanned aerial systems, while Operation FANSAN YAMMA is expected to receive its own dedicated drone capability immediately after the completion of the construction of its operational hangar.

“As it stands today, Operation FANSAN YAMMA is awaiting the completion of the construction of our hangar before our own drones are deployed for more efficient conduct of operations,” he said.

The commander noted that the deployment of dedicated drones would significantly improve the command’s ability to monitor vast forest corridors, detect terrorist movements, identify IED threats and support troops engaged in offensive operations.

He explained that the North-West theatre presents unique operational challenges because of its expansive forests, mountainous terrain and remote settlements that are often inaccessible to conventional ground patrols, particularly during the rainy season.

According to him, unmanned aerial platforms will bridge those operational gaps by providing persistent surveillance over difficult terrain while supporting intelligence-driven operations against terrorist enclaves.

He further stated that drones would complement existing air assets by providing commanders with real-time intelligence before, during and after military operations.

The Theatre Commander noted that the growing sophistication of terrorist tactics—including the increasing deployment of improvised explosive devices, ambushes and hit-and-run attacks—requires equally sophisticated technological responses.

He said the Armed Forces have therefore prioritised investments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as part of broader efforts to reduce casualties and enhance operational effectiveness.

“Our objective is not only to attack terrorists but also to ensure the safety of our personnel during operations. Modern technology is becoming increasingly important in achieving that objective,” he said.

Major General Idris commended the leadership of the Armed Forces, particularly the Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede; the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu; and the Honourable Minister of Defence for their continued commitment to equipping frontline formations with modern capabilities.

He observed that the support being provided by Defence Headquarters has already translated into significant improvements in operational performance across various theatres.

According to him, enhanced surveillance capabilities, improved intelligence gathering and the increasing deployment of modern equipment have enabled troops to sustain pressure on terrorist groups while reducing their freedom of movement.

The commander explained that force protection remains one of the command’s highest priorities, stressing that every available technological solution is being explored to minimise operational risks to personnel.

He added that the military’s ongoing investment in drones is expected to transform operations by improving early warning, target acquisition, battle damage assessment and operational coordination between ground and air forces.

He also reiterated that the introduction of dedicated UAV capability would further strengthen the command’s ability to dominate remote forests where terrorists have increasingly sought refuge after being pushed away from major highways through sustained military offensives.

“The terrorists are constantly adapting, and we must remain ahead of them. Technology gives us that advantage. With improved drone capability, better intelligence and continued support from the military high command, we will further deny them freedom of movement and make the operational environment even more hostile for criminal elements,” he said.

Major General Idris reaffirmed that Operation FANSAN YAMMA would continue to combine modern technology with intelligence-led operations, long-range patrols and coordinated inter-agency collaboration to protect communities, secure critical infrastructure and dismantle terrorist networks across the North-West.

He assured Nigerians that the command remains committed to enhancing force protection, improving operational efficiency and sustaining the momentum of ongoing operations until lasting peace and security are restored throughout the theatre.

Operation FANSAN YAMMA to Deploy Dedicated Drones as Theatre Commander Unveils New Force Protection Measures

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