Opinions
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
By: Zagazola Makama
The Jan. 29 attack on Niger’s Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey has exposed a dangerous evolution in jihadist cooperation across West Africa: a tightening operational axis between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin and Islamic State affiliates operating across the Sahel.
Beyond the symbolism of striking a capital-city airport, intelligence indicators point to something more consequential, the emergence of a transnational fighting concept that seeks to fuse manpower, logistics and media operations from Lake Chad through Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
For years, ISWAP’s Lake Chad network and Sahel-based Islamic State factions operated on largely parallel tracks. That boundary is now blurring. Recent intelligence indicates ISWAP elements are travelling westward from the Lake Chad Basin into Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions, while Sahelian militants rotate into Borno and neighboring areas for logistics, training and media coordination.
The signature of this cooperation was first visible in northeastern Nigeria in early 2025, when ISIS released a video showing some foreign fighters training ISWAP fighters in the Lake Chad shores of Marte and Kukawa. In 12 Aug 25, about 200 ISWAP elements, including ISIS affiliated members from BURKINA, MALI, NIGER, CAR and MOZAMBIQUE were sighted near Lake Chad.
To consolidate their cooperations 8 foreign fighters (5 light skinned ARABS, and 3 non-ARAB dark skinned foreigners) infiltrated the LCRBA some months ago. Another top ABU YASIR, an ARAB, later arrived. The foreign fighters are said to have infiltrated unnoticed into the North East to gain access to ISWAP Camps via ungoverned borders of DIFFA (NIGER Republic) into the LCRBA. In November, about 63 foreign fighters arrived the Lake Chad through Kusuri in Cameroon with armed drones.
According to the arrangement, these ISIS-linked ARABs are to be in full control of coordinating major operations like specifying targets, timings for attacks, training on new tactics using armed drones and overseeing conduct of attacks.
Since then, ISWAP had launched a series of attacks involving rudimentary drones, a capability believed to have been supported by technical expertise from Sahel-based ISIS affiliates. Separate intelligence streams also point to the movement of non-African Islamic State fighters into the Lake Chad theatre, particularly around Monguno, Kukawa and the Timbuktu Triangle.
Footage released by Amaq on Jan. 2, showing militants infiltrating Niamey, burning a Bayraktar TB2 drone in a hangar and damaging other air platforms, suggests a coordinated, multi-cell operation. Notably, the cameraman’s use of Kanuri dialect dominant in ISWAP’s Lake Chad heartland, implies ISWAP’s hand in logistics, operational security and media. Most fighters appear to have been Nigerien, but ISWAP’s role in enabling and packaging the attack points to command-and-control integration.
Assailants reportedly entered through Niamey 2000 a critical access node evading layered security and nearby community watch structures. This indicates pre-attack reconnaissance and possible sleeper support.
At least five attackers were neutralised at the scene, while others escaped northwards through the Tiloa area. On the side of Niger’s forces, casualties were heavy. Security sources say 27 personnel were killed, 24 Nigerien soldiers and three African Corps members while 18 others were wounded and evacuated to the Military Garrison and the Referral Hospital in Niamey. Several drones and about five aircraft were destroyed in the attack.
Nigerien authorities initially claimed higher terrorist losses, but sources say the damage appears to have fallen more heavily on government forces and infrastructure. This points to a coordinated, multi-cell operation with ISWAP providing command-and-control functions. It’s no longer just ideological alignment, it’s operational integration.
The attack lands amid a widening rift between the Alliance of Sahel States (AES Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso) and ECOWAS. Niamey’s leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tiani, publicly accused Côte d’Ivoire’s Alassane Ouattara, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Benin’s Patrice Talon of sponsoring the attack charges those governments deny. Abidjan’s summoning of Niger’s ambassador illustrates the rapid diplomatic deterioration.
The raid has brought to the fore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in Sahelian capitals. The fact that militants could strike an international airport in the heart of Niamey and degrade aviation assets is deeply worrying. Airports are economic lifelines. Attacks like this ripple through tourism, trade, investor confidence and humanitarian logistics.
Given the Islamic State network’s history of targeting high-profile facilities, other airports, military airstrips and energy installations across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin could be next.
Diplomatic cold war has continued to result in security consequences as counter-terrorism coordination is eroding in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, regional polarisation is deepening while Jihadist narratives are gaining traction. Mutual suspicion between Niger Republic and other countries had reduced intelligence sharing and cross-border security cooperations which is exactly what a mobile jihadist alliance is exploiting. Niger’s pivot toward Russia, and the growing role of the African Corps, also complicate unified regional responses. Accusations of foreign interference feed recruitment and justify attacks on “collaborators.”
Against this backdrop, Washington’s decision to send a senior official to Mali to “reset ties” is telling the U.S. is recalibrating from heavy security conditionality toward pragmatic engagement that emphasises sovereignty, economic development and stability.
Mali has increasingly been viewed as the “COG” (centre of gravity) of the AES. Access to Bamako, therefore, is seen as a gateway to broader engagement with the bloc and a means to counter expanding Russian and China influence while safeguarding interests in critical minerals. Whether this reset can translate into improved regional security cooperation remains uncertain, especially as AES states bristle at Western pressure and ECOWAS sanctions.
For Nigeria, It is clear that the Lake Chad Basin is no longer just a local insurgency theatre; it is becoming a launchpad for Sahel-wide operations. If ISWAP fighters can move westward to Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions and Sahelian militants can cycle into Borno for training, logistics and media, then the basin risks becoming the connective tissue of a transnational Islamic State corridor. Nigeria and its Lake Chad partners needs a renewed joint tasking framework that anticipates mixed cells, foreign fighter inflows and media-enabled operations.
For the region, (NIGERIA) the choice is urgent, rebuild cooperative security despite political rifts with NIGER or allow insurgents to exploit the fractures. The cost of delay will be paid across capitals, at airports, bases, regional hubs and cities across West Africa.
Cross-border intelligence must be rebuilt, not just within ECOWAS but with pragmatic channels to AES states. Form a fushion of Information cell with representatives of all controls for prompt intelligence sharing on terrorists activities. Ideological divides should not trump the common threat. If left unchecked, this alliance could stitch together the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel into a single battle-space, multiplying the reach, resilience and propaganda power of jihadist networks.
Zagazola is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region.
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
Opinions
Nigeria Is Innovating. But Who Will Ensure No One Is Left Behind?
Nigeria Is Innovating. But Who Will Ensure No One Is Left Behind?
By: Michael Mike
A wake-up call to Science Journalists as innovation hubs prepare to open new frontiers
Nigeria is building the labs. But an important question remains: who will translate the science?
Across the country, a quiet transformation is underway. Innovation hubs are emerging spaces where ideas are tested, collaboration is nurtured, and solutions are imagined.
Initiatives such as the Mine Tech Innovation Hub, hosted at Nasarawa State University, Keffi and supported by UNDP under the leadership of Ms. Elsie Attafuah, are preparing a new generation to move research beyond theory and into real-world application. These hubs represent more than infrastructure; they embody ambition, creativity, and the promise of inclusive growth.
This is not just progress. It is possibility.
Yet at the heart of this transformation lies a critical challenge: while Nigeria’s innovation ecosystem is expanding, there remains a significant gap in translating scientific knowledge into accessible and actionable understanding. In many cases, solutions remain largely within laboratories and classrooms, while the communities they are meant to serve continue to grapple with persistent challenges.
The issue is not a lack of innovation.
The gap is translation.
Nigeria stands at a crossroads. With growing research capacity, a vibrant youth population, and increasing institutional support, the country has the potential to become a leader in innovation across Africa.
However, innovation in isolation does not guarantee impact. Without deliberate efforts to communicate and contextualize knowledge, breakthroughs risk remaining invisible, inaccessible, and ultimately underutilized.
As these hubs evolve into powerful ecosystems of growth and inclusion, a crucial question emerges: will innovation reach the people it is meant to serve—or will it remain out of reach and without impact?
This challenge directly affects progress toward SDG 9, which emphasizes industry, innovation, and infrastructure. Achieving these goals requires more than generating ideas; it requires ensuring that those ideas are understood, embraced, and applied in ways that improve lives.
This is where science journalism steps in as a gamechanger.
Innovation does not scale through technical language alone. It scales through understanding—through storytelling that connects research to reality. A community cannot engage with what it does not understand. A policymaker cannot act on what is not clearly communicated. An investor cannot support what has not been made visible.
Science journalists are not merely reporters; they are translators of complexity. They serve as bridges between break through and society, transforming abstract concepts into meaningful narratives that people can relate to and act upon.
Without this bridge, innovation risks being admired in principle but ignored in practice.
To close this gap, Nigeria must act deliberately, with all stakeholders treating science journalism as a strategic priority within the innovation ecosystem.
Further efforts to enhance access, training, and engagement for science journalists could significantly strengthen the impact of innovation initiatives
Storytelling is not an add-on or an afterthought—it is infrastructure.
Strengthening science communication within innovation ecosystems can enhance the translation of breakthroughs into accessible knowledge for communities, policymakers, and investors.
Nigeria’s path to innovation is now a reality unfolding.; it is an emerging force in the present. The systems are forming. The ideas are maturing. The opportunities are expanding. Yet progress alone is not enough.
If the story is not told, the impact will not be felt.
Science journalists must rise—not tomorrow, but now.
Because inclusive development is not achieved simply by creating solutions. It is achieved when those solutions are understood, embraced, and allowed to reach every corner of society. Otherwise, we risk building innovations that never leave the lab—and futures that never arrive.
About the Author
Dr. Nelson Okoko is a Geologist, Development Communication Specialist, science journalist, and social and behavioural communication expert based in Abuja. His work focuses on participatory communication and innovation ecosystems for inclusive development. He is the proponent of the Collaborative Sovereign Communication Theory (CSCT), a forward-looking framework redefining communication dynamic in development practice.
Nigeria Is Innovating. But Who Will Ensure No One Is Left Behind?
Opinions
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
By: Zagazola Makama
For more than a decade, Nigeria’s battle against terrorism has largely been viewed through the lens of military operations, troop deployments, air strikes, and battlefield victories. However, as the conflict evolved, security experts increasingly recognised that military force alone could not permanently end violent extremism.
This reality gave rise to Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), a Federal Government initiative designed to complement kinetic operations through deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of eligible low-risk individuals associated with terrorist groups.
Since its establishment, the programme has generated both support and controversy. While proponents describe it as a strategic security tool that weakens terrorist organisations from within, critics argue that it appears to offer opportunities to former insurgents while victims continue to struggle with the consequences of conflict.
The debate raises a fundamental question: can a country defeat terrorism through force alone, or must it also create pathways for disengagement and rehabilitation?
Recent explanations by the Coordinator of OPSC, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Ali, provide useful insights into the rationale behind the programme and the challenges it seeks to address.
Contemporary counterterrorism strategies across the world increasingly combine military operations with non-kinetic interventions. The reason is simple. Insurgencies are sustained not only by weapons and fighters but also by recruitment networks, ideological indoctrination, economic desperation, coercion, fear, and social dislocation. Even successful military campaigns may struggle to achieve lasting peace if these underlying drivers remain unaddressed. Operation Safe Corridor was established to address this gap.
According to programme officials, it provides a controlled process through which eligible low-risk individuals who voluntarily surrender can be screened, rehabilitated, and prepared for reintegration into society. The underlying logic is that every successful defection reduces the manpower available to terrorist organisations while simultaneously encouraging others to abandon violence.
Perhaps the most persistent misconception surrounding OPSC is the belief that it serves as an open-door policy for all insurgents. Available information suggests otherwise. Officials insist that admission into the programme follows extensive intelligence profiling and legal review. Individuals who voluntarily surrender are subjected to screening by military and civilian intelligence agencies before their cases are reviewed by the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The Ministry determines who qualifies for rehabilitation and who should face prosecution under existing legal frameworks. This distinction is critical because public concerns often stem from fears that individuals responsible for serious crimes are simply being released back into society. The programme coordinator maintains that only individuals assessed as low-risk and legally eligible are admitted into the rehabilitation process.
For years, critics have reduced the complex national security programme into simplistic slogans. They call it “a reward for Boko Haram.” They describe it as “pampering terrorists.” Some even falsely claim it is a recruitment channel into the military. These accusations may generate applause on social media, but they disintegrate when closely examined.
The truth is that most of the loudest critics of Operation Safe Corridor have never visited the centre, studied its structure, legal framework, operational processes, or strategic objectives. They react emotionally to a conflict that has caused immense suffering, but emotion is not a substitute for security policy.
The reality is that Operation Safe Corridor is not an act of sympathy toward terrorists. It is an instrument of war. And it may be one of the most important non-kinetic weapons Nigeria has ever deployed against violent extremism.
Nigerians must understand that it is not an amnesty programme, pardon, compensation scheme, reward for terrorism, or a recruitment pathway into security agencies. It is a voluntary programme.
Contrary to popular belief that only Boko Haram members are rehabilitated, not everybody associated with terrorist organisations who enters Operation Safe Corridor comes from the North-East. There are Igbos from the South-East, Yorubas from the South-West, and individuals from other ethnic groups enrolled in the programme.
Additionally, those captured on the battlefield in the North-East do not automatically qualify. Those with prosecutable offences do not automatically qualify. Those assessed as high-risk do not qualify. Those involved in serious criminal activities can face prosecution.
This distinction is critical. Operation Safe Corridor does not decide who enters the programme. The Federal Ministry of Justice does. That fact alone destroys one of the biggest misconceptions surrounding the initiative.
One of the strongest arguments against Operation Safe Corridor is the claim that terrorists simply walk into the camp and are forgiven. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Before admission, individuals undergo extensive profiling involving military intelligence, civilian intelligence agencies, security services, legal authorities, psychologists, and health professionals. Their backgrounds are examined, their activities are investigated, their risk levels are assessed, and their legal status is reviewed. Only after this process are recommendations made.
The programme operates within a multi-agency framework involving more than seventeen Ministries, Departments, and Agencies. This means decisions are not taken by one commander, one agency, or one institution. They are subjected to scrutiny from multiple stakeholders.
Those found to have prosecutable cases can be sent for trial. Those categorised as low-risk may be referred for rehabilitation. This is not leniency; it is classification, and every serious counterterrorism system in the world relies on classification.
The most important question left unanswered is this: if there is no pathway out of terrorism, why would anyone surrender? One basic reality is that a terrorist organisation is weakened not only when fighters are killed. It is weakened when fighters abandon the organisation, as every surrender reduces its manpower, operational capability, intelligence-gathering capacity, and recruitment potential.
This is where Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model, an initiative of Borno state government become strategically important. The programmes creates a credible exit route. And that exit route has helped generate hundreds of thousands of surrenders over the years.
Every surrendered individual represents one less fighter available to conduct attacks, plant IEDs, gather intelligence, transport logistics, recruit new members, or support terrorist operations. In military terms, this is attrition from within.
Based on figures repeatedly cited by military authorities and reports on the deradicalisation programme, the number of Boko Haram/ISWAP members and their families who surrendered through the combined non-kinetic approach involving the Borno Model and Operation Safe Corridor has grown significantly over the years.
In 2018, when the window of opportunity was announced, the military reported that 146 Boko Haram members had voluntarily surrendered under Operation Safe Corridor. By 2019, authorities said over 1,370 fighters had surrendered, with some transferred into rehabilitation programmes.
Following the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, mass defections accelerated, with thousands of fighters and family members laying down their arms. Thousands of people trapped in the Sambisa Forest were able to escape.
In January 2023, the Chief of Defence Staff disclosed that more than 83,000 insurgents and their family members had surrendered. By 2025, military authorities updated the figure to approximately 120,000–129,000 Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters and family members who had surrendered.
For example, in 2026, Defence Headquarters stated that while over 300,000 terrorists and associated persons had surrendered over a decade across the North-East, only 2,615 ex-combatants had undergone rehabilitation under Operation Safe Corridor, with 2,016 graduating from the programme.
It is impossible to understand Nigeria’s recent gains against insurgency without acknowledging the role played by this mechanism. One of the biggest mistakes made by those opposing Operation Safe Corridor is assuming everyone associated with terrorist groups joined voluntarily. The reality is far more complicated.
It is important to note that those who surrendered include fighters, farmers, women, children, and other trapped populations who emerged from insurgent enclaves, not only active combatants.
Military authorities have consistently explained that only a low-risk fraction of the surrendered population qualifies for the formal Operation Safe Corridor deradicalisation programme after screening, profiling, and legal review.
Thousands of individuals were abducted, forced into service, married against their will, recruited as children, coerced through threats, and trapped by circumstances. Many women found within insurgent camps were themselves victims. Many children born within terrorist-controlled territories never chose that environment.
In the Sambisa Forest, there were dozens of villages with people trapped by terrorists. In Gwoza, there are still thousands of people trapped within terrorist enclaves. In the Lake Chad Tumbuns, many farmers and fishermen were trapped in ISWAP-controlled areas. Sometimes they became collateral victims during attacks on terrorist enclaves. Many foot soldiers were not ideological extremists.
Research cited by programme managers indicates that more than 60 percent of foot soldiers in extremist groups are not primarily driven by ideology. Many were coerced or manipulated, with threats of death if they attempted to escape.
A serious nation cannot treat all these categories identically. That is why modern counterterrorism relies on differentiation.
Another myth is that participants simply spend a few months relaxing before returning home. Again, the facts suggest otherwise.
The clients spend several months undergoing rehabilitation. During this period, extremist interpretations are challenged by trained scholars. Participants are exposed to alternative teachings that reject violence and promote lawful coexistence.
Years of conflict leave deep psychological scars. Counselling addresses trauma, fear, guilt, anxiety, behavioural conditioning, and emotional instability. Participants receive practical skills training designed to support lawful livelihoods.
Clients learn about citizenship, lawful conduct, and responsibilities within society.
The rehabilitation programme increasingly focuses on changing behaviour, addressing trauma, and creating alternatives to violence rather than attempting to achieve ideological transformation alone. Within OPSC, rehabilitation reportedly includes religious reorientation, psychosocial support, vocational training, civic education, behavioural assessment, and skills acquisition.
The objective is to help participants disengage from violence and develop the capacity to function productively within society.
One challenge in evaluating deradicalisation programmes is determining what success actually means. Is success measured by the number of people processed through the programme, by the number who do not return to violence, or by broader security outcomes?
Officials point to several indicators. On the other hand, some high-risk or captured terrorists have been detained for seven to eight years in Giwa Barracks and Kainji while prosecution of their cases continued.
Officials at the Joint Investigation Centre located at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri, said it has so far investigated about 1,450 terrorism-related cases, while over 500 Boko Haram terrorists were subsequently convicted by the Federal Ministry of Justice in Kainji, Niger State.
The Commander of the facility, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Audu, who disclosed this while outlining the structure, operations, and reforms of the multi-agency detention and investigation centre supporting counterterrorism efforts in the North-East, said the facility remains central to Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents.
He disclosed that “recently, the centre moved over 500 suspects for trial, most of whom were convicted and are serving various jail terms,” adding that the development reflects improved coordination among security and justice institutions handling terrorism cases.
The existence of Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model is believed to have contributed to the surrender of over 300,000 individuals to Nigerian troops over time. Some of the rescued or surrendered victims have been reunited with their families by the Borno State Government, while Operation Safe Corridor has so far graduated more than 2,600 individuals from the programme since inception.
From a strategic perspective, these figures suggest that the programmes may be helping to reduce the pool of active fighters available to extremist groups, as every surrender represents not only one less combatant on the battlefield but also a potential source of intelligence and a signal to others that exit options exist.
Nevertheless, experts caution that long-term outcomes remain the most important measure.
The true test lies in whether reintegrated individuals remain peaceful, productive, and accepted within their communities years after completing rehabilitation.
Critics often portray Operation Safe Corridor as some bizarre Nigerian experiment. It is not. Comparable programmes exist worldwide. Somalia has implemented disengagement initiatives for defectors from Al-Shabaab. Colombia developed reintegration systems following the FARC conflict. Many countries facing insurgencies rely on combinations of military pressure and rehabilitation frameworks.
Consequently, acceptance of former associates of terrorist groups is often difficult. Many victims understandably question why resources appear to be directed toward former combatants while communities continue to struggle. This perception has become one of the most significant public relations and policy challenges facing OPSC.
Programme managers acknowledge the concern and argue that sustainable peace requires a balance between supporting victims and rehabilitating eligible returnees.
According to officials, victim-centred initiatives are increasingly being incorporated into broader stabilisation efforts, including psychosocial support and community recovery programmes.
Another major issue is funding. According to OPSC officials, Defence Headquarters and a few non-governmental organisations currently bear much of the financial responsibility for activities within the rehabilitation camp.
However, reintegration, the phase widely regarded as the most important remains significantly underfunded. Successful reintegration requires transportation, livelihood support, community sensitisation, monitoring, mentorship, and follow-up services.
Without adequate resources, there is a risk that individuals may return to environments characterised by unemployment, social rejection, and economic hardship.
Such conditions can undermine rehabilitation gains and increase vulnerability to relapse. Therefore, experts argue that the long-term success of OPSC will depend not only on what happens inside the camp but also on the strength of support systems available after graduation. International experiences also show that weak reintegration systems can undermine otherwise successful rehabilitation efforts.
This lesson appears particularly relevant to Nigeria, where economic challenges and community mistrust remain significant obstacles.
As insecurity continues to evolve, Operation Safe Corridor itself is undergoing transformation. Authorities are expanding deradicalisation infrastructure beyond the North-East, including facilities in Zamfara and planned structures in the North-Central region.
There is also increasing emphasis on victim support, community ownership, strategic communication, and livelihood programmes.
Ultimately, the debate surrounding OPSC reflects a broader question confronting modern counterterrorism efforts worldwide.
Can security be achieved solely through military victories, or does lasting peace require addressing the human dimensions of conflict?
While opinions remain divided, one point appears increasingly clear.
Military operations may remove immediate threats, but sustainable peace often depends on what happens after the guns fall silent. In that regard, Operation Safe Corridor represents Nigeria’s attempt to navigate the difficult balance between security, justice, rehabilitation, and long-term stability.
Whether the programme ultimately achieves its objectives will depend not only on the quality of rehabilitation within the camps but also on the nation’s ability to support victims, strengthen communities, and sustain reintegration long after participants leave the programme.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter-Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region.
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
Opinions
That Phantom Rift Between VP Shettima And Gov. Zulum
That Phantom Rift Between VP Shettima And Gov. Zulum
By: Inuwa Bwala
Those who know the kind of fraternity between Vice President Kashim Shettima and Governor Babagana Umara Zulum, also know that, there can never be any disagreement between them over any issue, not even political permutations in Borno between them.
When I read an online analysis atributed to an unknown source, quoting an equally unknown KBC news, I know, that the merchants of mischief are again upto their games.
Overtly or covertly, the duo of Kashim Shettima and Babagana Umara Zulum, have never given anyone reasons to believe, they are in disagrerment, over who becomes the next governor of Borno state.
What has never been in doubt, is their collective belief that, as Muslims, God is the ultimate determinant of who gets what, in the power equations in Borno, now or in the future.
I have had intimate interactions with both of them, and even in my usual speculative mind as a journalist, I never had the incling that there was any friction of some sort, over who succeeds Zulum as Governor.
Rather, at every turn, both leaders have displayed exceptional sense of camaraderie and mutual respect to eachother.
The Vice President, often comes down from his olympian height to tell people, that, once he comes to Borno, the Governor is his boss. Governor Zulum will often tell everybody, that Kashim Shettima remains his mentor and leader, and everytime he goes to Abuja, the Vice President’s house is his first port of call.
Perhaps, those who fabricate such phantom disagreements, between them, are the usual conflict profiteers, who thrive on driving wedges between leaders for fun or for some gains.
Not quite a week ago, Governor Zulum was in the media telling the world that, he will not play god by trying to annoint anybody as his successor, but believes that God is the ultimate decider through the instrumentality of the people of Borno.
The Vice President has never uttered a word about the politics of Borno, rather, he demonstrates statemanly disposition on all matters relating to the state.
As humans, they may have preferences, but as believers in the indispensibility of God, their preferences are at the altar of the almighty.
Bringing in names of people as possible successors could after all be mere promotional gimmicks, which at the end of the day endanger their chances. The person who may succeed Governor Zulum may not even be amongst those mentioned, perhaps a dark horse somewhere, who does not even know that he or she is God’s choice.
Very often, I cite the emergence of our dear Governor himself, in 2019. Nobody gave him a chance and all eyes were focused in other directions, untill God’s calling came.
As for those who manufacture the stories of a dilema surrounding Senator Kashim Shettima’s position as Vice President in the next dispensation, the open expression of confidence in Kashim Shettima by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu alone, should be sufficient.
Those who know the President very well can attest to his bluntness, and his actions have so far given assurance, that, Kashim Shettima is his dependable ally.
Tinubu is not known to play to the gallery and he does not gamble with his passions. Where people get the idea that he may drop Kashim Shettima, as his running mate in 2027 remains as puzzling, as the earlier stories preceeding the 2023 election.
It is not an anathema for people to permutate against 2027, but with more than one year still ahead, I feel people should not be too uncharitable in distracting leaders, fantasizing imaginary scenarios.
I may be right or wrong, but the truth may not be too far away from comming.
Just musing.
That Phantom Rift Between VP Shettima And Gov. Zulum
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