The Blood We Have Normalised

By U.K. Umar

It happens in many parts of Nigeria, particularly across the North-West and North-Central, but I write this from the perspective of someone who has spent considerable time on the frontlines in Plateau and Benue States. I have walked through communities still smelling of burnt homes. I have spoken with soldiers who had barely returned from operations before heading out again. I have sat with grieving families whose only crime was waking up on the wrong side of an endless cycle of violence. The stories differ only in names and locations. The pain is identical.

Almost every week, another community buries its dead. Men, women and children are killed in attacks and reprisal attacks, many hacked to death in ways that defy human conscience. Yet the official response has become painfully predictable. Government condemns the killings. Officials promise that perpetrators will be brought to justice. Security agencies launch investigations. Then everyone waits until the next massacre. We have repeated this script for years while the cemeteries continue to expand.

What worries me even more is that much of the country seems to have adjusted to this reality. It is as though the killings in Plateau, Benue, Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto or parts of Kebbi have become distant headlines rather than a national emergency. But all is not well with Nigeria. Not even close. A nation that becomes comfortable with burying dozens of its citizens every other week is a nation slowly losing its collective humanity.

In the past few weeks alone, we have witnessed renewed violence around the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in Kuru, Plateau State. Security forces have had to repel repeated attacks targeting one of the country’s foremost strategic institutions. Before that came attacks around Vom, deadly assaults on security personnel, and fresh recoveries of military weapons stolen from fallen soldiers. Across the border in Benue State, communities continue to count their dead after successive attacks, with entire settlements displaced and livelihoods destroyed. These are not isolated incidents. They are symptoms of a much deeper crisis.

Having recently visited military formations in both Plateau and Benue States, one truth became impossible to ignore. The Nigerian Armed Forces are carrying a burden that no military alone can solve. I met exhausted officers and soldiers who spend weeks away from their families, operating under difficult terrain and enormous psychological pressure. Many have paid the ultimate price. Others continue to fight despite losing colleagues in brutal ambushes. Their sacrifices deserve recognition, not constant vilification.

But another truth also confronted me.

In community after community, I found fear. I found anger. I found suspicion. Most painfully, I found a hatred that has become deeply entrenched between many indigenous farming communities and Fulani pastoralists. It is a hatred born from years of killings, displacement, cattle rustling, destruction of farms, revenge attacks and mutual distrust. Both sides have suffered losses that cannot simply be measured in statistics. Every family seems to have a story of someone murdered, displaced or permanently scarred.

That reality makes peace infinitely harder.

When grief is inherited from one generation to another, revenge begins to masquerade as justice. Every fresh attack becomes justification for another reprisal. Every funeral plants the seeds for another burial.

This is why simplistic narratives do not help.

Reducing the crisis to farmers versus herders, Christians versus Muslims, or indigenes versus settlers ignores the complex web of criminality, historical grievances and political failures that sustain the violence. Criminals exploit genuine community fears. Communities, in turn, increasingly shield criminals whom they perceive as protectors of their own people.

Perhaps one of my biggest observations from these visits is the alarming proliferation of arms in civilian hands. There are simply too many sophisticated weapons circulating among non-state actors. These weapons are not manufactured in villages. They arrive through organised trafficking networks and remain hidden within communities.

Unfortunately, many community members know who possesses these arms. They know who participates in attacks. They know who provides logistics and intelligence. Yet they remain silent, often out of fear, ethnic loyalty or expectation of future retaliation. That silence has become one of the greatest obstacles confronting security agencies.

No intelligence operation can succeed where communities refuse to cooperate.

Equally disturbing is the conduct of some political and community leaders whose public utterances sometimes amount to subtle calls to arms. In moments that demand restraint, they choose inflammatory rhetoric. They cast security forces as enemies rather than partners. They reinforce ethnic victimhood while carefully avoiding any condemnation of criminals operating within their own constituencies.

Words matter.

Every careless speech delivered from a podium has consequences in villages where emotions already run dangerously high. Every attempt to delegitimise the military without evidence weakens public confidence and emboldens armed groups.

This is not to suggest that the Armed Forces are infallible. Like every human institution, mistakes occur. Allegations of misconduct should always be investigated transparently and professionally. But there is an important distinction between demanding accountability and deliberately undermining the very institution standing between communities and complete anarchy.

The military can only do so much.

The larger solution sits on the tables of elected leaders—from the President to state governors and local government authorities. They alone possess the constitutional powers to drive coordinated political, economic and social interventions capable of addressing the roots of these conflicts.

Security operations must continue with greater intelligence support and improved inter-agency coordination. But security alone cannot heal communities where trust has collapsed.

Justice must be impartial.

Compensation must not depend on ethnicity.

Prosecution must not depend on political convenience.

Victims deserve equal recognition regardless of whether they are farmers or herders, Christians or Muslims, indigenes or settlers.

Government must reward those who choose peace and punish those who profit from violence without fear or favour. Anything less simply reinforces the perception that violence works.

The country also needs an aggressive programme for arms recovery, community reconciliation, youth engagement and economic revitalisation in the affected areas. Entire generations are growing up knowing nothing except conflict. That should frighten every Nigerian.

Nigeria cannot continue to normalise mass burials.

We cannot continue issuing statements while villages disappear.

We cannot continue allowing children to inherit hatred as though it were family property.

The bloodshed in Plateau and Benue is not just their tragedy. It is Nigeria’s tragedy.

History will not judge us by the number of condolence messages we issued. It will judge us by whether we found the courage to stop the killing while there was still a country united enough to save.

The Blood We Have Normalised

Building a Developmental State: What Nigeria Can Learn from China’s Revolutionary Journey

By Raymond Na’anlep Delmut

Dongfang Scholar, Peking University, China
Nigerian Diplomat, Policy Analyst, and Author

Development is often measured by economic statistics, towering skylines, high-speed railways, and technological breakthroughs. Yet beneath every enduring national transformation lies something far more fundamental, strong institutions, visionary leadership, disciplined governance, and a society united around a long-term national purpose. These are the enduring lessons that emerge from China’s revolutionary history and modernization journey, lessons that hold particular relevance for Nigeria as it seeks to strengthen its institutions and accelerate national development.

Much of the global conversation on China’s rise begins with the economic reforms introduced in 1978. While those reforms undoubtedly transformed the country into one of the world’s leading economic powers, they tell only part of the story. China’s remarkable achievements were built upon institutional foundations laid decades earlier during one of the most difficult periods in its history. The experiences of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Long March, and the revolutionary base at Yan’an created a culture of resilience, organizational discipline, strategic planning, and leadership development that would later underpin one of history’s most remarkable modernization projects.

During the PKU Dongfang Scholars Programme at Peking University, scholars from across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East examined this historical evolution through lectures, policy dialogues, field visits, and engagements with academics and government institutions. One lesson consistently emerged: sustainable development is rarely accidental. It is built patiently through institutions capable of surviving political transitions, adapting to changing realities, and maintaining a consistent national vision.

China’s transformation illustrates that modernization begins long before economic growth becomes visible. The revolutionary administration established in Jiangxi during the early 1930s experimented with governance despite extreme resource constraints. It developed systems of local administration, public health, taxation, education, agricultural management, and judicial administration while confronting military pressure and political uncertainty. When circumstances forced the revolutionary leadership to embark on the Long March, these institutions were not abandoned. Instead, they were preserved, refined, and strengthened.

The Long March itself has become a symbol not simply of endurance but of institutional survival. It demonstrated the importance of preserving leadership, protecting organizational knowledge, and adapting strategy to changing realities. The subsequent establishment of the revolutionary base at Yan’an transformed the movement into a centre of political education, leadership training, policy experimentation, and governance innovation. Many of the principles later associated with China’s modernization including merit-based leadership development, long-term planning, organizational discipline, and continuous policy learning were cultivated during this formative period.

Nigeria’s own historical trajectory has been markedly different. Since independence in 1960, the country has demonstrated enormous resilience despite periods of political instability, civil conflict, constitutional transitions, and changing development priorities. As Africa’s most populous nation and one of its largest economies, Nigeria possesses exceptional human capital, abundant natural resources, entrepreneurial dynamism, and considerable regional influence. Yet these strengths have not consistently translated into sustained institutional effectiveness or broad-based economic transformation.

The comparison between Nigeria and China is not intended to suggest institutional imitation. The two countries differ profoundly in their political systems, historical experiences, constitutional structures, and social realities. Rather, the value of comparison lies in identifying transferable principles that can strengthen governance within Nigeria’s democratic and federal framework.

Perhaps the most significant lesson concerns long-term strategic planning. China’s successive Five-Year Plans have provided continuity across generations of leadership while remaining aligned with broader national development objectives extending several decades into the future. In contrast, Nigeria has produced numerous ambitious development plans, many of which have been weakened by inconsistent implementation, shifting political priorities, and institutional discontinuity. Development becomes more sustainable when national priorities remain consistent regardless of changes in political leadership.

Leadership development represents another important lesson. China has invested systematically in preparing public officials through specialized institutions dedicated to continuous education, strategic planning, and governance. Nigeria already possesses respected institutions such as the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, the Public Service Institute of Nigeria, the Foreign Service Academy, the National Defence College, and the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria. The challenge is not institutional absence but ensuring that leadership development becomes a continuous, merit-based process fully integrated into national governance.

Equally important is the role of institutional discipline. China’s experience demonstrates that effective governance depends upon accountability, performance evaluation, ethical public service, and administrative coordination. Nigeria has established important institutions to promote transparency and combat corruption, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, and the Code of Conduct Bureau. Continued reforms aimed at strengthening coordination, consistency, and public confidence will remain central to building a more effective state.

Infrastructure also emerges as more than an economic asset. China’s investments in transport networks, logistics corridors, industrial parks, and digital infrastructure have served not only economic purposes but also strengthened national integration and state capacity. Nigeria’s continued investment in roads, railways, ports, power, and digital connectivity can similarly contribute to economic growth while reinforcing national cohesion.

Perhaps the most enduring lesson concerns human capital. China’s sustained investment in education, science, technology, engineering, research, and innovation has enabled its transition from labour-intensive manufacturing to a knowledge-driven economy. Nigeria’s greatest strategic resource is not oil, gas, or minerals, but its youthful population. Unlocking that potential will require substantial and sustained investment in education, technical skills, research, entrepreneurship, and digital innovation.

China’s modernization also illustrates the importance of national purpose. Throughout its developmental journey, public institutions have remained broadly aligned around shared national objectives. While democratic societies naturally accommodate political competition and ideological diversity, development itself need not become a partisan issue. Nigeria’s political parties may legitimately differ in policy preferences and governing philosophies, yet education, infrastructure, industrialization, food security, healthcare, technological advancement, and youth development should remain enduring national priorities.

The broader significance of China’s experience extends beyond economics. It demonstrates that modernization is fundamentally a process of building capable institutions, cultivating effective leadership, maintaining policy continuity, and investing in people. These principles are not exclusive to any political ideology. They represent universal foundations of successful state-building.

For Nigeria, the path forward lies not in copying another country’s model but in adapting proven governance principles to its own constitutional, democratic, and cultural realities. The country’s diversity, entrepreneurial energy, diplomatic influence, and youthful population provide immense opportunities for transformation. What remains essential is the sustained commitment to strengthening institutions, promoting accountability, investing in human capital, and maintaining a long-term national development vision.

History reminds us that great nations are rarely built within a single political administration. They are constructed patiently through generations of disciplined leadership, institutional learning, and collective national purpose. China’s revolutionary journey illustrates how resilience, strategic planning, and organizational discipline can eventually produce remarkable modernization. Nigeria possesses the human and material resources to achieve comparable national transformation through its own democratic path.

The future of Nigeria will ultimately depend not on the abundance of its resources but on the strength of its institutions, the quality of its leadership, and the willingness of its citizens to place long-term national development above short-term political interests. The challenge before Nigeria is therefore not simply economic; it is institutional. Building a developmental state begins with building institutions capable of sustaining national progress for generations to come.

Raymond Na’anlep Delmut
is a Nigerian diplomat, policy analyst, Dongfang Scholar Peking University, and author of several books. His research focuses on diplomacy, governance, leadership, modernization, development policy, comparative public administration, and South–South cooperation.

Building a Developmental State: What Nigeria Can Learn from China’s Revolutionary Journey

Africa and France: From Colonial Shadows to a Partnership of Equals

By: Michael Mike

French Emmanuel Macron and Kenyan William Ruto, recently cohosted the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, with the intention of rebuilding relations between France and African countries. Present were many African leaders, Michael Olukayode in this report tries to place what the meeting means to France and Africa, now and in the future

For more than six decades after formal decolonisation, relations between France and Africa have remained among the most complex, controversial and strategically important international relationships in the world. What began as a colonial enterprise evolved into political alliances, military partnerships, economic dependence, cultural exchanges and, increasingly in recent years, bitter disputes over sovereignty and influence.

Today, however, that relationship appears to be entering another turning point.

At the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, Kenya, co-hosted by Emmanuel Macron and William Ruto, African and European leaders attempted to redefine the future of Africa-France relations around the language of equality, co-investment, sovereignty and shared prosperity.

The summit was historically symbolic. For the first time, the traditional Africa-France summit was held in a major Anglophone African country rather than a Francophone former French colony. That alone reflected a deliberate shift in France’s African policy.

But beneath the optimistic language of partnership lies a deeper historical question: can France truly build a new relationship with Africa without confronting the enduring legacies of “Françafrique”?

The Burden of History

France’s relationship with Africa cannot be understood without examining colonialism and the post-independence system that followed it.

Following the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s, France retained enormous political, military and economic influence over many of its former colonies in West and Central Africa. Through military agreements, monetary arrangements such as the CFA franc, strategic resource control, and elite political networks, Paris maintained what became known as “Françafrique” — an informal system of influence that critics described as neo-colonial.

For decades, France intervened militarily in African states, supported friendly governments, influenced political transitions and protected economic interests. French companies dominated sectors ranging from oil and mining to telecommunications and infrastructure.

To many Africans, particularly younger generations, the relationship increasingly appeared unequal. France was often seen not as a partner but as a guardian of old structures that preserved dependency.

Anti-French sentiment grew sharply across parts of West Africa in recent years, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where military juntas expelled French troops and questioned France’s long-standing role in regional security.

This changing political mood explains why the Nairobi summit represented more than diplomacy; it was an attempt at political reinvention.

Macron’s Attempt to Redefine France-Africa Relations

President Macron openly acknowledged during the summit that France’s traditional approach to Africa had become unsustainable.

“For too long,” he admitted, “too many people… saw Africa as their back yard. That is over.”

That statement was perhaps one of the most candid acknowledgements ever made by a French president regarding France’s historical posture toward Africa.

Macron’s speeches in Nairobi repeatedly emphasized that Africa no longer wants charity, paternalism or lectures from Europe.

“The African continent does not want us to come along with aid,” he declared. “People in Africa want us to come and invest.”

Throughout the summit, Macron framed the future relationship around four key concepts:

• equality;
• co-investment;
• sovereignty;
• and mutual strategic interest.

He argued that Europe’s own future prosperity and strategic autonomy are increasingly tied to Africa’s success.

“Supporting your success is a condition of our success,” he said.

This language marked a sharp departure from older diplomatic frameworks in which Africa was often treated primarily as a recipient of aid, humanitarian assistance or security intervention.

Instead, Macron repeatedly described Africa as:

• “the continent of the present,”
• a hub of innovation,
• and a critical partner in technology, energy, industrialisation and artificial intelligence.

The summit also produced concrete economic announcements, including €23 billion in investment pledges for Africa — €14 billion from French firms and €9 billion from African investors.

Why Africa Is No Longer Waiting for Europe

France’s changing tone is not occurring in a vacuum. Africa itself has changed dramatically.

The continent is now the youngest in the world, increasingly urbanised and technologically connected. African governments are diversifying partnerships with China, Turkey, India, Gulf states and Russia. No single external power dominates Africa today.

China’s rise, especially, transformed Africa’s diplomatic landscape. Chinese investment in infrastructure, mining, manufacturing and telecommunications altered the balance of influence that France and other European powers once enjoyed.

Macron himself acknowledged this shift in Nairobi, noting that China, Turkey and the United States had become stronger competitors in Africa because they were often perceived as more commercially aggressive and competitive.

At the same time, African leaders are becoming more assertive in demanding reforms in global governance, financing and trade systems.

This was strongly reflected in the intervention of Bola Tinubu at the summit.

Tinubu’s Intervention: Africa Wants Fairness, Not Charity

President Tinubu’s contribution in Nairobi reflected a broader African frustration with the global economic system.

He argued that Africa’s industrialisation and development are being constrained by unfair financial structures, punitive borrowing costs and weak investment mechanisms.

Tinubu warned that African countries are treated as permanently “high risk” economies, making access to affordable finance extremely difficult.

According to Reuters, Tinubu noted that Nigeria alone is projected to spend $11.6 billion on debt servicing in 2026 — almost half of government revenue.

His intervention aligned closely with the themes raised by Macron and Ruto:

• reform of the global financial architecture;
• support for industrialisation;
• and stronger African economic integration.

Tinubu stressed that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials toward value-added manufacturing and regional industrialisation.

That position echoed Macron’s own argument that Africa should no longer merely export raw minerals and commodities while industrial processing happens elsewhere.

Tinubu also highlighted Nigeria’s maritime ambitions and offered the country’s Deep Blue maritime security project as a regional platform for Gulf of Guinea cooperation.

His broader message was significant: Africa is not asking for sympathy; it is demanding fair participation in the global economy.

That marks a major philosophical shift in Africa’s international diplomacy.

The Central Contradiction: Trust

Despite the optimistic rhetoric in Nairobi, the future of France-Africa relations still faces a fundamental challenge: trust.

Many Africans remain skeptical of France’s intentions.

Online discussions during the summit revealed continuing suspicion about whether France’s new strategy is genuinely different from older patterns of influence. Some commentators accused France of merely shifting its focus from hostile Francophone countries toward more receptive Anglophone states such as Kenya.

Others questioned whether investment-led engagement could simply become a new form of economic dependency rather than genuine partnership.

These concerns are not baseless.

True partnership requires more than speeches and investment announcements. It requires structural change.

Africa’s future relationship with France — and indeed with Europe generally — must therefore be built on several principles.

What the Future Relationship Should Look Like

1. From Extraction to Industrialisation

Africa can no longer remain primarily an exporter of raw materials.

The continent possesses critical minerals essential for global energy transition, digital technology and manufacturing. Yet much of the value addition still occurs outside Africa.

Future France-Africa relations should focus on:

• local manufacturing;
• industrial parks;
• technology transfer;
• and African ownership within supply chains.

Macron acknowledged this reality directly when he said Africa should not merely be “where raw materials… are extracted but also where processing occurs.”

That is perhaps the most important economic issue of the next generation.

2. Financial Justice and Investment Reform

African countries continue to face disproportionately high borrowing costs despite their enormous growth potential.

Tinubu’s call for financial reform highlighted the urgency of this issue.

If France truly wants a new partnership with Africa, it must support:

• fairer sovereign risk assessments;
• lower financing barriers;
• stronger development banks;
• and African-led financial institutions.

Macron’s support for strengthening the Nairobi-based ATIDI guarantee mechanism may represent one step in that direction.

3. Respect for Sovereignty

Military interventions and political interference severely damaged France’s image in Africa.

Future relations must be grounded in non-interference, mutual respect and African leadership in security matters.

The Nairobi Declaration strongly emphasized that Africans must remain the principal actors in resolving African conflicts.

That principle is critical.

4. Youth, Technology and Human Capital

Africa’s greatest resource is not oil, gold or lithium — it is its people.

The summit repeatedly focused on youth, innovation, digital technology, AI, sports and creative industries because both African and European leaders recognize that the continent’s demographic strength could become a global economic engine.

France’s future role should therefore prioritize:

• education partnerships;
• research collaboration;
• digital infrastructure;
• entrepreneurship financing;
• and mobility for African students and professionals.

1. A Relationship Beyond Colonial Memory

History cannot be erased, but it does not have to permanently imprison the future.

France must continue confronting difficult aspects of colonial history honestly, while African governments must also engage pragmatically with new opportunities.

The future cannot be built entirely on resentment, nor can it be built on denial.

What Africa increasingly demands is dignity, reciprocity and respect.

A Defining Transition

The Africa Forward Summit may ultimately be remembered as the moment when France publicly accepted that the old order in Africa had ended.

Macron himself acknowledged this transformation:
“That is over.”

But declarations alone will not redefine the relationship.

The real test will lie in whether:

• investments become genuine partnerships;
• financing becomes fairer;
• African industries become stronger;
• and sovereignty becomes respected in practice rather than rhetoric.

Africa today is no longer a passive actor in global affairs. It is increasingly confident, assertive and strategic.

France can either adapt to this new Africa as an equal partner — or continue losing influence to countries that understand the changing realities more quickly.

The future of France-Africa relations will therefore not be determined in Paris alone.

It will increasingly be shaped in Nairobi, Abuja, Kigali, Lagos, Dakar, Johannesburg and across a continent that is no longer waiting to be spoken for.

Africa and France: From Colonial Shadows to a Partnership of Equals