Opinions
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
By: Zagazola Makama
For more than a decade, Nigeria’s battle against terrorism has largely been viewed through the lens of military operations, troop deployments, air strikes, and battlefield victories. However, as the conflict evolved, security experts increasingly recognised that military force alone could not permanently end violent extremism.
This reality gave rise to Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), a Federal Government initiative designed to complement kinetic operations through deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of eligible low-risk individuals associated with terrorist groups.
Since its establishment, the programme has generated both support and controversy. While proponents describe it as a strategic security tool that weakens terrorist organisations from within, critics argue that it appears to offer opportunities to former insurgents while victims continue to struggle with the consequences of conflict.
The debate raises a fundamental question: can a country defeat terrorism through force alone, or must it also create pathways for disengagement and rehabilitation?
Recent explanations by the Coordinator of OPSC, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Ali, provide useful insights into the rationale behind the programme and the challenges it seeks to address.
Contemporary counterterrorism strategies across the world increasingly combine military operations with non-kinetic interventions. The reason is simple. Insurgencies are sustained not only by weapons and fighters but also by recruitment networks, ideological indoctrination, economic desperation, coercion, fear, and social dislocation. Even successful military campaigns may struggle to achieve lasting peace if these underlying drivers remain unaddressed. Operation Safe Corridor was established to address this gap.
According to programme officials, it provides a controlled process through which eligible low-risk individuals who voluntarily surrender can be screened, rehabilitated, and prepared for reintegration into society. The underlying logic is that every successful defection reduces the manpower available to terrorist organisations while simultaneously encouraging others to abandon violence.
Perhaps the most persistent misconception surrounding OPSC is the belief that it serves as an open-door policy for all insurgents. Available information suggests otherwise. Officials insist that admission into the programme follows extensive intelligence profiling and legal review. Individuals who voluntarily surrender are subjected to screening by military and civilian intelligence agencies before their cases are reviewed by the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The Ministry determines who qualifies for rehabilitation and who should face prosecution under existing legal frameworks. This distinction is critical because public concerns often stem from fears that individuals responsible for serious crimes are simply being released back into society. The programme coordinator maintains that only individuals assessed as low-risk and legally eligible are admitted into the rehabilitation process.
For years, critics have reduced the complex national security programme into simplistic slogans. They call it “a reward for Boko Haram.” They describe it as “pampering terrorists.” Some even falsely claim it is a recruitment channel into the military. These accusations may generate applause on social media, but they disintegrate when closely examined.
The truth is that most of the loudest critics of Operation Safe Corridor have never visited the centre, studied its structure, legal framework, operational processes, or strategic objectives. They react emotionally to a conflict that has caused immense suffering, but emotion is not a substitute for security policy.
The reality is that Operation Safe Corridor is not an act of sympathy toward terrorists. It is an instrument of war. And it may be one of the most important non-kinetic weapons Nigeria has ever deployed against violent extremism.
Nigerians must understand that it is not an amnesty programme, pardon, compensation scheme, reward for terrorism, or a recruitment pathway into security agencies. It is a voluntary programme.
Contrary to popular belief that only Boko Haram members are rehabilitated, not everybody associated with terrorist organisations who enters Operation Safe Corridor comes from the North-East. There are Igbos from the South-East, Yorubas from the South-West, and individuals from other ethnic groups enrolled in the programme.
Additionally, those captured on the battlefield in the North-East do not automatically qualify. Those with prosecutable offences do not automatically qualify. Those assessed as high-risk do not qualify. Those involved in serious criminal activities can face prosecution.
This distinction is critical. Operation Safe Corridor does not decide who enters the programme. The Federal Ministry of Justice does. That fact alone destroys one of the biggest misconceptions surrounding the initiative.
One of the strongest arguments against Operation Safe Corridor is the claim that terrorists simply walk into the camp and are forgiven. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Before admission, individuals undergo extensive profiling involving military intelligence, civilian intelligence agencies, security services, legal authorities, psychologists, and health professionals. Their backgrounds are examined, their activities are investigated, their risk levels are assessed, and their legal status is reviewed. Only after this process are recommendations made.
The programme operates within a multi-agency framework involving more than seventeen Ministries, Departments, and Agencies. This means decisions are not taken by one commander, one agency, or one institution. They are subjected to scrutiny from multiple stakeholders.
Those found to have prosecutable cases can be sent for trial. Those categorised as low-risk may be referred for rehabilitation. This is not leniency; it is classification, and every serious counterterrorism system in the world relies on classification.
The most important question left unanswered is this: if there is no pathway out of terrorism, why would anyone surrender? One basic reality is that a terrorist organisation is weakened not only when fighters are killed. It is weakened when fighters abandon the organisation, as every surrender reduces its manpower, operational capability, intelligence-gathering capacity, and recruitment potential.
This is where Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model, an initiative of Borno state government become strategically important. The programmes creates a credible exit route. And that exit route has helped generate hundreds of thousands of surrenders over the years.
Every surrendered individual represents one less fighter available to conduct attacks, plant IEDs, gather intelligence, transport logistics, recruit new members, or support terrorist operations. In military terms, this is attrition from within.
Based on figures repeatedly cited by military authorities and reports on the deradicalisation programme, the number of Boko Haram/ISWAP members and their families who surrendered through the combined non-kinetic approach involving the Borno Model and Operation Safe Corridor has grown significantly over the years.
In 2018, when the window of opportunity was announced, the military reported that 146 Boko Haram members had voluntarily surrendered under Operation Safe Corridor. By 2019, authorities said over 1,370 fighters had surrendered, with some transferred into rehabilitation programmes.
Following the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, mass defections accelerated, with thousands of fighters and family members laying down their arms. Thousands of people trapped in the Sambisa Forest were able to escape.
In January 2023, the Chief of Defence Staff disclosed that more than 83,000 insurgents and their family members had surrendered. By 2025, military authorities updated the figure to approximately 120,000–129,000 Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters and family members who had surrendered.
For example, in 2026, Defence Headquarters stated that while over 300,000 terrorists and associated persons had surrendered over a decade across the North-East, only 2,615 ex-combatants had undergone rehabilitation under Operation Safe Corridor, with 2,016 graduating from the programme.
It is impossible to understand Nigeria’s recent gains against insurgency without acknowledging the role played by this mechanism. One of the biggest mistakes made by those opposing Operation Safe Corridor is assuming everyone associated with terrorist groups joined voluntarily. The reality is far more complicated.
It is important to note that those who surrendered include fighters, farmers, women, children, and other trapped populations who emerged from insurgent enclaves, not only active combatants.
Military authorities have consistently explained that only a low-risk fraction of the surrendered population qualifies for the formal Operation Safe Corridor deradicalisation programme after screening, profiling, and legal review.
Thousands of individuals were abducted, forced into service, married against their will, recruited as children, coerced through threats, and trapped by circumstances. Many women found within insurgent camps were themselves victims. Many children born within terrorist-controlled territories never chose that environment.
In the Sambisa Forest, there were dozens of villages with people trapped by terrorists. In Gwoza, there are still thousands of people trapped within terrorist enclaves. In the Lake Chad Tumbuns, many farmers and fishermen were trapped in ISWAP-controlled areas. Sometimes they became collateral victims during attacks on terrorist enclaves. Many foot soldiers were not ideological extremists.
Research cited by programme managers indicates that more than 60 percent of foot soldiers in extremist groups are not primarily driven by ideology. Many were coerced or manipulated, with threats of death if they attempted to escape.
A serious nation cannot treat all these categories identically. That is why modern counterterrorism relies on differentiation.
Another myth is that participants simply spend a few months relaxing before returning home. Again, the facts suggest otherwise.
The clients spend several months undergoing rehabilitation. During this period, extremist interpretations are challenged by trained scholars. Participants are exposed to alternative teachings that reject violence and promote lawful coexistence.
Years of conflict leave deep psychological scars. Counselling addresses trauma, fear, guilt, anxiety, behavioural conditioning, and emotional instability. Participants receive practical skills training designed to support lawful livelihoods.
Clients learn about citizenship, lawful conduct, and responsibilities within society.
The rehabilitation programme increasingly focuses on changing behaviour, addressing trauma, and creating alternatives to violence rather than attempting to achieve ideological transformation alone. Within OPSC, rehabilitation reportedly includes religious reorientation, psychosocial support, vocational training, civic education, behavioural assessment, and skills acquisition.
The objective is to help participants disengage from violence and develop the capacity to function productively within society.
One challenge in evaluating deradicalisation programmes is determining what success actually means. Is success measured by the number of people processed through the programme, by the number who do not return to violence, or by broader security outcomes?
Officials point to several indicators. On the other hand, some high-risk or captured terrorists have been detained for seven to eight years in Giwa Barracks and Kainji while prosecution of their cases continued.
Officials at the Joint Investigation Centre located at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri, said it has so far investigated about 1,450 terrorism-related cases, while over 500 Boko Haram terrorists were subsequently convicted by the Federal Ministry of Justice in Kainji, Niger State.
The Commander of the facility, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Audu, who disclosed this while outlining the structure, operations, and reforms of the multi-agency detention and investigation centre supporting counterterrorism efforts in the North-East, said the facility remains central to Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents.
He disclosed that “recently, the centre moved over 500 suspects for trial, most of whom were convicted and are serving various jail terms,” adding that the development reflects improved coordination among security and justice institutions handling terrorism cases.
The existence of Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model is believed to have contributed to the surrender of over 300,000 individuals to Nigerian troops over time. Some of the rescued or surrendered victims have been reunited with their families by the Borno State Government, while Operation Safe Corridor has so far graduated more than 2,600 individuals from the programme since inception.
From a strategic perspective, these figures suggest that the programmes may be helping to reduce the pool of active fighters available to extremist groups, as every surrender represents not only one less combatant on the battlefield but also a potential source of intelligence and a signal to others that exit options exist.
Nevertheless, experts caution that long-term outcomes remain the most important measure.
The true test lies in whether reintegrated individuals remain peaceful, productive, and accepted within their communities years after completing rehabilitation.
Critics often portray Operation Safe Corridor as some bizarre Nigerian experiment. It is not. Comparable programmes exist worldwide. Somalia has implemented disengagement initiatives for defectors from Al-Shabaab. Colombia developed reintegration systems following the FARC conflict. Many countries facing insurgencies rely on combinations of military pressure and rehabilitation frameworks.
Consequently, acceptance of former associates of terrorist groups is often difficult. Many victims understandably question why resources appear to be directed toward former combatants while communities continue to struggle. This perception has become one of the most significant public relations and policy challenges facing OPSC.
Programme managers acknowledge the concern and argue that sustainable peace requires a balance between supporting victims and rehabilitating eligible returnees.
According to officials, victim-centred initiatives are increasingly being incorporated into broader stabilisation efforts, including psychosocial support and community recovery programmes.
Another major issue is funding. According to OPSC officials, Defence Headquarters and a few non-governmental organisations currently bear much of the financial responsibility for activities within the rehabilitation camp.
However, reintegration, the phase widely regarded as the most important remains significantly underfunded. Successful reintegration requires transportation, livelihood support, community sensitisation, monitoring, mentorship, and follow-up services.
Without adequate resources, there is a risk that individuals may return to environments characterised by unemployment, social rejection, and economic hardship.
Such conditions can undermine rehabilitation gains and increase vulnerability to relapse. Therefore, experts argue that the long-term success of OPSC will depend not only on what happens inside the camp but also on the strength of support systems available after graduation. International experiences also show that weak reintegration systems can undermine otherwise successful rehabilitation efforts.
This lesson appears particularly relevant to Nigeria, where economic challenges and community mistrust remain significant obstacles.
As insecurity continues to evolve, Operation Safe Corridor itself is undergoing transformation. Authorities are expanding deradicalisation infrastructure beyond the North-East, including facilities in Zamfara and planned structures in the North-Central region.
There is also increasing emphasis on victim support, community ownership, strategic communication, and livelihood programmes.
Ultimately, the debate surrounding OPSC reflects a broader question confronting modern counterterrorism efforts worldwide.
Can security be achieved solely through military victories, or does lasting peace require addressing the human dimensions of conflict?
While opinions remain divided, one point appears increasingly clear.
Military operations may remove immediate threats, but sustainable peace often depends on what happens after the guns fall silent. In that regard, Operation Safe Corridor represents Nigeria’s attempt to navigate the difficult balance between security, justice, rehabilitation, and long-term stability.
Whether the programme ultimately achieves its objectives will depend not only on the quality of rehabilitation within the camps but also on the nation’s ability to support victims, strengthen communities, and sustain reintegration long after participants leave the programme.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter-Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region.
OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism
Opinions
LET PLATEAU BREATHE AGAIN
LET PLATEAU BREATHE AGAIN
His Excellency has made a heartfelt appeal to Birom militias, Mwaghavul Militiamen and other cattle rustlers: stop stealing cows and let Plateau be in peace.
“I want to appeal to our People, as we are dealing with criminality and terrorism, we must not be found to be involved in criminality ourselves.
“The incidences of cattle rustling, let none of us be found involved. Because when we catch you, we will also deal with you as a criminal.
“You cannot rustle cows and bring death upon us. We will not accept it.
“And even those who are involved in this criminal enterprise of cattle rustling, whether they are in the security agencies or even in the communities where the cattle are rustled from, we are watching you.
“And we will go after everybody that does that to be able to deal with the situation
Thank you, Your Excellency. 🙏
The world is watching and the world must see Plateau choose peace.
LET PLATEAU BREATHE AGAIN
Opinions
After Barmou: Is Niger shifting from a counter-terrorism army to a regime-protection force?
After Barmou: Is Niger shifting from a counter-terrorism army to a regime-protection force?
By: Zagazola Makama
The removal of Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou as Chief of Staff of the Nigerien Armed Forces marks far more than a routine change at the top of the military hierarchy.
It may represent the opening phase of a deeper restructuring of Niger’s armed forces following the reported military mutiny of late August a restructuring driven not only by operational requirements, but increasingly by the ruling authorities’ overriding concern: loyalty to the regime.
On Friday, Sept. 11, Niger’s authorities announced the appointment of Brig. Gen. Mamane Sani Kiaou, previously Chief of Staff of the Army, as the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, replacing Barmou.
The appointment came only days after reports of a serious internal military crisis that exposed divisions within the security establishment and raised questions about the confidence of Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani’s government in elements of its own armed forces.
The timing is significant. From elite commander to casualty of a military fracture Barmou was not an ordinary military officer.
Long before the July 2023 coup, he was one of the principal figures in the development of Niger’s special operations capabilities. He had commanded special forces formations and was closely associated with the Special Operations Command and Special Intervention Battalions.
He was also regarded as an experienced operational commander with extensive exposure to Western military training and international security cooperation. That background makes his removal particularly significant.
The very units and operational structures that Barmou helped build were designed to do one thing: find the enemy, move rapidly, strike hard and sustain pressure against armed groups operating across Niger’s vast and difficult terrain.
Today, however, some of those same capabilities appear to have become a source of political anxiety for the authorities. The question confronting the regime is no longer simply whether the army can defeat the Islamic State Sahel Province or Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). It is whether the most capable elements of the army can also be trusted not to challenge the government. That distinction could fundamentally reshape Niger’s military doctrine.
The reported military disturbances of Aug. 28 and 29 appear to have exposed a fracture that had been building beneath the surface. The crisis reportedly involved officers and personnel associated with highly trained operational formations precisely the kind of forces that any government fighting a determined insurgency would normally want to strengthen.
But for a regime that has already come to power through a military takeover, an armed force capable of independent action presents a different calculation. A professional military needs initiative. A regime worried about another coup needs control. That is the dilemma now confronting Niamey.
If the authorities conclude that highly trained and autonomous combat formations can become politically dangerous, they may begin prioritising loyalty over operational independence. That could mean targeted removals, transfers, command changes, closer surveillance of senior officers and a restructuring of special operations formations.
It could also mean strengthening formations considered politically more dependable, particularly those directly responsible for protecting the leadership. The circumstances surrounding Barmou’s departure are particularly important. According to information contained in the original analysis, Barmou was reportedly involved in attempts to manage the military crisis without escalating it into a confrontation between Nigerien soldiers.
He was said to have favoured negotiations with mutinous personnel, while other elements of the leadership reportedly considered a more forceful response, including Russian assistance.
Whether every element of that account is ultimately confirmed remains to be seen. But the broader political message is already clear.
Barmou’s removal suggests that the authorities are no longer comfortable leaving the management of sensitive military crises entirely in the hands of commanders whose primary instinct may be to preserve institutional cohesion. For a professional army, avoiding a fight between soldiers is often a virtue.
For a regime facing an internal military challenge, however, negotiation can be interpreted as weakness, hesitation or insufficient loyalty. That is where the relationship between operational professionalism and political reliability becomes dangerous.
Who is Mamane Sani Kiaou?
Kiaou enters the position at a particularly difficult moment. Before his promotion, he had reportedly toured several defence areas, including Agadez and Zinder, with official messaging focused on cohesion, engagement with troops, countering misinformation and lessons from the August crisis. His elevation therefore appears to have a significance beyond ordinary military rotation. He could be tasked with restoring discipline and operational effectiveness. But he may also be expected to restore political control over the military establishment.
If that becomes the dominant mission, the restructuring could extend deep into the special forces, command structures and elite formations. The immediate priority could be to ensure that no military formation becomes sufficiently autonomous, influential or powerful to pose a challenge to the political leadership.
This is where the greatest strategic danger lies.
Special forces are valuable because they possess initiative, cohesion, mobility, specialist training and the ability to operate with considerable independence. Those characteristics make them highly effective against insurgents. But those same characteristics can become politically uncomfortable for governments that fear military intervention. The temptation, therefore, is to dilute those capabilities.
Commanders can be rotated. Units can be reorganised. Senior officers can be transferred.
Special operations structures can be placed under tighter political supervision. Elite formations can be dispersed or absorbed into larger structures. And officers considered too influential or insufficiently reliable can gradually be removed from positions of authority.
Such measures may reduce the immediate coup risk. But they can also reduce battlefield effectiveness. An elite military capability that took years to build cannot simply be recreated by presidential decree. Training, institutional memory, battlefield experience, trust between commanders and soldiers, and the ability to operate independently under pressure are accumulated over years. Destroying that architecture is considerably easier than rebuilding it.
The jihadists may benefit from the distraction
This is the strategic paradox facing Niger.
While Niamey concentrates on controlling its military, JNIM and Islamic State militants remain focused on expanding their operational space.
The areas of Tillabéri, Tahoua and Diffa, together with Niger’s wider borderlands and the Liptako-Gourma region, require highly mobile, experienced and locally knowledgeable forces.
If elite formations become preoccupied with internal investigations, loyalty assessments, command changes and political surveillance, the insurgents may exploit the resulting gaps.
A commander worried about whether his decisions will later be interpreted as political disloyalty may become less willing to take operational risks. An officer concerned that influence over his troops could make him politically suspicious may avoid building strong independent command relationships. A military organisation obsessed with internal loyalty can gradually become less willing to exercise the initiative required in counter-insurgency warfare.
That is how a political security strategy can unintentionally produce an operational security problem.
Implications for Nigeria
If Niger’s elite combat units are weakened or distracted by internal restructuring, JNIM and Islamic State elements could exploit the security gaps along the Niger–Nigeria border. Instability in Niger could push terrorists, weapons and fighters toward Nigeria, particularly through vulnerable areas of Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa and Yobe. Any deterioration in Niger’s military effectiveness could force Nigeria to deploy more resources to its northern borders and intensify surveillance and counter-terrorism operations. Increased Russian involvement in Niger could alter the regional security balance and potentially complicate intelligence-sharing and military cooperation between Niger and Nigeria. A politically preoccupied Nigerien military may have less capacity for effective cooperation with Nigeria and other regional partners against JNIM, Islamic State and cross-border criminal networks. lastly, Bandits, arms traffickers and terrorist groups could exploit any security vacuum along the largely porous Nigeria–Niger frontier.
The biggest concern for Nigeria is that a military focused increasingly on regime security rather than battlefield effectiveness could create a security vacuum on its doorstep. Any prolonged weakening of Niger’s counter-terrorism capacity would inevitably increase pressure on Nigeria’s already stretched northern security architecture.
Russia and the growing role of Africa Corps
Another dimension is Niger’s increasing reliance on Russian security support, particularly Africa Corps. Russian personnel can provide specialised capabilities, protect strategic installations and support selected operations.
But they cannot replace the Nigerien military.
Niger is a vast country of more than one million square kilometres, with difficult terrain, porous borders and insurgent networks that exploit local knowledge, mobility and community relationships. No foreign force can substitute indefinitely for a national military capable of operating across that entire environment.
The danger is therefore the emergence of a two-tier security system: heavily protected political and strategic centres around Niamey, while remote communities remain dependent on increasingly stretched national forces.
If the most capable Nigerien formations are simultaneously being reorganised for political reasons, the resulting gap could become even more significant.
The future position of Defence Minister Salifou Mody will also be important. Questions surrounding a possible reconfiguration of the military leadership have already generated speculation about whether Mody could eventually be moved to another political position while Tiani assumes greater direct control over defence affairs. There has also been speculation about Gen. Amadou Ibro, Tiani’s chief of staff, potentially receiving expanded responsibilities. These scenarios remain unconfirmed. But if subsequent decrees produce further changes at the top of Niger’s security architecture, Barmou’s removal will likely be remembered not as an isolated personnel decision but as the first visible step in a much wider restructuring.
The real test for Kiaou
The defining question for Mamane Sani Kiaou will therefore not simply be whether he can restore discipline. It will be what kind of discipline he is being asked to restore. If the objective is to rebuild cohesion, strengthen command structures, protect professional competence and ensure that the army remains focused on defeating insurgent groups, the restructuring could ultimately strengthen the Nigerien Armed Forces. But if the central objective is to ensure that the army can never again become a threat to the regime, the consequences could be very different.
The distinction is fundamental. An army built primarily around political loyalty looks toward the capital and asks: An army built primarily around national defence looks toward the battlefield and asks. The danger for Niger is that the two missions could gradually become confused.
Before the 2023 coup, the country invested heavily in building specialised forces capable of intelligence gathering, rapid deployment and counter-terrorism operations. The post-coup authorities inherited that architecture.
But the August 2026 crisis appears to have changed the political calculus. The men best trained to fight insurgents may now also be viewed as the men most capable of challenging the regime. That creates an uncomfortable choice.
The coming months will reveal which path Niamey chooses. If the restructuring preserves professional competence while restoring discipline and institutional cohesion, Niger could emerge with a more unified military.
If, however, loyalty tests, purges and political control become more important than battlefield effectiveness, the country could enter a dangerous cycle in which the military spends more time watching itself than watching the enemy. And that is precisely the opportunity insurgent groups do not need to be told about.
After Barmou: Is Niger shifting from a counter-terrorism army to a regime-protection force?
Opinions
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu Is Nigeria’s Greatest-Ever Leader
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu Is Nigeria’s Greatest-Ever Leader
The case for judging leadership not by the comfort it preserves, but by the institutions it builds, the difficult choices it confronts and the future it makes possible.
By Princess Zahrah
Mustapha Audu, the Director-General, Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC), and the National Publicity Secretary, City Boy Movement
History has an inconvenient habit of making consequential leadership clearer in retrospect than it appears in real time.
Those who live through periods of reform experience disruption, uncertainty and disagreement. Historians, arriving later, see trajectories. They identify the decisions that altered institutions, the political choices that changed the direction of nations and the leaders who possessed the foresight to act before consensus made action easy.
Nigeria is living through such a moment.
It is therefore worth advancing a proposition that deserves to be examined seriously rather than dismissed as political hyperbole: President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is Nigeria’s greatest-ever leader.
Greatness, of course, is not perfection. Nor does it require pretending that reform has been painless or that every policy has produced its intended outcome. The more demanding test of leadership is whether a statesman can recognise the structural problems of his age, confront what others have postponed, build institutions rather than merely occupy them, develop political and administrative capacity, and make decisions whose significance extends beyond the immediate electoral calendar.
Measured against those criteria, Tinubu’s record is exceptional.
A Political Life of Unusual Consequence
The mistake in much contemporary analysis of President Tinubu is to begin his political biography on 29 May 2023. His significance predates the presidency by three decades. He was an elected senator in the Third Republic, became associated with the struggle for democratic restoration during military rule, experienced exile, returned to Nigeria and became Governor of Lagos State in 1999. After eight years as governor, something unusual occurred: President Tinubu left office without leaving political consequence.
He became one of the central organisers of opposition politics, helping construct alliances that eventually contributed to the formation of the All Progressives Congress and the historic democratic transfer of federal power in 2015. That trajectory matters.
Many politicians possess power while occupying office. Far fewer demonstrate the capacity to organise people, institutions and coalitions when the formal machinery of the state is no longer theirs to command.
President Tinubu’s career has therefore been distinguished not simply by longevity, but by institutional and political endurance.
From Lagos to the Philosophy of the Capable State
The intellectual origins of the Tinubu presidency are perhaps most visible in Lagos. When he became governor in 1999, Lagos embodied a central contradiction of the Nigerian condition: extraordinary private dynamism coexisting with inadequate public capacity. The challenge was not merely determining what government should do. It was building a government capable of doing it.
States do not become effective because their leaders possess admirable intentions. They become effective when institutions can mobilise revenue, formulate policy, execute decisions, enforce rules predictably and create the conditions in which private enterprise can flourish. The Lagos experience helped establish a principle that has remained visible throughout Tinubu’s political life: government must possess the capacity to govern. That proposition is now being tested nationally.
Ending the Politics of Postponement
Nigeria’s structural economic difficulties did not begin in 2023. For decades, the country accumulated distortions: an increasingly expensive petrol subsidy, foreign-exchange imbalances, weak public revenues, infrastructure deficits, import dependence and administrative inefficiencies that imposed substantial costs on businesses.
Governments understood many of these problems. What Nigeria frequently lacked was the political willingness to confront them decisively. The country consequently developed what might be described as a political economy of postponement: the political cost of reform was immediate, while the cost of avoiding reform could conveniently be transferred to the future.President Tinubu disrupted that logic.
The removal of the petrol subsidy was consequential precisely because previous administrations understood the problem but struggled to resolve it permanently. The transition has imposed genuine hardship on Nigerians. Any intellectually credible defence of reform must acknowledge this. But hardship does not settle the policy question.
The relevant question is whether the previous arrangement could have been sustained indefinitely — and what the eventual cost of continued postponement would have been. Leadership sometimes requires choosing not between difficulty and comfort, but between the difficulty of adjustment today and the greater danger of structural failure tomorrow.
Making Nigeria Work
Perhaps the less dramatic but potentially more enduring transformation is occurring within government itself. Economic competitiveness is frequently discussed in terms of capital, infrastructure and markets. Yet one of its most important determinants is something less glamorous: the efficiency of the state. A permit is economics, a customs procedure is economics, a company registration is economics, a commercial court is economics, the time required to obtain an approval is economics.
Every unnecessary procedure imposes a cost. Every unpredictable regulation introduces uncertainty. Every hour an entrepreneur spends navigating bureaucracy is an hour unavailable for production, innovation and expansion. This is why the ease-of-doing-business agenda matters. Through PEBEC and the broader business-facilitation framework, the objective is not simply to make bureaucracy more convenient. It is to reduce the institutional cost of being productive in Nigeria. The philosophy underlying these reforms is more significant than any individual procedure:Government should facilitate legitimate enterprise rather than constitute an obstacle to it. Nigeria has never been more efficient and accountable , this is only possible because of President Tinubu’s commitment to building a $1 Trillion Dollar Economy by 2030.
The Burden of Foresight
Reform possesses an inherent political cruelty: its costs are frequently immediate while its benefits take time. Citizens encounter price adjustments today.
Investment responds later. An old system can be dismantled quickly; the productive ecosystem intended to replace it may require years. This is why foresight is rarely popular in the moment. Foresight is not the ability to predict the future perfectly. It is the capacity to recognise that continuing the present is itself a decision about the future. President Tinubu’s political career has been characterised by an unusual willingness to expend political capital rather than simply accumulate it. That distinction matters, Nigeria cannot currently point to any other leader with a comparable record of building leaders and planning diligently for the future.
Why Tinubu’s Record Is Different
Nigeria has produced extraordinary leaders, and acknowledging Tinubu’s significance requires no diminution of their contributions. But the breadth of his political journey is unusual. Senator. Pro-democracy figure. Exile. Two-term governor. Opposition organiser. Coalition builder. Party strategist. Presidential candidate. President. Economic reformer. This is more than longevity; this shows visionary patriotic dedication to purpose. The argument for President Tinubu as Nigeria’s greatest-ever leader therefore does not rest upon a single policy or moment. It rests upon accumulation of political struggle, development of people, institutions and ultimately the accumulation of difficult decisions taken.
Give Him His Flowers — And Record History Properly Nigeria has an unfortunate habit of becoming intellectually generous toward its leaders only after they are gone. The controversial statesman becomes visionary in the obituary. Decisions once condemned become courageous in retrospect. Perspective arrives when recognition can no longer be received. We should not require death to become historically fair.
Giving President Tinubu his flowers does not mean suspending scrutiny. I encourage us to all continue to demand results, demand better leaving conditions, social amenities and infrastructural development. But while making those demands, we should possess sufficient historical intelligence to recognise consequential leadership while it is occurring.
President Tinubu’s work is unfinished. History’s final verdict cannot yet be written. But his place in Nigerian history is already impossible to ignore. Few Nigerian political lives have traversed so much history, shaped so many institutions and remained consequential across so many different political eras. That is why, in my considered view, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is Nigeria’s greatest-ever leader to date.
Not because he has solved every Nigerian problem, not because leadership is synonymous with perfection, but because the deepest measure of statesmanship is ultimately the capacity to see beyond the country one inherits, to confront the problems others postpone, and to organise institutions, people and political power in pursuit of the country that might yet be built. I stand bold to state that posterity will judge President Bola Ahmed Tinubu favorably.
Princess Zahrah Mustapha Audu
Director General – Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) & National Publicity Secretary – City Boy Movement.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu Is Nigeria’s Greatest-Ever Leader
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