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Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
By: Zagazola Makama
Mali stands at a critical turning point as fresh negotiations between the Tuareg rebels of northern Mali and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) gain momentum. According to sources close to both groups, these talks represent a significant shift in strategy that could fundamentally reshape the security and political landscape of the Sahel.
For the Tuareg rebels, these negotiations are a response to Mali’s recent national consultations, which called for dialogue with jihadist groups but excluded northern armed factions from the process. Additionally, Tuareg leaders argue that grassroots communities who have been caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict are pushing for a settlement to avoid further bloodshed.
On the other hand, the rebels say they are keen to avoid the mistakes of 2012, when the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) initially seized control of northern Mali, only to be overpowered by jihadist forces, leading to a rapid escalation of violence and the subsequent 2013 French military intervention.
A Shift in JNIM’s Strategy
A key factor encouraging the Tuareg rebels to engage in talks is the shifting approach of JNIM itself. Over the years, the group has evolved in its tactics, messaging, and governance strategy. Unlike the extremist brutality displayed in 2012, JNIM has refined its policies, making it a more pragmatic and structured insurgency.
According to sources close to the Tuareg rebels, JNIM’s leadership began reassessing its position following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s ability to consolidate power while maintaining Afghanistan’s territorial integrity served as a model. Additionally, recent jihadist dynamics in Syria further influenced JNIM’s approach, leading to a reconsideration of its long-term objectives in Mali.
Statements from key JNIM figures, including Amadou Koufa, leader of Katiba Macina, and Jafar Dicko, head of JNIM operations in Burkina Faso, indicate a growing willingness to compromise. Their recent declarations have emphasized political and governance issues rather than outright military conquest.
Most notably, a recent JNIM communiqué framed the military juntas in the region as obstacles to regional stability. The statement called for international intervention against these governments, signaling that JNIM sees an opportunity to reposition itself as a legitimate actor rather than a purely insurgent force.
This convergence of interests between Tuareg rebels and JNIM has laid the groundwork for negotiations, with both sides willing to soften their positions for mutual benefit.
Key Points of Negotiation
JNIM sources have confirmed that discussions are ongoing, with a primary focus on governance and the role of Sharia law. Historically, one of the main points of contention between the two factions has been JNIM’s strict interpretation of Islamic law, which led to the breakdown of their alliance in 2012.
However, the current negotiations propose a new governance model in which Sharia law would be implemented at the local level, but administered by community-based religious authorities rather than JNIM operatives. This compromise, according to sources, has been accepted by JNIM’s leadership.
Another major shift is JNIM’s perspective on Mali’s territorial integrity. Rather than supporting the Tuareg rebels’ long-standing push for an independent Azawad, JNIM has reportedly argued that regional and international actors would be more likely to tolerate an Islamic governance structure within a unified Mali rather than outright secession.
JNIM’s ability to convince Tuareg leaders to focus on governing northern Mali rather than seeking full independence represents a major ideological shift. The jihadist group is prepared to support Tuareg fighters in taking control of key territories, but with the understanding that these areas would be governed under an Islamic framework rather than an independent Tuareg state.
A New Governance Model for Northern Mali?
Sources close to JNIM say that if the alliance moves forward, the group is ready to coordinate and administer territories alongside Tuareg rebels. However, lessons from the 2012 conflict have prompted a change in strategy.
Rather than raising the black flag of al-Qaeda over captured cities a move that led to international military intervention in the past—JNIM plans to allow Tuareg governance structures to manage administrative affairs. This means that while JNIM would retain influence, it would avoid direct control over urban areas, instead allowing local Tuareg leadership to take the forefront.
Such a strategy could serve multiple purposes: Reducing the risk of foreign military intervention by keeping governance in the hands of local Tuareg leaders, JNIM would present a less overt threat to international powers. Legitimizing its role in Mali’s political landscape rather than being seen purely as an extremist group, JNIM could position itself as a political and security partner in the region. Avoiding the mistakes of 2012 The rapid downfall of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 was largely due to its inability to maintain control. By working together with the rebels rather than sidelining them, JNIM aims to ensure a more sustainable presence.
The Question of Al-Qaeda Affiliation
One of the most sensitive aspects of the negotiations revolves around JNIM’s relationship with al-Qaeda’s central command. According to sources, there is ongoing internal debate about whether the group should formally distance itself from al-Qaeda.
For JNIM leaders, the question is not just ideological but also strategic. Some within the group believe that dissociating from al-Qaeda could open doors to direct negotiations with Western governments. Others argue that such a move would require religious justification, possibly linked to a major political development such as the formal independence of Azawad or the collapse of the Malian government in Bamako.
Interestingly, sources indicate that JNIM is more willing to negotiate its future with Western powers directly rather than through Tuareg intermediaries. The concern within JNIM is that Tuareg leaders could use any potential al-Qaeda split as leverage in their own diplomatic engagements with France and other international actors.
Conclusion: A Game-Changer for Mali?
If these negotiations result in a formal agreement, the implications for Mali and the wider Sahel could be profound. A coordinated Tuareg-JNIM alliance would not only reshape local power dynamics but could also alter the trajectory of jihadist movements across West Africa.
The shift in JNIM’s strategy from ideological extremism to pragmatic governance signals a broader recalibration of jihadist operations in the region. Whether this shift leads to long-term stability or another round of conflict remains to be seen.
What is clear, however, is that Mali’s security landscape is on the brink of another transformation one that could redefine the balance of power in the Sahel for years to come.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region
Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
ADC Unveils Timetable, Guidelines for 2025/2026 Congresses, National Convention
By: Michael Mike
The African Democratic Congress (ADC), has released a comprehensive timetable and guidelines for the conduct of its congresses and national convention for the 2025/2026 political year, as part of efforts to strengthen internal democracy and reposition the party ahead of future elections.
The guidelines are contained in a National Secretariat Circular dated December 30, 2025, and signed by the party’s National Chairman, Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe.
According to the circular, the party’s activities will commence with a Board of Trustees (BoT) meeting scheduled for January 5, 2025, followed by a National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting on January 7, 2025.
Key agenda items at the NEC meeting include the filling of vacancies in the National Working Committee (NWC), the fixing of dates for membership registration and revalidation, and preparations for ward, local government and state congresses.
He said: “For 2026, the ADC announced that membership registration and revalidation will take place from January 2 to January 15. This will be followed by ward executive committee congresses on January 17, with matters arising to be addressed between January 19 and 22.
“Local government congresses are scheduled for January 24, while state executive committee congresses will be held on January 31, 2026. Matters Arising: February 2-5, 2026 National-Level Activities.
“National Working Committee Convention: d. The approved delegates to the State Congresses, as provided for in Article 24 (a) – (e) and specifically modified by a resolution of the NWC at its 17th December, 2026 in National
headquarters Abuja are as follows: Local Government Chairmen
“LGA Secretaries; Youth Leader; Women Leader; State Executive Committee members and National Executive Committee (NEC) members from the State; PWD Leader; Ex-Officio Member; All Elected Council Chairman and their Deputies; Board of Trustees Member; Zonal National Officer; Any Elected National / State Assembly Members; Legal Adviser.
“States shall constitute Congress Planning Committees, membership of which shall not include persons contesting for any of the state executive offices.
“All persons willing to contest for state offices shall register their intentions with the State Congress Committee with an intention Fees N2,000.00 (Two Thousand Naira Only) which the Congress Committee may utilize for the purpose of financing the congresses, in part.
“The State Executive Committee shall supervise the work of the Congress Planning Committee to ensure strict compliance with the guidelines on State Congresses.
“Approved composition and distribution of the State Executive Committee members should, as much as practicable, be carried out according to the Senatorial Zones and in compliance with the Party’s Constitutional provision (Article 5, 17):
“Senatorial Zone with the highest number of members (6 positions). Chairman; Asst. Secretary; Asst. Financial Secretary; Auditor; Organizing Secretary; Women Leader; Senatorial Zone with 2nd highest number of members (5 positions); Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Legal Adviser, Asst. Publicity Secretary, Asst.”
On zoning, the ADC disclosed that distribution of state executive committee positions should, as much as practicable, reflect senatorial zones and comply with the party’s constitutional provisions.
The party’s National Working Committee convention is slated for February 13 to 15, 2026.
The party emphasised that only validly registered or revalidated members whose names appear in the official membership register will be eligible to participate in the congresses, in line with provisions of the ADC constitution.
State chapters were also directed to formally notify the National Secretariat of the dates, venues and times of their congresses to enable proper communication with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
He said: “The criteria for qualification to contest for executive positions in the State Executive Committee are as follows: At least, attendance of Secondary School; The Offices of State Legal Adviser, Treasurer and Financial Secretary should have experiences in their respective professions; else the offices should be occupied by persons best deemed suitable.
“The Office of the State Youth Leader must NOT be more than 25 years while that of the State Woman Leader is exclusively reserved for Women.
“All pre-congress appeals shall be determined not later than 24 hours before the congresses while all appeals consequent upon the congresses shall be determined within 3 days after the congresses.
“The Congress Planning Committee shall submit reports of congresses to the National Secretariat via adcnationalcongressreformcommitee@gmail.com not later than 5 working days after the congresses.”
The party urged members and state chapters to strictly adhere to the guidelines to ensure transparent, credible and orderly congresses nationwide.
ADC Unveils Timetable, Guidelines for 2025/2026 Congresses, National Convention
Multiple terrorists neutralised in Sambisa as coordinated strikes unsettle ISWAP commanders
By: Zagazola Makama
Fresh intelligence emerging from the Sambisa Forest indicates significant disarray within the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) following a series of coordinated ground and aerial strikes by Nigerian forces that dislodged key terrorist hideouts and neutralised dozens of fighters at the turn of the new year.
Zagazola Makama report that on Jan. 2, 2026, intercepted intelligence revealed growing concern among senior ISWAP commanders, including Jundullah and Ibn Hataf, after troops launched a surprise and “deadly” assault on the Balangaje hideout deep inside the Sambisa Forest on Jan. 1.
According to the sources, the Balangaje position described as a long-standing ISWAP enclave was completely overrun by the troops of Operation HADIN KAI, forcing surviving fighters to flee in disarray to other parts of the forest.
The commanders reportedly admitted that their forces were caught unprepared, resulting in a chaotic retreat in which many fighters were cut off and forced to escape individually, abandoning weapons, logistics and command structures.
More critically, the terrorists expressed concern over the fate of several senior commanders who have remained unaccounted for since the assault, raising strong indications of leadership casualties or severe command-and-control breakdown.
Security sources confirmed that the ground assault on Balangaje was launched by forces of 21 Armored Brigade operating in Nguro Soye in Bama Local Government Area.
Zagazola report that this ground success was decisively reinforced by precision air operations conducted under Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK), marking what one source described as a “welcome to 2026” for insurgent groups operating in the North-East.
On Jan. 1, following authorisation by OPHK, air assets engaged multiple high-value terrorist targets across Sambisa, Gava and the wider OPHK Area of Responsibility.
At about 0027 hours, an armed aircraft code-named Dragon, carried out a precision strike on a building with solar panels at Chiralia, identified as a terrorist logistics and command facility. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) confirmed the structure was engulfed in flames, with secondary explosions suggesting the presence of stored fuel, explosives or logistics caches.
Further ISR operations tracked suspected Boko Haram Terrorists converging between rocky outcrops in the Gava axis. At approximately 0035 hours on Jan. 2, a precision strike was authorised and executed on the identified coordinates, with Battle Damaged Assessment confirming that about 11 suspected terrorists were neutralised.
Minutes later, surveillance assets observed about 10 additional terrorists fleeing the Gava settlements in panic after hearing the explosions. Continuous tracking revealed another convergence of about eight fighters under a tree, prompting a second precision strike at about 0114 hours.
BDA from the second engagement indicated that the eight terrorists were neutralised, while others fled in different directions. A secondary explosion was again observed near the strike point, reinforcing assessments that the location served as a weapons or logistics cache.
In a related operation, ISR assets identified a large concealed structure covered by trees and fitted with materials suspected to be solar panels, alongside a smaller adjoining building. Following clearance, the larger structure was engaged at about 0229 hours on Jan. 2, with BDA confirming its complete destruction.
Security analysts say the cumulative impact of these strikes has been profound. Beyond the immediate neutralisation of fighters, the operations degraded ISWAP’s logistics, energy supply, shelter and command infrastructure, while also exposing vulnerabilities in what had been considered secure forest hideouts.
The fact that ISWAP commanders are openly worried about missing senior leaders is significant. It points to either high-value casualties or a breakdown in their internal communication, both of which weaken their operational effectiveness.
The Sambisa Forest, once the symbolic and operational heartland of Boko Haram factions, has increasingly become a contested battlespace, with sustained intelligence-driven operations denying terrorists the freedom to regroup or reorganise.
The latest operations also illustrated the growing synergy between ground surface forces and air assets, particularly ISR-enabled precision strikes that exploit real-time intelligence to devastating effect.
The loss of Balangaje and the destruction of multiple hideouts across Chiralia, Gava and IRONS GATE axes further compress ISWAP fighters into smaller, more exposed pockets, increasing the likelihood of defections, internal fragmentation and further leadership losses.
As of press time, operations across the Sambisa Forest were ongoing.
The latest successes reaffirm the momentum of Operation Hadin Kai and suggest that insurgent groups entering 2026 are doing so under sustained pressure, shrinking space and growing internal anxiety over survival.
Multiple terrorists neutralised in Sambisa as coordinated strikes unsettle ISWAP commanders
Gunmen abduct village head in Kwara, wife injured
By: Zagazola Makama
Gunmen have abducted the village head of Afin community in Babanla area of Kwara State, injuring his wife during the attack.
Security sources said the incident occurred at about 10:00 a.m. on Jan. 2, when the assailants invaded Afin Village via Babanla, firing sporadically to scare residents.
The sources said the attackers whisked away the village head, Oba Simeon Olaonipekun, while his wife sustained gunshot injuries during the attack.
She was rushed to the General Hospital, Omu-Aran, for medical treatment.
Following the incident, security personnel and local vigilantes were mobilised to the area to track the assailants and rescue the abducted traditional ruler.
The sources said the scene of the incident was visited as efforts continued to trail the gunmen and prevent further attacks in the area.
Investigation into the abduction, the sources added, was ongoing.
Gunmen abduct village head in Kwara, wife injured
ADC Unveils Timetable, Guidelines for 2025/2026 Congresses, National Convention
Multiple terrorists neutralised in Sambisa as coordinated strikes unsettle ISWAP commanders
Gunmen abduct village head in Kwara, wife injured
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