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Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
By: Zagazola Makama
Mali stands at a critical turning point as fresh negotiations between the Tuareg rebels of northern Mali and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) gain momentum. According to sources close to both groups, these talks represent a significant shift in strategy that could fundamentally reshape the security and political landscape of the Sahel.
For the Tuareg rebels, these negotiations are a response to Mali’s recent national consultations, which called for dialogue with jihadist groups but excluded northern armed factions from the process. Additionally, Tuareg leaders argue that grassroots communities who have been caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict are pushing for a settlement to avoid further bloodshed.
On the other hand, the rebels say they are keen to avoid the mistakes of 2012, when the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) initially seized control of northern Mali, only to be overpowered by jihadist forces, leading to a rapid escalation of violence and the subsequent 2013 French military intervention.
A Shift in JNIM’s Strategy
A key factor encouraging the Tuareg rebels to engage in talks is the shifting approach of JNIM itself. Over the years, the group has evolved in its tactics, messaging, and governance strategy. Unlike the extremist brutality displayed in 2012, JNIM has refined its policies, making it a more pragmatic and structured insurgency.
According to sources close to the Tuareg rebels, JNIM’s leadership began reassessing its position following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s ability to consolidate power while maintaining Afghanistan’s territorial integrity served as a model. Additionally, recent jihadist dynamics in Syria further influenced JNIM’s approach, leading to a reconsideration of its long-term objectives in Mali.
Statements from key JNIM figures, including Amadou Koufa, leader of Katiba Macina, and Jafar Dicko, head of JNIM operations in Burkina Faso, indicate a growing willingness to compromise. Their recent declarations have emphasized political and governance issues rather than outright military conquest.
Most notably, a recent JNIM communiqué framed the military juntas in the region as obstacles to regional stability. The statement called for international intervention against these governments, signaling that JNIM sees an opportunity to reposition itself as a legitimate actor rather than a purely insurgent force.
This convergence of interests between Tuareg rebels and JNIM has laid the groundwork for negotiations, with both sides willing to soften their positions for mutual benefit.
Key Points of Negotiation
JNIM sources have confirmed that discussions are ongoing, with a primary focus on governance and the role of Sharia law. Historically, one of the main points of contention between the two factions has been JNIM’s strict interpretation of Islamic law, which led to the breakdown of their alliance in 2012.
However, the current negotiations propose a new governance model in which Sharia law would be implemented at the local level, but administered by community-based religious authorities rather than JNIM operatives. This compromise, according to sources, has been accepted by JNIM’s leadership.
Another major shift is JNIM’s perspective on Mali’s territorial integrity. Rather than supporting the Tuareg rebels’ long-standing push for an independent Azawad, JNIM has reportedly argued that regional and international actors would be more likely to tolerate an Islamic governance structure within a unified Mali rather than outright secession.
JNIM’s ability to convince Tuareg leaders to focus on governing northern Mali rather than seeking full independence represents a major ideological shift. The jihadist group is prepared to support Tuareg fighters in taking control of key territories, but with the understanding that these areas would be governed under an Islamic framework rather than an independent Tuareg state.
A New Governance Model for Northern Mali?
Sources close to JNIM say that if the alliance moves forward, the group is ready to coordinate and administer territories alongside Tuareg rebels. However, lessons from the 2012 conflict have prompted a change in strategy.
Rather than raising the black flag of al-Qaeda over captured cities a move that led to international military intervention in the past—JNIM plans to allow Tuareg governance structures to manage administrative affairs. This means that while JNIM would retain influence, it would avoid direct control over urban areas, instead allowing local Tuareg leadership to take the forefront.
Such a strategy could serve multiple purposes: Reducing the risk of foreign military intervention by keeping governance in the hands of local Tuareg leaders, JNIM would present a less overt threat to international powers. Legitimizing its role in Mali’s political landscape rather than being seen purely as an extremist group, JNIM could position itself as a political and security partner in the region. Avoiding the mistakes of 2012 The rapid downfall of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 was largely due to its inability to maintain control. By working together with the rebels rather than sidelining them, JNIM aims to ensure a more sustainable presence.
The Question of Al-Qaeda Affiliation
One of the most sensitive aspects of the negotiations revolves around JNIM’s relationship with al-Qaeda’s central command. According to sources, there is ongoing internal debate about whether the group should formally distance itself from al-Qaeda.
For JNIM leaders, the question is not just ideological but also strategic. Some within the group believe that dissociating from al-Qaeda could open doors to direct negotiations with Western governments. Others argue that such a move would require religious justification, possibly linked to a major political development such as the formal independence of Azawad or the collapse of the Malian government in Bamako.
Interestingly, sources indicate that JNIM is more willing to negotiate its future with Western powers directly rather than through Tuareg intermediaries. The concern within JNIM is that Tuareg leaders could use any potential al-Qaeda split as leverage in their own diplomatic engagements with France and other international actors.
Conclusion: A Game-Changer for Mali?
If these negotiations result in a formal agreement, the implications for Mali and the wider Sahel could be profound. A coordinated Tuareg-JNIM alliance would not only reshape local power dynamics but could also alter the trajectory of jihadist movements across West Africa.
The shift in JNIM’s strategy from ideological extremism to pragmatic governance signals a broader recalibration of jihadist operations in the region. Whether this shift leads to long-term stability or another round of conflict remains to be seen.
What is clear, however, is that Mali’s security landscape is on the brink of another transformation one that could redefine the balance of power in the Sahel for years to come.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region
Tuareg Rebels and JNIM: A New Strategic Alliance in Mali?
News
KACRAN Urges INEC to Extend PVC Collection Deadline by One Week
KACRAN Urges INEC to Extend PVC Collection Deadline by One Week
By: Michael Mike
The Kulen Allah Cattle Rearers Association of Nigeria (KACRAN) has urged the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to extend the ongoing display of the preliminary voters’ register and distribution of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) by one week to prevent the disenfranchisement of millions of eligible voters ahead of the 2027 general elections.
The association proposed that the exercise, scheduled to end on October 15, should be extended to October 22, 2026, citing inadequate public awareness, particularly among rural dwellers, pastoral communities and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Northern Nigeria.
In a statement signed by its National President, Hon. Khalil Mohd Bello, KACRAN said many Nigerians who registered online or physically between August 18 and December 10, 2025, remained unaware of the ongoing collection exercise and the approaching deadline.
The association expressed concern that while residents of major cities and towns had better access to information through newspapers, electronic media and social media, many people in remote rural communities and pastoral settlements were yet to receive adequate sensitisation.
KACRAN said it had spent months mobilising its members without PVCs to participate in the registration exercise but feared that many of those who registered might lose the opportunity to collect their cards before the deadline.
It also highlighted the plight of thousands of internally displaced persons across Northern Nigeria, noting that many had registered as voters after fleeing their communities but might struggle to collect their PVCs because of inadequate information about collection centres and their designated ward headquarters.
According to the association, a one-week extension would provide additional time to reach affected communities and enable registered voters to collect their cards ahead of the 2027 elections.
KACRAN stressed that PVC collection was critical to effective participation in the electoral process, arguing that every eligible vote mattered in determining the outcome of elections.
The association further criticised politicians for concentrating on campaigns and the selection of preferred candidates while paying insufficient attention to mobilising eligible voters who were yet to collect their PVCs.
It urged INEC to treat the request as urgent, warning that failure to extend the deadline could leave many registered Nigerians unable to participate fully in the forthcoming elections.
Beyond its appeal to the electoral commission, KACRAN called on the 19 Northern governors to declare Monday, October 19, and Tuesday, October 20, 2026, work-free days if INEC approved the extension.
The proposed days, it said, should be devoted to intensive public enlightenment and mobilisation across the region to ensure that all eligible voters whose cards were ready collected them at their designated ward headquarters.
The association also called on print and electronic media organisations, as well as social media platforms, to intensify public awareness campaigns and provide timely information on PVC collection.
It urged Nigerians who had registered and whose cards were available to collect them before the deadline, warning that failure to do so could lead to avoidable disappointment during the 2027 general elections.
KACRAN said it was prepared to participate actively in the electoral process and support the emergence of leaders committed to justice and fairness for all Nigerians.
KACRAN Urges INEC to Extend PVC Collection Deadline by One Week
News
Centre Urges Presidential Candidates to Commit to Fiscal Reforms
Centre Urges Presidential Candidates to Commit to Fiscal Reforms
By: Michael Mike
The Centre for Social Justice has called on political parties and presidential candidates to make strict budget discipline, transparent public borrowing and enforcement of statutory debt limits central to their manifestoes ahead of Nigeria’s next political transition.
The centre warned that rising public debt, mounting debt-servicing obligations and persistent breaches of public financial management rules were undermining fiscal stability, calling for structural reforms to strengthen accountability in the management of public funds.
In a policy commentary, Paul Dasimeokuma of the Centre for Social Justice said Nigeria needed to move away from discretionary fiscal practices towards strict compliance with existing laws governing budget preparation, public borrowing and debt management.
He cited public debt exceeding ₦159 trillion and debt-servicing costs consuming more than half of federal revenues as indicators of the pressure on the nation’s finances.
Dasimeokuma identified delays in the passage of annual budgets as a major weakness in the country’s fiscal management system, arguing that disruptions to the statutory budget calendar undermine planning, spending predictability and the credibility of public accounts.
He cited the 2026 Federal Budget, which received presidential assent on April 17, 2026, as an example of the delays that have characterised the budgeting process.
According to him, Section 14(1) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007 provides a framework for the timely preparation and approval of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which underpins the annual budget.
He argued that adherence to the statutory timetable would help ensure that annual budgets receive presidential assent before the commencement of the financial year on January 1.
The centre also raised concerns over the practice of extending capital budget implementation beyond the relevant financial year, sometimes resulting in multiple capital budgets being implemented concurrently.
Dasimeokuma said such practices created uncertainty in public expenditure management, distorted accounting and weakened the link between approved budgets and actual government spending.
He further questioned the management of public borrowing, arguing that loans should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny to establish their economic and social benefits before approval.
He referenced Section 41 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which sets out restrictions on government borrowing, and Section 44, which provides for cost-benefit analysis of proposed loans.
According to him, legislative approval of major borrowing proposals should be supported by transparent documentation showing the purpose, costs and expected returns of the loans.
He alleged that some borrowing approvals had been granted without sufficient public scrutiny and warned against the use of loans to finance recurrent expenditure and debt-service obligations.
Dasimeokuma also called attention to Section 42 of the Act, which provides for the establishment of an overall debt limit for the federation by the President in agreement with the National Assembly.
He argued that the absence of an established, legally binding debt ceiling had weakened the framework for controlling the growth of public debt.
To address the concerns, the centre urged political parties and presidential candidates to commit to four key reforms: establishing and enforcing a predictable budget calendar, implementing statutory debt limits, requiring the publication of cost-benefit analyses for external loans and ensuring transparency in public debt records.
It said the reforms should be incorporated into party manifestoes and translated into enforceable policies to improve fiscal discipline and strengthen public confidence in government financial management.
Dasimeokuma maintained that Nigeria’s economic stability would depend partly on whether political leaders could move beyond policy promises to enforce existing financial laws and ensure that public borrowing and expenditure were subject to effective oversight.
Centre Urges Presidential Candidates to Commit to Fiscal Reforms
News
Nigeria’s Nutrition Accountability Gap Persists as Child Stunting Hits 40%
Nigeria’s Nutrition Accountability Gap Persists as Child Stunting Hits 40%
By: Michael Mike
Nigeria’s failure to translate nutrition policies and funding commitments into measurable results has come under scrutiny, with the Athena Centre for Policy and Leadership calling for performance-based financing, stronger legislative oversight and tougher accountability measures to address child malnutrition.
The centre said on Wednesday that under-five stunting in Nigeria stood at 40 per cent, against a national target of 18 per cent that has expired, highlighting the gap between policy commitments and implementation.
Speaking at a policy webinar in Abuja, the Director of the Olikoye Ransome-Kuti Institute for Health and Social Equity, Dr Danjuma Iyaji, said Nigeria had developed systems for measuring nutrition outcomes without establishing adequate mechanisms to hold public officials accountable for poor performance.
“Nigeria has built the measurement architecture of nutrition accountability without building its consequence architecture,” Iyaji said.
The webinar, organised by the Athena Centre through its institute, was titled From Measurement to Consequence: Fixing Nigeria’s Nutrition Accountability Gap. It examined findings from the centre’s policy paper, Political Incentives and Nutrition Neglect: Why State Governments Fail to Improve Child Nutrition.
The discussion brought together officials from the Office of the Vice President, the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) and the House of Representatives Committee on Nutrition and Food Security to examine why government commitments were not consistently translating into improved nutrition outcomes.
According to the centre, only nine of Nigeria’s 36 states had formally established State Councils on Nutrition as of April 2026, while the existence of such councils did not necessarily demonstrate that they were functioning effectively.
To address the gaps, the centre proposed linking supplementary funding tranches to independently verified readiness, conducting annual state performance assessments, establishing an escalation framework for persistent non-performance and holding annual legislative hearings at the state level.
However, participants stressed that accountability measures must not deprive vulnerable children of essential nutrition services because their state governments failed to meet administrative or performance requirements.
The Senior Special Assistant to the President on Nutrition and Public Health, Uju Rochas-Anwukah, endorsed the diagnosis, identifying three major breaks in the accountability chain: commitments not translating into fund releases, releases failing to translate into service delivery, and inadequate understanding of nutrition priorities among subnational leaders.
“A stunted child is a lost asset that no bridge can build,” she said.
Rochas-Anwukah cautioned that readiness-based financing must not disadvantage states with the greatest nutrition needs but weaker implementation capacity. She also clarified that the terms governing the Child Nutrition Fund rested with UNICEF and its partners, rather than her office.
She called for a pathway through which less-prepared states could strengthen their capacity to qualify for support without leaving children in those states behind.
The presidential aide also urged the passage of the proposed National Food and Nutrition Bill, arguing that a stronger legal framework would help sustain accountability beyond individual administrations.
The Director of Nutrition at NPHCDA, Dr Adebiyi Olatunde, said accountability must extend beyond state-level indicators to primary healthcare facilities, where the availability of therapeutic foods and micronutrients directly affects children’s access to treatment and preventive services.
She warned that state-level figures could conceal serious deficiencies in individual communities and health facilities.
“At times we have data for a state, and the issue may be in only two particular wards,” Olatunde said.
She advocated collecting and analysing data down to ward and facility levels to identify localised failures. She also called for a root-cause assessment before sanctions or other escalation measures were imposed, to establish whether poor performance resulted from funding shortages, supply-chain problems or weaknesses in implementation.
The Research Lead for the House of Representatives Committee on Nutrition and Food Security, Abel Okechukwu, described conditional financing as “workable and urgently needed”, but argued that the approach should combine protected funding for essential services with incentives for improved performance.
He proposed allocating 70 per cent of funding as a protected lifeline for interventions such as micronutrient provision and school feeding, while reserving 30 per cent as a performance incentive linked to functional nutrition councils, approved costed plans and published expenditure records.
“Conditional financing should not punish the child,” Okechukwu said.
He also called for stronger legislative scrutiny, arguing that oversight hearings must be supported by reliable data and adequate preparation rather than conducted as ceremonial exercises.
According to him, effective hearings require standardised reporting templates and the submission of reports at least 21 days before proceedings.
Okechukwu said the committee intended to intensify joint oversight in 2026 and 2027. He also proposed inserting a provision in the Appropriation Act to link federal grants to evidence that state governments had exercised appropriate oversight of nutrition programmes.
The discussions refined several of the centre’s recommendations, particularly the need to protect essential nutrition funding, provide weaker states with a route to meeting readiness requirements, assess performance below the state level and make root-cause reviews the starting point for addressing persistent failures.
However, whether the existing Child Nutrition Fund arrangements permit the proposed financing conditions remains unresolved, according to the centre’s policy paper.
As follow-up measures, the Athena Centre said it would engage partners in the Child Nutrition Fund on financing conditions, present the proposed escalation framework to the Nigeria Governors’ Forum and take its legislative recommendations to State Houses of Assembly.
It also plans to circulate a policy note incorporating the panellists’ recommendations before publication and reassess the four proposed reforms in July 2027.
In her closing remarks, the webinar moderator and researcher at the institute, Ijeoma Achebe, said the discussion had strengthened the paper’s diagnosis of the challenges undermining nutrition outcomes.
“The gap is not simply about a lack of policies,” she said. “It is the distance between commitments and delivery.”
Nigeria’s Nutrition Accountability Gap Persists as Child Stunting Hits 40%
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