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Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse
Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse
By: Dr. James Bwala
The insurgency that has plagued northeastern Nigeria for over a decade, popularly known as Boko Haram, has caused immense suffering and destabilization in the region. Despite the profound implications of this crisis, much of the public discourse surrounding its origins is riddled with inaccuracies, oversimplifications, and politically motivated narratives. As a consequence, many Nigerians—including those on the streets of Maiduguri or other affected areas—hold incomplete or erroneous understandings of the group’s history. This lack of historical facts not only clouds efforts to address the root causes of the conflict but also fuels divisive rhetoric and politicization of the tragedy. Nigerians and those who continued to discuss the conflict and its history found a need to know and draw from facts to line up their narratives. Discoursants like lawyer Femi Falana and politicians like Naja’atu need facts to buttress their claims and should not rely on hearsay or half-truths, perhaps from where they heard their stories, because it is not adding up.
For us, who reported this crisis on the front line and studied the historical lines from direct elements and foot soldiers, we know that the widespread misconception is the tendency to attribute Boko Haram’s insurgency exclusively to the late Malam Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s most notorious leader, who emerged publicly in the early 2000s. While Yusuf did play a role in shaping the movement known as the “Yusufiya sect,” claiming he single-handedly started Boko Haram grossly simplifies the complex evolution of this militant group in Borno State or Northeast Nigeria. Such reductionism is evident in popular narratives frequently encountered among ordinary citizens, who often repeat what they have heard without contextual depth. An accurate historical account reveals that the conditions fostering Boko Haram’s emergence existed long before Yusuf’s ascendancy, involving multiple actors and events that laid the groundwork for radicalization and violence from the simply known Islamiyya sect in Kannamma to the Yusufiya sect and Boko Haram, the name given to them after the Bauchi Prison break at the beginning of the one-year conflict in 2010.
Like I did mention earlier, complicating the discourse around the history or founder are politicized allegations by prominent individuals that seek to assign blame to specific personalities without credible evidence. For instance, Hajiya Naja’atu has in recent times launched rhetoric directed at Vice President Kashim Shettima, linking her claims to the arrest of Kabiru Sokoto at the Borno liaison office in Abuja (which she said is Shettima’s house). Similarly, respected lawyer Femi Falana has publicly accused a former governor of Borno State of initiating the Boko Haram insurgency, associating the claims with political thuggery during the administration of Modu Sheriff. While such claims may have come within certain political constituencies, they dangerously oversimplify a multifaceted crisis and divert attention from deeper structural factors. Most importantly, these rhetorics are often founded on partial or misinterpreted information rather than comprehensive, verifiable research into the insurgency’s roots.
Testimonies and records of journalists and observers who were active in Maiduguri and the wider northeastern region since the early 1990s have captured far more interesting narratives. These professionals witnessed firsthand the unfolding developments culminating in the Boko Haram crisis. Their accounts reveal the existence of leadership predating Mohammed Yusuf, notably an individual named Mohammed Ali, who led an early Islamist sect prior to the “Yusufiya” movement. Ali was reportedly killed amid violence after escaping arrest in Kannamma, located in present-day Yobe State, long before Yusuf became publicly acknowledged as Boko Haram’s leader. The circumstances surrounding Mohammed Ali’s demise evidence internal fractures and state interventions that contributed to the radicalization pathway exploited by later insurgents.
Geographically, the significance of certain locations underscores the continuity in Boko Haram’s operational terrain. Mohammed Ali was ambushed and killed between Talala and Ajigil, areas within Damboa Local Government in Borno State. These locations remain critical hubs for Boko Haram activities today, illustrating how the movement’s influence expanded along established routes starting decades ago. Access between Buni Yadi and Damboa, through Foi village, forms a corridor still exploited for logistical and militant operations. Understanding these geographic linkages offers valuable insight into Boko Haram’s sustained presence and the entrenchment of its networks in northeastern Nigeria.
The persistence of incorrect narratives can be partly attributed to inadequate primary research and reliance on hearsay or politically motivated sources. This deficiency highlights an urgent need for esteemed public figures, journalists, analysts, and commentators to engage in meticulous and objective investigation when discussing Boko Haram’s origins. Reckless or uninformed rhetoric risks exacerbating communal tensions, misguiding policy responses, and undermining public trust. For example, assigning blame to isolated individuals without substantial proof politicizes the insurgency, detracting from broader considerations such as socioeconomic marginalization, governmental neglect, corruption, and ideological manipulation—all key contributors to the conflict.
Moreover, responsible storytelling about Boko Haram’s history requires acknowledging the complexity of insurgencies as social phenomena. These are rarely the product of singular agents but rather evolve from layered interactions between various factors, including local grievances, religious ideologies, political exclusions, and external influences. Therefore, simplistic attributions fail to capture the organic, evolving nature of such movements. A comprehensive approach that integrates oral histories, archival materials, community testimonies, and official documents can provide a more accurate chronicle and inform more effective counterinsurgency strategies.
The discourse on Boko Haram’s history demands a progressive shift toward historical accuracy and intellectual honesty. The prevailing narrative that attributes the insurgency solely to late Malam Mohammed Yusuf or assigns culpability to particular public figures without substantive evidence does a disservice to truth and justice. Recognizing the role of earlier leaders like Mohammed Ali and appreciating the broader socio-political context enables Nigerians and the international community to better comprehend the insurgency’s complexities. It is incumbent upon respected voices—whether in politics, law, or the media—to prioritize thorough research and measured discourse. Doing so not only honors the memory of victims and affected communities but also facilitates the formulation of genuine solutions anchored in reality, empathy, and inclusiveness. Only through such a principled approach can Nigeria hope to heal the wounds inflicted by Boko Haram and work toward lasting peace and stability in its northeastern regions.
- James Bwala, PhD, writes from Maiduguri.
- Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse
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Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
By Zagazola Makama
Troops of the Joint Task Force North East, Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK), have foiled coordinated infiltration attempts by suspected ISWAP terrorists targeting parts of Maiduguri and Buratai axis of Borno State, forcing the insurgents to retreat after intense engagements.

The attempted attacks occurred between 12:20 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. on Friday, when the terrorists simultaneously advanced toward Muna Garage, Shuwari Village and the Ajilari Cross area in an apparent bid to gain access into the Maiduguri metropolis.

Military sources told Zagazola Makama that the troops, supported by an effective early warning system, detected the movement of the insurgents and engaged them from multiple directions with heavy and accurate fire, disrupting the coordinated assault before the terrorists could penetrate the city.
The sources said the terrorists, overwhelmed by the troops’ swift tactical response, abandoned their mission and fled in disarray.

In related operations, troops also repelled separate infiltration attempts by the insurgents at Miringa and Dutsen Kura in the Buratai area of Borno State.
During the pursuit of the fleeing terrorists at Miringa, a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle activated an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). However, no casualty was recorded among the troops, and the operational situation remained stable.
Security sources said clearance and exploitation operations are ongoing across the affected areas to track down the fleeing terrorists, recover possible abandoned equipment and prevent any further threat to nearby communities.
The military reaffirmed that Operation HADIN KAI would continue sustained offensive operations aimed at denying terrorist groups freedom of movement and safeguarding lives and property across the North-East.
Residents were also urged to remain vigilant and continue providing credible and timely intelligence to security agencies to support ongoing counter-terrorism operations.
Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
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CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
PRESS STATEMENT
CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
July 8, 2026
The Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja, expresses its support for the position articulated by security analyst and conflict reporter Zagazola Makama on the imperative of objective, fact-based reporting of criminal activities, irrespective of the ethnic, religious, or political identity of those involved.
CCS believes that the fight against insecurity in Nigeria can only succeed when the same standards of accountability are applied to all offenders without exception. Criminality does not become acceptable because it is committed by a member of one’s ethnic group, nor does violence become justifiable because it is wrapped in the language of communal defence.
The controversy generated by the identification of a suspected attacker involved in the attempted assault on the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, highlights a deeper national challenge: the tendency of some individuals and groups to support transparency only when it exposes those they consider opponents, while resisting the same transparency when facts implicate members of their own communities.
CCS maintains that objective reporting is not ethnic profiling. Where credible facts establish the identity, affiliation, or operational background of criminal actors, journalists and security analysts should not be intimidated into suppressing such information merely because it is politically inconvenient or socially uncomfortable. Selective outrage and selective accountability only deepen mistrust and prolong conflict.
For years, Nigerians have demanded that security reports accurately identify perpetrators of violence. That demand must remain consistent. Whether the perpetrators are Fulani bandits, Berom militias, Irigwe militias, Mwaghavul militias, or any other armed criminal group, the truth must be reported and the law must take its course.
The Centre also commends the professionalism and courage of security personnel who successfully repelled the attempted attack on NIPSS and continue to defend strategic national institutions under difficult circumstances. Their sacrifices deserve public recognition and support.
CCS wishes to emphasize that no community in Nigeria possesses a monopoly on either victimhood or criminality. Across the country, millions of law-abiding citizens from every ethnic and religious background desire peace, security, and justice. Equally, criminal elements exist across communities and must be confronted without bias or sentiment.
Nigeria cannot defeat insecurity if citizens judge crimes based on the identity of the perpetrator rather than the nature of the offence. A criminal remains a criminal regardless of ethnicity. An armed attacker remains an armed attacker regardless of religion. A murderer does not become a hero because he belongs to a particular community.
The Centre therefore calls on the media, civil society organisations, community leaders, and the general public to uphold a single standard of justice and accountability. The protection of criminals through ethnic, religious, or political narratives undermines national security and weakens efforts to build lasting peace.
CCS stands firmly for truth, accountability, and equal justice under the law. We support all responsible efforts to expose criminality wherever it exists and reject every attempt to shield offenders from scrutiny because of their identity.
There must be no sacred cows in the fight against insecurity. There must be no shielding of criminals. Justice must remain blind to ethnicity, religion, and politics.
Yusuf Musa
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja &
Capt. Kabir Aminu (Rtd.)
Director, Security and Strategic Studies
Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja
CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
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The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
By Senator Iroegbu
Months ago, these pages made an argument that ran counter to conventional wisdom. Nigeria’s most effective answer to disinformation may not be found inside government ministries or technology companies, but in an unlikely place: the mosque, the church and the traditional palace. That idea was named the Kano Model, a simple but powerful proposition that places religious and traditional leaders at the centre of the fight to build public resilience against misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation.

Today, that idea has taken a decisive step forward. In Abuja, between 24 and 25 June 2026, Alkalanci, the Hausa language verification platform, convened the largest edition yet of its fact-checking and media literacy training. Supported by the MacArthur Foundation and in collaboration with the Centre for Democracy and Development, the workshop gathered Islamic clerics and scholars from across Northern Nigeria under a single roof for the first time. It followed earlier sessions in Kano, Sokoto, Gombe, Kaduna and Maradi in neighbouring Niger Republic. More than 120 clerics and teachers have now passed through the programme, across six cities and two countries. What began as a modest experiment in one emirate has matured into a movement.
The timing could hardly be more consequential. Nigeria is moving steadily towards the 2027 general elections, a season when domestic misinformation predictably surges. Across the Sahel, military governments battle violent extremism while geopolitical rivalries intensify and foreign powers compete for influence through information operations as much as through diplomacy or arms. Artificial intelligence now allows fabricated videos, cloned voices and manipulated images to circulate at alarming speed. This is no longer merely a media challenge. It is a national security challenge.
The significance of Abuja lies not only in scale but in institutional weight. The two most authoritative bodies in Nigerian Islam lent their voices to the cause. The Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), led by the Sultan of Sokoto, and Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) both charged clerics with becoming guardians of truth. Speaking through its Secretary-General, Professor Is-haq Oloyede, the NSCIA grounded the appeal in scripture, recalling that Surah Al-Hujurat instructs believers to verify information before acting upon it. Verification, the Council argued, is not an import but a divine injunction.
That moral framing changes the conversation entirely. For decades, governments have tried to combat disinformation through regulation, censorship and technology. Each has a role, yet none reaches the deeper question of trust. People do not always believe institutions. They believe people they know. Across Northern Nigeria and much of Africa, few voices command greater trust than religious leaders and traditional rulers. Every Friday, every Sunday, and at countless community gatherings, millions receive guidance from imams, pastors, scholars, and emirs. When those trusted voices urge citizens to pause before forwarding a message, verify a viral clip or question an inflammatory rumour, they build a social firewall no algorithm can match.

This is precisely where traditional institutions become decisive. The programme has drawn consistent endorsement from the emirates. The Emir of Kano was represented at the pioneering session, the Sultan of Sokoto at another, the Emirate of Gombe at a third. When a Sarkin Alkali speaks for the Sultan, or a royal envoy addresses assembled imams, the message carries an authority no government circular can rival. As the Emir of Gombe’s representative reminded an earlier gathering, truthfulness is not merely an ethical duty. It is an act of faith.
The threats, meanwhile, are evolving. Alkalanci’s Editor, Alhassan Bala, warned that the coming election season will bring a surge of misinformation from domestic actors, alongside foreign information manipulation and interference. Deepfakes, the synthetic speeches, videos and audio, are now cheap enough to flood any campaign, adding a dangerous new layer. The JNI’s Secretary-General, Professor Khalid Abubakar Aliyu, went further still, urging clerics to remain resolutely apolitical, to verify before they speak, and cautioning politicians against enticing religious leaders into partisan corners. In a country where a single doctored clip can inflame a community overnight, a clergy trained to pause and verify is a national security asset.
The Sahel makes the stakes plainer. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, disinformation has become an instrument of war, deployed to justify coups, discredit democratic institutions and turn populations against their neighbours and regional bodies. Much of it is amplified by networks tied to external powers seeking leverage on African soil. That the Alkalanci training has already crossed into Maradi is therefore no small detail. It carries the model into the very theatre where information warfare is fiercest, and through the one channel foreign propagandists struggle to capture: the trusted local voice speaking a local language.
Equally telling is what this reveals about civil society. The programme is not a state project. It is a local organisation building long-term societal resilience, empowering trusted leaders to become educators, validators and defenders of truth. Every such effort is, in plain terms, an investment in peace.
The lesson from Kano and now Abuja is remarkably simple. The fight against disinformation cannot be won by governments alone, nor outsourced entirely to journalists, fact-checkers or technology companies. It must become a societal responsibility, one that reaches beyond the North and beyond a single faith, drawing in Christian clergy, women and youth networks and traditional rulers nationwide.
At a time when falsehood travels faster than truth, Africa’s greatest advantage may not lie in more sophisticated technology, but in its enduring institutions of faith and tradition. The warriors for truth are multiplying. The task before Nigeria, the Sahel and Africa is to keep their ranks growing.
Senator Iroegbu is a security, geopolitics and development analyst. Email: senator.iroegbu@yahoo.co.uk
The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
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