My Binoculars: June 12, The Fragile Security of Nigeria and This Unending Damnation Called Ransom for Commercial Banditry

By: Bodunrin Kayode

Most residents in Nigeria are so used to the old ways of doing things that they think that mere agitation for the release of one set of captive will be the end of this lingering sing-song that has been let loose in the land by theses scare cat criminals called bandits. Release our students has become a mere social album released intermittently because even the political leaders are busy trying to solve this damnation from the head instead of from the root. The interagency corporation in terms of intelligence sharing has equally become so weak that the policy itself has deteriorated to a mere chorus either in a staccato or crescendo format to suit the ears of foreign watchers like the Americans who seem to care. We also know that the disparity between the vocal range of the department of State Service (DSS) and the military is so wide that it will take the grace of God for them to continue to sing in harmony as was preached by General Chris Musa before he was dropped as Chief of Defense staff. Until they all find their bearings harmoniously, these criminals extorting Nigerians in the savannah will continue to have their say with impunity. Abductions and kidnappings will surely linger for a long time until this government swallows its pride and requests for massive help from willing friends or mercinaries to take out these criminals in the bush once and for all.

Very few State actors within the general security network bother about taking these criminals out of their hide outs as long as their loved ones have been freed from their grips. These urchins can continue to stay in the savannah and now some parts of the rain forests in the South West of the country carrying out their criminality on vulnerable people to make them cry. Some of the residents they have humiliated include political, military and traditional rulers and they don’t care a hoot about our common humanity. Yet the Federal government in the last eleven years continue to treat their known sponsors like sacred cows who should not be touched.

For some of these reasons, I don’t believe that the release of captives this weekend will ever stop another set of residents from being captured in two weeks time. This is because these criminals will always get more vulnerable people to monitor especially in our largely unmanned forest terrain and pick them up like hawks clutching their preys in their claws. Poor residents, desperate to free their loved ones empower these criminals with “anything they want” under the sun besides humongous amounts of cash making them richer by the days.
It’s a very sad reality that any layman can see the lacuna in our communities for easy capture of our people because of the way our security architecture is designed. Off course the bottom line of all this hide and seek game is the demand for more money because the whole phenomenon has become an industry for the criminals who keep prospering while fighting for a “known cause” against the rest of us. From Boko Haram to Lakurawa, Biafran and even Islamic State of West African Province (iswap) fighters, they all have fixated known causes not hidden to keen observers in the country.

How to stop these criminals from prospering

Security managers have to stop doing things the same way they are used to doing them after the civil war and move to the next known level of sophistry. The key intelligence people must move from manual to the highest form of digital sophistication and collaborate with the big players in the world to get results. The military intelligence and the cyber tech squad must increase their romance.

By this I also mean that, trainers in the Nigerian Defense Academyy (NDA) for instance should go beyond the conventional ways they are used to doing things and incorporate asymmetric formations into their curriculum the way institutions like West Point and Sandhurst have done even before the commencement of the rebellion against organized governments by extremists in many parts of the world. The earlier the better for our security network which is heavily appropriated in trillions of naira yet grossly underfunded each fiscal year. This gives rise to the inability of defense managers most times to being unable to buy the basic and advanced Intel equipment for utilization to fight back. Even when the British and American troops on ground have been enabling our personnel with some of these rare equipment within the last decade, the effect in terms of optics is minimal compared to a situation where our men will own and operate theirs. For us residents who live and work in the “Hadin Kai” theatre, we know that the British have been doing their best with theses Intel supports but it has never been enough to cover even 10 percent of the vast forests which stretches up to the Tumbus islands of the lake Chad or way beyond the Mandara mountains down to the central African region. Most commanders in the Frontline have operated under a trial and error basis when it comes to descerning critical Intel. But thank God, the collaboration with the Americans have started yielding tangible fruits beyond some reasonable doubts.

Key intelligence agencies have to start acting in real time to save more lives if they are supported with these expensive equipment to respond to assist the ten agencies now dishing out intels. This is because responding in real time is key to stop these criminals from their lingering operations in the country. Consequently, it is only the right intelligence that can take out the estimated 30,000 criminals the Americans alerted the nation about and not necessarily brute force known to the military.

Our dedicated operatives also have to stop clamoring for half bread by ensuring that our political servants in government and service Chiefs go after and take out all 30,000 of the criminals as has been revealed by those who have the right equipment to see the bandits as they roam about our bushes with impunity. Mark my words if the security operatives do not move to the next level in terms of Intel sharing and management, many more will have to be abducted. Hundreds more will suffer in the process and die before the next June 12 democracy day. And please don’t ever ask me why. Nigeria has a lot of fixing to do in the security sector for residents to sleep with both eyes closed.

Bodunrin Kayode wrote in from Maiduguri.

My Binoculars: June 12, The Fragile Security of Nigeria and This Unending Damnation Called Ransom for Commercial Banditry

Africa Forward: When Africa Stops Showing Up as a Guest

By: Michael Mike

Nairobi Summit may have signalled the beginning of a more equal Africa-Europe relationship. The real test is whether investment finally replaces dependency.

By Senator Iroegbu

Something shifted in Nairobi last week. It was not the numbers, though the numbers were striking. It was not the speeches, though some were worth hearing. What shifted was the room’s geography — and the logic behind the conversation. For the first time, France and an African country co-chaired an Africa-France summit on African soil, with President Macron and President Ruto standing side by side as equals, not host and supplicant.

For decades, Africa’s engagements with major global powers have followed an almost predictable script. African leaders are invited to Paris, Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Brussels, or New Delhi. Red carpets are rolled out. Grand declarations about “strategic partnership” are made. Communiqués are signed. Photographs are taken. Then everyone flies home, while very little changes for ordinary Africans.

The imbalance was often visible even in the choreography of these summits. Africa appeared less like an equal negotiating bloc and more like a guest invited to seek assistance, security guarantees, investment, or development aid.

The Africa Forward Summit, held in Nairobi on May 11 and 12, broke that script in key important ways. Nairobi appeared different in tone, structure, and ambition. For once, the summit was held on African soil, not in Europe. For once, the conversation shifted from aid to investment, from dependency to co-production, and from diplomatic rhetoric to commercial engagement. That distinction matters greatly, inspiring confidence in the possibility of meaningful progress.

Over two days, €24 billion in commitments were announced: €15 billion from French sources and €9 billion from African investors, with a focus on real projects that can inspire trust and motivate further action. According to figures announced at the summit, investment and financing commitments were unveiled across sectors, including energy transition, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, agriculture, healthcare, maritime development, industrialisation, sports, and logistics.

More importantly, the summit focused less on political symbolism and more on practical business partnerships. French and European companies openly discussed co-investing and co-producing with African firms inside Africa itself. Still, the true measure of success will depend on the accountability and follow-through of these commitments.

If implemented seriously, that could become the summit’s most consequential outcome.
Africa does not lack resources. Africa does not lack markets. Africa does not lack entrepreneurial energy or youthful talent. What the continent has historically lacked is equitable access to capital, technology transfer, industrial partnerships, and financing systems that support value addition and manufacturing. The summit’s emphasis on co-production rather than extraction is therefore significant.

Again, it is worth noting that Africa’s resource wealth and youthful ambition are evident. Still, the true test of the summit’s success lies in measurable outcomes-such as increased local industrial capacity, technology transfer, and fair financing structures-that can demonstrate real progress and build trust in future initiatives.

Nigeria has already emerged with one practical example. French hospitality giant Accor and Shoreline Group signed a Letter of Intent to develop Nigeria’s first national hotel platform, with a planned $300 million investment targeting 10 hotels across eight Nigerian cities by 2030. The initiative will also establish a hospitality training academy to support skills development and job creation. That is the kind of partnership Africa should encourage: investment tied to infrastructure, skills transfer, employment, and long-term economic activity rather than mere extraction of profit.

The summit also launched the Africa-France Impact Coalition, a business platform bringing together major African and French companies with combined operations worth over €100 billion and employing hundreds of thousands across the continent. Discussions covered artificial intelligence, renewable energy, healthcare manufacturing, agriculture, digital connectivity, and infrastructure.

If this approach survives beyond speeches and summit declarations, it is crucial to establish clear monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure commitments lead to real change. This could signal the beginning of something Africa urgently needs: a genuine scramble for African industrial development rather than another scramble for African raw materials. Still, Africans should approach this new enthusiasm with cautious optimism rather than emotional excitement. While history advises caution, the progress made in Nairobi offers a foundation for genuine change, encouraging a hopeful outlook for Africa’s future.

France carries a uniquely complicated relationship with Africa, especially in Francophone West and Central Africa. The issue is no longer colonialism in its formal sense — that chapter is closed. The deeper issue is that the post-colonial relationship never fully evolved into genuine equality. Some African governments outsourced large parts of their security architecture and strategic decision-making to Paris. Paris, in turn, became deeply embedded politically and militarily in several former colonies. Both sides participated in that arrangement and paid a price for it.

Mali illustrates the contradiction vividly. In 2013, when jihadist forces threatened Bamako, France intervened militarily and was initially celebrated as a saviour. A decade later, those same French forces became the primary targets of nationalist fury, accused by military juntas of exploitation and neo-colonial manipulation. Wagner arrived. The French departed. It was a melodrama, and like most melodramas, it contained real grievances buried beneath the theatre.

The lesson is not that France is good or bad. The lesson is that framing any external partner in those terms is a strategic error. External powers-whether the US or China, East or West, EU, France or Russia-are neither saviours nor permanent enemies. They are here to advance their strategic interests. Africa’s responsibility is therefore not emotional attachment or ideological hostility — it is strategic negotiation, empowering Africa to shape the terms of its own development.

To this end, Africa can no longer afford military protectorates disguised as partnerships. Neither can it afford exploitative mercenary arrangements or forms of economic engagement that quietly transfer strategic infrastructure, ports, airports, logistics corridors, and mineral assets into foreign control without strengthening domestic productive capacity. The continent needs partnerships rooted in mutual benefit, commercial realism, and respect for sovereignty.

Accordingly, this is why France’s apparent recalibration matters. France’s evolving role as a gateway to facilitating mutually beneficial partnerships can empower Africa, emphasising that this is a strategic opportunity rather than charity. If Paris is genuinely shifting away from paternalistic diplomacy toward facilitating business partnerships, industrial co-investment, and private-sector collaboration, that is potentially good news not only for Africa and France but for Europe more broadly. Europe needs markets, growth opportunities, energy partnerships, and supply chain diversification.

Africa needs investment, industrialisation, infrastructure, technology, and jobs. The interests are complementary.
But Africans have heard promises before. This is why the true judgment of the Africa Forward Summit will not be made through speeches, declarations, or summit communiqués. It will be made through implementations and answering these questions. Will the announced projects materialise? Will African firms genuinely become co-producers rather than junior subcontractors? Will financing become fairer and more accessible? Will technology actually transfer? Will industrial jobs be created on African soil? Will Africa’s AI, healthcare, logistics, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors truly advance? Like Saint Thomas, Africans should believe not merely what they hear, but what they eventually see.

Still, Nairobi may have offered an important glimpse into what a healthier Africa-Europe relationship could look like: less aid dependency, less geopolitical theatre, less paternalism, and far more equal partnership, investment, production, and shared prosperity. If that shift proves genuine, then the Africa Forward Summit may eventually be remembered not as another diplomatic gathering, but as the moment Africa stopped showing up as a guest and started negotiating as an equal partner.

We will be watching. The continent will be watching whether, five years from now, there are factories, hotels, data centres, and solar plants on African soil, built with African hands, owned in African names. That is the only summit result that matters.
Iroegbu is a journalist and a geopolitics, security, and public affairs analyst.

Africa Forward: When Africa Stops Showing Up as a Guest

AU’s Sudan Dilemma: Balancing Anti-Coup Norms with Diplomatic Pragmatism

By Sami Abdelhalim Saeed

Since the military coup d’etat in Sudan on 25 October 2021 and the subsequent outbreak of war in April 2023, the African Union (AU) has faced a profound dilemma in Sudan in terms of balancing its “zero tolerance” policy for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) with the pragmatic need to discuss an existential crisis in Sudan, an AU founding member.

While Sudan’s membership in the AU remains officially suspended to uphold constitutional governance, the AU is increasingly applying a normalisation approach to the political landscape by the “step-by-step” strategy. Recently, Egypt championed this approach during its February 2026 Chairmanship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

The goal was to restore Sudan’s AU membership through informal consultations with the PSC and re-engagement in AU technical committees. This allowed Egypt to maintain diplomatic influence without formally legitimising the military regime in Sudan.

Conversely, Sudan’s military generals still actively seek readmission, providing the AU with a diplomatic “carrot” for ceasefire negotiations. The PSC, in its meeting on February 12, 2026, affirmed the suspension of Sudan’s membership. The PSC argued that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) still holds ultimate power, and the constitutional order has not yet been fully achieved.

By maintaining Sudan’s suspension in early 2026, the AU signalled its commitment to promoting constitutionalism and strengthening its anti-coup norms.
AU Legal Framework for Promoting Constitutionalism

The AU has moved from a policy of non-interference, typical of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to one of non-indifference. This shift is evident in the AU policy on the elimination of unconstitutional changes of power. It has produced a robust, though sometimes unevenly enforced, legal framework to prevent and punish such changes across the continent.

The AU has designed a coherent and integrated legal framework, wherein each component complements the others, and the entire system is interpreted collectively to articulate strong protections for constitutional governments across the continent against military coups d’état and the pursuit of power through force.

The AU framework for addressing UCG is anchored in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, which establishes a policy of zero tolerance for the unconstitutional seizure of power. The Lomé Declaration of 2000 identifies four specific triggers, including military coups and mercenary interventions, while the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), adopted in 2007, broadens the definition to encompass so-called “constitutional coups,” such as unlawful extensions of presidential terms.

Enforcement responsibilities are assigned to the PSC in accordance with the PSC Protocol (2002), which implements suspensions and oversees the restoration of democratic governance within specified timelines.
The Legal Basis for Sudan’s Suspension from the African Union
On October 25, 2021, the military unconstitutionally suspended the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration 2019. It dissolved the transition cabinet and arrested the Prime Minister, together with most of the ministers.

There was no legal basis for the suspension of the Constitutional Declaration. This is because such a suspension would have required approval from both the Sovereign Council and the Transitional Cabinet.
This arguably constitutes the offence of rebellion against the constitutional regime under Article 164(1) of the Armed Forces Act of 2007. It makes provision for punishment by;

“death, or imprisonment, for a term, notexceeding twenty years together with the possibility of deprival of all, or part of the pension, or privileges for whoever does, agrees or plans with others to affect the constitutional, or security regime, or unity of the country, by use of military force, or wages war against it, or does the material, or ethical preparation therefor, or commits any acts, or does any communications, or equipages, as by nature cause the sameAs such, the 2021 coup d’état was manifestly illegal under Sudan’s constitutional, military and criminal laws.

Based on the above, the AU issued a communiqué on October 26, 2021, regarding the situation in Sudan. Emphasizing article 4(p) of its Constitutive Act (which establishes the principle of condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments), article 7 (g) of its Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the ACDEG, it decided, to suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led transitional authority.

The AU Mediation Gap: Balancing Peace and Constitutionalism in Sudan Suspending member states from the AU creates a complex paradox for the PSC. While intended to isolate military juntas, suspension often triggers a “mediation gap” that diminishes the AU’s leverage, pushing regimes toward non-democratic partners while stripping the AU of its “left-hand” diplomatic intimacy.

This structural estrangement complicates essential negotiations, as seen in the ongoing Sudanese conflict, where the inability to engage warring parties formally hampers peace-building efforts. Furthermore, suspension risks regional fragmentation. These initiatives also inadvertently punish the populace, as international development aid often dries up alongside diplomatic status, fueling nationalist narratives that paint the AU as an elitist, hostile outsider.

To navigate these pitfalls, the AU’s PSC is increasingly shifting toward hybrid approaches or a shifting, dual-track strategy, such as informal consultations. This pragmatic evolution allows the AU to maintain the technical oversight necessary to steer transitions and oversee peace processes without granting the legitimacy that comes with full membership, effectively balancing principled pressure with the necessity of continued engagement.

The Sudan crisis (2021–2026) exemplifies the AU’s struggle to balance legal integrity with diplomatic pragmatism. Despite intense lobbying for readmission to facilitate mediation between warring factions, the PSC maintained Sudan’s suspension in February 2026 to uphold anti-coup norms. To navigate this deadlock, the AU adopted a “step-by-step” normalisation strategy.

By engaging through technical committees, coordinating via the “Quintet” group ( AU, IGAD, UN, the League of Arab States (LES) and the European Union (EU), and reopening a liaison office in Port Sudan, the AU provides essential humanitarian and peacebuilding support on the ground without formally legitimising the military regime or compromising its foundational AU’s constitutive principles.

At first glance, it seems that the AU policy of combating unconstitutional change of governments conflicts with the mandate of the AU-PSC to maintain peace and security on the continent. It may appear to political analysts that the AU-PSC failed to anticipate the trajectory of the peace process in Sudan after Sudan’s membership was suspended following the military coup of October 2021.

Obviously, the AU aims to balance these by insisting that peace and security cannot be restored without a return to a consensus on a civilian-led transitional government. The 2025 AU priorities focus on restoring constitutional order and protecting civilians as foundational to stability. In addition, the AU’s strategy involves implementing the revised Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy, aimed at both repairing state-society relations and strengthening democratic governance.

The AU’s PSC has experience restoring constitutional order in Africa but continues to face significant challenges in the Sahel, Madagascar, and Sudan. The AU recently lifted the suspensions of Guinea on January 22, 2026, and Gabon in April 2025, following successful presidential elections in both countries. This process—transition, new constitution, elections, and reinstatement—now serves as the model the AU urges the remaining nations to adopt.

Sudan plays a multifaceted role in continental peace and security that extends beyond the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The AU’s Peace and Security Council is encouraged to engage with Sudan on these broader challenges.

However, Sudan’s ongoing suspension is likely to constrain the Council’s effectiveness. Furthermore, Sudan faces unresolved disputes with Ethiopia over the Al-Fashaga Region in eastern Sudan, as well as ongoing issues with South Sudan over the contested Abyei Region.

Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso recommended that, when addressing the challenges of “Peace” and “Democracy” within the context of ACDEG, the AU should adopt an inclusive transitional framework rather than privileging a single perspective.

Dersso’s approach advocates for a negotiated agreement in which the military commits to a specific timeline for withdrawal from politics, while the rebellion consents to disarmament. This strategy enables simultaneous progress toward both peace and democracy.

The AU’s ability to initiate a peace process for Sudan depends on successfully balancing the anti-coup legal framework with a pragmatic, dual-track diplomatic strategy. By applying an inclusive, process-oriented approach that synchronises military withdrawal with civilian-led government, the AU can bridge the “mediation gap” and maintain peace and democracy in Sudan.

Dr Sami Abdelhalim Saeed is an African constitutional expert and rule-of-law scholar with over 15 years of experience advising United Nations missions on peacebuilding and legal reforms in post-conflict environments.

AU’s Sudan Dilemma: Balancing Anti-Coup Norms with Diplomatic Pragmatism