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How misdiagnosis, narratives are fuelling Nigeria’s banditry escalation

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How misdiagnosis, narratives are fuelling Nigeria’s banditry escalation

By: Zagazola Makama

Nigeria’s banditry crisis is no longer escalating simply because armed groups are growing bolder. It is escalating because the country continues to misdiagnose the threat, apply blunt policy tools to differentiated actors, and unintentionally feed a violent criminal economy through ransom payments, politicised narratives and delayed state consolidation.

Across the North-West and parts of the North-Central, banditry has evolved beyond rural violence into a structured, profit-driven security threat. Yet public debate remains trapped between emotional appeals for dialogue and absolutist calls for force, leaving little room for the strategic clarity required to halt the violence.

At the heart of the escalation is money. Banditry today survives on a diversified revenue architecture that includes ransom payments, cattle rustling, illegal mining, arms trafficking, extortion levies on farming and mining communities, and collaboration with transnational criminal networks. Each successful kidnapping or “peace levy” reinforces the viability of violence as a business model.

Data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in December 2024 underlined the scale of this economy with the North-West accounting for the highest number of kidnap incidents and victims.

Zagazola argue that as long as communities remain unprotected and ransom payments continue as a survival strategy, banditry will regenerate faster than military operations can suppress it. This is not ideology-driven violence at its core; it is cash-flow-driven criminality as every payment funds the next attack.

Another accelerant is Nigeria’s persistent failure to differentiate categories of armed actors. Security assessments increasingly point to at least two distinct groups operating within the banditry ecosystem.

The first consists of low-level, defensive armed actors, often rural residents who acquired weapons after suffering attacks and whose violence is reactive rather than predatory. The second group comprises entrenched, profit-driven bandit networks responsible for mass kidnappings, village destruction, sexual violence, arms trafficking and territorial control.

Yet public discourse and policy responses frequently collapse these actors into a single category of “bandits,” resulting in indiscriminate dialogue offers, blanket amnesty rhetoric or, conversely, broad-brush security operations that alienate communities. This conceptual error, allows high-value criminal leaders to masquerade as aggrieved actors while exploiting negotiations to buy time, regroup and rearm.

Dialogue has repeatedly been applied in contexts where the state lacks coercive leverage. Experiences in Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto and Kaduna states and parts of the North-West show a consistent pattern: temporary reductions in violence following peace deals, followed by rapid relapse and escalation. Officials who participated in the dialogue have openly acknowledged that many agreements collapsed within months.

The negotiations conducted without sustained military pressure, intelligence dominance and post-agreement enforcement mechanisms merely incentivise armed groups to pause tactically. When criminals negotiate from a position of strength, dialogue becomes appeasement.

Perhaps the most dangerous accelerant is the ethnicisation of banditry. Although criminal gangs include actors of identifiable ethnic backgrounds, the violence itself is not driven by ethnic grievance. Nonetheless, selective media framing and political rhetoric like what had been witnessed in Plateau have increasingly cast banditry through identity lenses, particularly in farmer–herder contexts.

This framing obscures the criminal logic of the violence and deepens mistrust between communities that are themselves victims. In Nigeria today, the fulani herdsmen and pastoralists communities are being weaponized and stereotyped as bandits. This dangerous persecution has strengthens bandit recruitment narratives, allowing criminal leaders to cloak profit-driven violence in claims of ethnic persecution or genocide.

Historical records and sociological studies show that Fulani, Hausa, Tiv, Berom and other communities coexisted for decades through complementary economic systems. The breakdown of this coexistence has been exploited by armed groups seeking cover, recruits and informants. Security agencies possess significantly more intelligence on bandit networks than is visible in public debate. Lawful interceptions, human intelligence and post-operation assessments routinely reveal financial motives, supply routes and internal hierarchies within armed groups.

However, public advocacy for dialogue often relies on forest-level engagements that security officials describe as “theatrical performances” by bandits choreographed grievances designed to elicit sympathy and concessions. The disconnect between classified intelligence and public narratives has allowed emotionally compelling but strategically flawed arguments to dominate national discourse.

Another escalation factor is the emerging convergence between bandit networks and ideological terrorist groups as Nigeria’s internal security landscape firmly indicates that what has long been treated as banditry especially in the North-West and parts of North-Central Nigeria has evolved into a hybrid jihadist campaign, driven by Boko Haram (JAS faction) and reinforced by JNIM elements operating from Sahelian-linked forest sanctuaries. Shared arms supply chains, training exchanges and joint operations could transform banditry from criminal violence into full-spectrum insurgency if unchecked. Nigeria’s past experience with Boko Haram demonstrates the cost of dismissing such convergence as isolated or exaggerated.

Military operations have succeeded in degrading bandit camps in several corridors, but the absence of immediate governance has allowed violence to recycle. Clearing operations not followed by permanent security presence, functional courts, reopened schools, healthcare and markets leave vacuums that criminal actors quickly refill. Bandits and other criminals thrive where state authority is episodic rather than continuous. Security victories without governance consolidation merely displace violence spatially and temporally.

Therefore, Nigeria must urgently reset its approach by formally adopting threat differentiation, choking financial lifelines, regulating community defence structures, and ensuring intelligence-led, precise enforcement against high-risk criminal networks. Dialogue, they say, must be selective, conditional and embedded within formal disarmament and reintegration frameworks not deployed as a moral reflex.

Above all, the state must reclaim narrative control by defining banditry clearly as organised criminal violence, not a sociological misunderstanding. As one senior official put it, “Banditry escalates where sentiment overrides strategy. The cure begins with honesty.”

Without that honesty, Nigeria risks allowing a violent criminal economy to entrench itself deeper into the country’s security architecture at a cost measured not just in money, but in lives, legitimacy and national cohesion.

How misdiagnosis, narratives are fuelling Nigeria’s banditry escalation

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FG Moves to Stem Human Trafficking, Irregular Migration as Over 1,000 Nigerians Return from Crisis Routes

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FG Moves to Stem Human Trafficking, Irregular Migration as Over 1,000 Nigerians Return from Crisis Routes

By: Michael Mike

The Federal Government on Tuesday unveiled a renewed strategy to curb irregular migration and dismantle human trafficking networks, warning that worsening economic hardship and the growing use of digital platforms by traffickers are exposing more Nigerians, particularly women and young people, to exploitation across Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

The renewed commitment came as the government and its international partners marked the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Protection, Reintegration and Assistance to Migrants and Communities (COMPASS) Programme, revealing that more than 1,000 stranded Nigerians have voluntarily returned from countries including Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Mali, Egypt, India and the United Arab Emirates, while over 900 vulnerable returnees have received psychosocial care, healthcare and livelihood support to rebuild their lives.

Stakeholders warned that trafficking syndicates are becoming increasingly sophisticated, exploiting technology, poverty and unemployment to lure desperate Nigerians into dangerous migration routes where many end up trapped in forced labour, sexual exploitation and other forms of abuse.

Speaking at the anniversary event, the Chief of Mission of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Nigeria, Sharon Dimanche, said migration itself was not the problem but the absence of safe and legal pathways.

She said: “Migration is not the problem. The challenge is ensuring that migration is safe, orderly and regular, while protecting the dignity of every migrant.”

Dimanche said the COMPASS Programme had significantly strengthened Nigeria’s migration governance architecture by improving policies and institutional coordination while placing the protection of migrants at the centre of migration management.

Highlighting the programme’s impact, she recounted the story of “Joy”, a Nigerian woman trafficked abroad and subjected to severe exploitation before returning home traumatised.

According to her, through IOM’s psychosocial support and reintegration programme, Joy rebuilt her life, established a fashion business and now employs several young women.

“Joy is no longer defined by what happened to her. She is defined by what she has become,” Dimanche said, describing the story as evidence that effective reintegration can transform survivors into productive members of society.

The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Reduction, Dr. Bernard Doro. reaffirmed the Federal Government’s commitment to protecting returning migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable communities.

He said the government’s “One Humanitarian, One Poverty Reduction” framework under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s Renewed Hope Agenda was designed to integrate humanitarian assistance with long-term poverty reduction.

“Migration, when properly managed, presents opportunities for national development. We will continue to strengthen institutions, expand livelihood opportunities and ensure that returning migrants are empowered to rebuild their lives with dignity.”

The Minister of Women Affairs and Social Development, Imaan Sulaiman-Ibrahim, who was represented at the event, by the Director and Special Adviser Administration, Mrs. Erimfolami Ola, warned that women and children continue to bear the greatest burden of irregular migration and human trafficking.

According to her representative, the ministry has worked closely with partners under the COMPASS Programme to facilitate the voluntary return of over 1,000 stranded Nigerians while strengthening institutional responses to trafficking and forced displacement.

She stressed that interventions in Edo State had demonstrated that addressing poverty and unemployment significantly reduces the factors driving irregular migration.

Representing the Minister of Youth Development, Ayodele Olawande, represented by the the Head of Youth Migration and Climate Action Resilience, pecial Adviser (Administration), Adedoyin Oyekan, said creating sustainable opportunities for young Nigerians remains one of the most effective responses to irregular migration.

The ministry pledged to deepen collaboration with IOM and development partners in expanding entrepreneurship, skills acquisition, innovation and employment programmes aimed at discouraging dangerous migration.

Also speaking, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Nigeria, Bengt van Loosdrecht, announced plans for a football-based youth initiative that would equip young Nigerians with coaching and life skills while educating communities about the dangers of irregular migration.

He said the programme would empower participants to become community ambassadors for safe migration.

According to the ambassador, “Migration is fundamentally a human issue. Through COMPASS, we are investing not only in stronger institutions but also in protecting people, supporting survivors and preventing others from falling into the hands of traffickers.”

Van Loosdrecht explained that the Netherlands established the COMPASS Programme to consolidate migration support into a coordinated framework capable of providing survivor care, mental health services, institutional strengthening and protection for vulnerable migrants.

Also addressing the gathering, the Director-General of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Binta Bello, described the COMPASS Programme as one of Nigeria’s most strategic partnerships in the fight against human trafficking.

She said the initiative had strengthened the agency’s capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases through specialised training for investigators and prosecutors while improving support for victims.

Warning that trafficking networks continue to evolve, Bello said: “Traffickers are adapting to technology, exploiting economic hardship and taking advantage of the aspirations of vulnerable young Nigerians. We must therefore strengthen partnerships among government, international organisations, civil society and communities to stay ahead of these criminal networks.”

The renewed commitment comes amid persistent concerns over the thousands of Nigerians who, in recent years, have embarked on perilous journeys across the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea in search of better economic opportunities. Many have perished, while others have been rescued from detention camps, trafficking rings and exploitative labour conditions abroad.

Stakeholders at the event agreed that while stronger law enforcement remains essential, tackling poverty, unemployment and social vulnerability is critical to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and sustaining Nigeria’s fight against human trafficking.

FG Moves to Stem Human Trafficking, Irregular Migration as Over 1,000 Nigerians Return from Crisis Routes

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MSF Ends Kano Diphtheria Emergency Mission After Vaccinating 835,000 Children

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MSF Ends Kano Diphtheria Emergency Mission After Vaccinating 835,000 Children

By: Michael Mike

The humanitarian medical organisation, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)/Doctors Without Borders, has concluded its three-year emergency response to the devastating diphtheria outbreak in Kano State after supporting the vaccination of more than 835,000 children, describing immunisation as the key factor behind the sharp decline in infections.

The organisation, however, warned that the disease remains a major threat to children unless health authorities sustain routine immunisation, disease surveillance and rapid access to treatment.

MSF announced the end of its emergency intervention following the completion of a two-phase mass vaccination campaign carried out in partnership with the Kano State Ministry of Health.

The intervention followed one of Nigeria’s worst recorded diphtheria outbreaks, which claimed over 1,260 lives in Kano alone, most of them children.

According to MSF, more than 14,707 children received treatment during the emergency through MSF-run and supported treatment centres, including both facility-based and home-based care programmes.

The organisation also strengthened referral systems, disease surveillance, data management and community mobilisation while supporting the state’s vaccination drive.

Across two vaccination rounds, 835,028 doses of diphtheria vaccines were administered to children. The second phase, conducted between June 20 and 24, 2026, reached 486,948 children across 20 wards after the first round vaccinated 348,080 children, which ended on April 27.

MSF Project Coordinator in Kano, Abdoul-Aziz Djibrilla, said the outbreak placed enormous pressure on families, healthcare workers and health facilities across the state.

“Kano experienced a critical diphtheria outbreak that placed enormous pressure on families, healthcare workers and health facilities,” Djibrilla said.

He noted that although infections had declined considerably in recent months, largely because of the vaccination campaigns, the disease had not been eliminated.

“Although the number of cases has declined in recent months, mainly due to mass vaccination campaigns, the disease remains a serious health threat to children in Kano, driven by low immunisation coverage, overcrowding, delayed care-seeking, and malnutrition,” he added.

Kano has remained the epicentre of Nigeria’s diphtheria outbreak. According to the Kano State Ministry of Health, the state recorded more than 31,900 suspected cases and over 1,260 deaths between March 2022 and March 22, 2026.

The figures account for a significant proportion of Nigeria’s 65,759 suspected cases and 2,229 deaths reported by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) since the outbreak was officially declared in 2023.

At the height of the outbreak between late 2025 and early 2026, treatment centres were overwhelmed, with more than 100 children admitted daily across supported health facilities and home-based care programmes. Bed occupancy exceeded available capacity in several facilities as healthcare workers struggled to cope with the influx of patients requiring specialised treatment.

Diphtheria is a highly contagious but vaccine-preventable bacterial infection spread mainly through respiratory droplets or contact with infected wounds. The disease causes sore throat, fever, swollen lymph nodes and the formation of a thick grey membrane that can block the airway. In severe cases, toxins produced by the bacteria can damage the heart, kidneys and nervous system, while untreated infections can be fatal in about 30 per cent of cases, particularly among young children.

The outbreak has largely affected children aged between five and 14 years, many of whom had never been vaccinated or had received incomplete immunisation.

Despite the improvement recorded through the vaccination campaigns, MSF cautioned that immunity gaps persist, leaving thousands of children vulnerable to future outbreaks.

Djibrilla stressed that sustained government commitment would determine whether the gains recorded are maintained.

“Continued commitment from health authorities and partners to sustain high immunisation coverage, strengthen surveillance, and ensure timely access to quality treatment will be critical to preventing future outbreaks and protecting the lives of children in Kano,” he said.

MSF has operated continuously in Nigeria since 1996 and currently provides free medical care in 10 states, relying largely on private donations to maintain its humanitarian independence. The organisation said it would continue supporting healthcare interventions in Nigeria beyond the conclusion of the Kano diphtheria emergency response.MSF Ends endence. The organisation said it would continue supporting healthcare interventions in Nigeria beyond the conclusion of the Kano diphtheria emergency response.

MSF Ends Kano Diphtheria Emergency Mission After Vaccinating 835,000 Children

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Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse

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Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse

By: Dr. James Bwala

The insurgency that has plagued northeastern Nigeria for over a decade, popularly known as Boko Haram, has caused immense suffering and destabilization in the region. Despite the profound implications of this crisis, much of the public discourse surrounding its origins is riddled with inaccuracies, oversimplifications, and politically motivated narratives. As a consequence, many Nigerians—including those on the streets of Maiduguri or other affected areas—hold incomplete or erroneous understandings of the group’s history. This lack of historical facts not only clouds efforts to address the root causes of the conflict but also fuels divisive rhetoric and politicization of the tragedy. Nigerians and those who continued to discuss the conflict and its history found a need to know and draw from facts to line up their narratives. Discoursants like lawyer Femi Falana and politicians like Naja’atu need facts to buttress their claims and should not rely on hearsay or half-truths, perhaps from where they heard their stories, because it is not adding up.

For us, who reported this crisis on the front line and studied the historical lines from direct elements and foot soldiers, we know that the widespread misconception is the tendency to attribute Boko Haram’s insurgency exclusively to the late Malam Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s most notorious leader, who emerged publicly in the early 2000s. While Yusuf did play a role in shaping the movement known as the “Yusufiya sect,” claiming he single-handedly started Boko Haram grossly simplifies the complex evolution of this militant group in Borno State or Northeast Nigeria. Such reductionism is evident in popular narratives frequently encountered among ordinary citizens, who often repeat what they have heard without contextual depth. An accurate historical account reveals that the conditions fostering Boko Haram’s emergence existed long before Yusuf’s ascendancy, involving multiple actors and events that laid the groundwork for radicalization and violence from the simply known Islamiyya sect in Kannamma to the Yusufiya sect and Boko Haram, the name given to them after the Bauchi Prison break at the beginning of the one-year conflict in 2010.

Like I did mention earlier, complicating the discourse around the history or founder are politicized allegations by prominent individuals that seek to assign blame to specific personalities without credible evidence. For instance, Hajiya Naja’atu has in recent times launched rhetoric directed at Vice President Kashim Shettima, linking her claims to the arrest of Kabiru Sokoto at the Borno liaison office in Abuja (which she said is Shettima’s house). Similarly, respected lawyer Femi Falana has publicly accused a former governor of Borno State of initiating the Boko Haram insurgency, associating the claims with political thuggery during the administration of Modu Sheriff. While such claims may have come within certain political constituencies, they dangerously oversimplify a multifaceted crisis and divert attention from deeper structural factors. Most importantly, these rhetorics are often founded on partial or misinterpreted information rather than comprehensive, verifiable research into the insurgency’s roots.

Testimonies and records of journalists and observers who were active in Maiduguri and the wider northeastern region since the early 1990s have captured far more interesting narratives. These professionals witnessed firsthand the unfolding developments culminating in the Boko Haram crisis. Their accounts reveal the existence of leadership predating Mohammed Yusuf, notably an individual named Mohammed Ali, who led an early Islamist sect prior to the “Yusufiya” movement. Ali was reportedly killed amid violence after escaping arrest in Kannamma, located in present-day Yobe State, long before Yusuf became publicly acknowledged as Boko Haram’s leader. The circumstances surrounding Mohammed Ali’s demise evidence internal fractures and state interventions that contributed to the radicalization pathway exploited by later insurgents.

Geographically, the significance of certain locations underscores the continuity in Boko Haram’s operational terrain. Mohammed Ali was ambushed and killed between Talala and Ajigil, areas within Damboa Local Government in Borno State. These locations remain critical hubs for Boko Haram activities today, illustrating how the movement’s influence expanded along established routes starting decades ago. Access between Buni Yadi and Damboa, through Foi village, forms a corridor still exploited for logistical and militant operations. Understanding these geographic linkages offers valuable insight into Boko Haram’s sustained presence and the entrenchment of its networks in northeastern Nigeria.

The persistence of incorrect narratives can be partly attributed to inadequate primary research and reliance on hearsay or politically motivated sources. This deficiency highlights an urgent need for esteemed public figures, journalists, analysts, and commentators to engage in meticulous and objective investigation when discussing Boko Haram’s origins. Reckless or uninformed rhetoric risks exacerbating communal tensions, misguiding policy responses, and undermining public trust. For example, assigning blame to isolated individuals without substantial proof politicizes the insurgency, detracting from broader considerations such as socioeconomic marginalization, governmental neglect, corruption, and ideological manipulation—all key contributors to the conflict.

Moreover, responsible storytelling about Boko Haram’s history requires acknowledging the complexity of insurgencies as social phenomena. These are rarely the product of singular agents but rather evolve from layered interactions between various factors, including local grievances, religious ideologies, political exclusions, and external influences. Therefore, simplistic attributions fail to capture the organic, evolving nature of such movements. A comprehensive approach that integrates oral histories, archival materials, community testimonies, and official documents can provide a more accurate chronicle and inform more effective counterinsurgency strategies.

The discourse on Boko Haram’s history demands a progressive shift toward historical accuracy and intellectual honesty. The prevailing narrative that attributes the insurgency solely to late Malam Mohammed Yusuf or assigns culpability to particular public figures without substantive evidence does a disservice to truth and justice. Recognizing the role of earlier leaders like Mohammed Ali and appreciating the broader socio-political context enables Nigerians and the international community to better comprehend the insurgency’s complexities. It is incumbent upon respected voices—whether in politics, law, or the media—to prioritize thorough research and measured discourse. Doing so not only honors the memory of victims and affected communities but also facilitates the formulation of genuine solutions anchored in reality, empathy, and inclusiveness. Only through such a principled approach can Nigeria hope to heal the wounds inflicted by Boko Haram and work toward lasting peace and stability in its northeastern regions.

  • James Bwala, PhD, writes from Maiduguri.
  • Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse
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