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OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism

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OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism

By: Zagazola Makama

For more than a decade, Nigeria’s battle against terrorism has largely been viewed through the lens of military operations, troop deployments, air strikes, and battlefield victories. However, as the conflict evolved, security experts increasingly recognised that military force alone could not permanently end violent extremism.

This reality gave rise to Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), a Federal Government initiative designed to complement kinetic operations through deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of eligible low-risk individuals associated with terrorist groups.

Since its establishment, the programme has generated both support and controversy. While proponents describe it as a strategic security tool that weakens terrorist organisations from within, critics argue that it appears to offer opportunities to former insurgents while victims continue to struggle with the consequences of conflict.

The debate raises a fundamental question: can a country defeat terrorism through force alone, or must it also create pathways for disengagement and rehabilitation?

Recent explanations by the Coordinator of OPSC, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Ali, provide useful insights into the rationale behind the programme and the challenges it seeks to address.

Contemporary counterterrorism strategies across the world increasingly combine military operations with non-kinetic interventions. The reason is simple. Insurgencies are sustained not only by weapons and fighters but also by recruitment networks, ideological indoctrination, economic desperation, coercion, fear, and social dislocation. Even successful military campaigns may struggle to achieve lasting peace if these underlying drivers remain unaddressed. Operation Safe Corridor was established to address this gap.

According to programme officials, it provides a controlled process through which eligible low-risk individuals who voluntarily surrender can be screened, rehabilitated, and prepared for reintegration into society. The underlying logic is that every successful defection reduces the manpower available to terrorist organisations while simultaneously encouraging others to abandon violence.

Perhaps the most persistent misconception surrounding OPSC is the belief that it serves as an open-door policy for all insurgents. Available information suggests otherwise. Officials insist that admission into the programme follows extensive intelligence profiling and legal review. Individuals who voluntarily surrender are subjected to screening by military and civilian intelligence agencies before their cases are reviewed by the Federal Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry determines who qualifies for rehabilitation and who should face prosecution under existing legal frameworks. This distinction is critical because public concerns often stem from fears that individuals responsible for serious crimes are simply being released back into society. The programme coordinator maintains that only individuals assessed as low-risk and legally eligible are admitted into the rehabilitation process.

For years, critics have reduced the complex national security programme into simplistic slogans. They call it “a reward for Boko Haram.” They describe it as “pampering terrorists.” Some even falsely claim it is a recruitment channel into the military. These accusations may generate applause on social media, but they disintegrate when closely examined.

The truth is that most of the loudest critics of Operation Safe Corridor have never visited the centre, studied its structure, legal framework, operational processes, or strategic objectives. They react emotionally to a conflict that has caused immense suffering, but emotion is not a substitute for security policy.

The reality is that Operation Safe Corridor is not an act of sympathy toward terrorists. It is an instrument of war. And it may be one of the most important non-kinetic weapons Nigeria has ever deployed against violent extremism.

Nigerians must understand that it is not an amnesty programme, pardon, compensation scheme, reward for terrorism, or a recruitment pathway into security agencies. It is a voluntary programme.

Contrary to popular belief that only Boko Haram members are rehabilitated, not everybody associated with terrorist organisations who enters Operation Safe Corridor comes from the North-East. There are Igbos from the South-East, Yorubas from the South-West, and individuals from other ethnic groups enrolled in the programme.

Additionally, those captured on the battlefield in the North-East do not automatically qualify. Those with prosecutable offences do not automatically qualify. Those assessed as high-risk do not qualify. Those involved in serious criminal activities can face prosecution.

This distinction is critical. Operation Safe Corridor does not decide who enters the programme. The Federal Ministry of Justice does. That fact alone destroys one of the biggest misconceptions surrounding the initiative.

One of the strongest arguments against Operation Safe Corridor is the claim that terrorists simply walk into the camp and are forgiven. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Before admission, individuals undergo extensive profiling involving military intelligence, civilian intelligence agencies, security services, legal authorities, psychologists, and health professionals. Their backgrounds are examined, their activities are investigated, their risk levels are assessed, and their legal status is reviewed. Only after this process are recommendations made.

The programme operates within a multi-agency framework involving more than seventeen Ministries, Departments, and Agencies. This means decisions are not taken by one commander, one agency, or one institution. They are subjected to scrutiny from multiple stakeholders.

Those found to have prosecutable cases can be sent for trial. Those categorised as low-risk may be referred for rehabilitation. This is not leniency; it is classification, and every serious counterterrorism system in the world relies on classification.

The most important question left unanswered is this: if there is no pathway out of terrorism, why would anyone surrender? One basic reality is that a terrorist organisation is weakened not only when fighters are killed. It is weakened when fighters abandon the organisation, as every surrender reduces its manpower, operational capability, intelligence-gathering capacity, and recruitment potential.

This is where Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model, an initiative of Borno state government become strategically important. The programmes creates a credible exit route. And that exit route has helped generate hundreds of thousands of surrenders over the years.

Every surrendered individual represents one less fighter available to conduct attacks, plant IEDs, gather intelligence, transport logistics, recruit new members, or support terrorist operations. In military terms, this is attrition from within.

Based on figures repeatedly cited by military authorities and reports on the deradicalisation programme, the number of Boko Haram/ISWAP members and their families who surrendered through the combined non-kinetic approach involving the Borno Model and Operation Safe Corridor has grown significantly over the years.

In 2018, when the window of opportunity was announced, the military reported that 146 Boko Haram members had voluntarily surrendered under Operation Safe Corridor. By 2019, authorities said over 1,370 fighters had surrendered, with some transferred into rehabilitation programmes.

Following the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, mass defections accelerated, with thousands of fighters and family members laying down their arms. Thousands of people trapped in the Sambisa Forest were able to escape.

In January 2023, the Chief of Defence Staff disclosed that more than 83,000 insurgents and their family members had surrendered. By 2025, military authorities updated the figure to approximately 120,000–129,000 Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters and family members who had surrendered.

For example, in 2026, Defence Headquarters stated that while over 300,000 terrorists and associated persons had surrendered over a decade across the North-East, only 2,615 ex-combatants had undergone rehabilitation under Operation Safe Corridor, with 2,016 graduating from the programme.

It is impossible to understand Nigeria’s recent gains against insurgency without acknowledging the role played by this mechanism. One of the biggest mistakes made by those opposing Operation Safe Corridor is assuming everyone associated with terrorist groups joined voluntarily. The reality is far more complicated.

It is important to note that those who surrendered include fighters, farmers, women, children, and other trapped populations who emerged from insurgent enclaves, not only active combatants.

Military authorities have consistently explained that only a low-risk fraction of the surrendered population qualifies for the formal Operation Safe Corridor deradicalisation programme after screening, profiling, and legal review.

Thousands of individuals were abducted, forced into service, married against their will, recruited as children, coerced through threats, and trapped by circumstances. Many women found within insurgent camps were themselves victims. Many children born within terrorist-controlled territories never chose that environment.

In the Sambisa Forest, there were dozens of villages with people trapped by terrorists. In Gwoza, there are still thousands of people trapped within terrorist enclaves. In the Lake Chad Tumbuns, many farmers and fishermen were trapped in ISWAP-controlled areas. Sometimes they became collateral victims during attacks on terrorist enclaves. Many foot soldiers were not ideological extremists.

Research cited by programme managers indicates that more than 60 percent of foot soldiers in extremist groups are not primarily driven by ideology. Many were coerced or manipulated, with threats of death if they attempted to escape.

A serious nation cannot treat all these categories identically. That is why modern counterterrorism relies on differentiation.

Another myth is that participants simply spend a few months relaxing before returning home. Again, the facts suggest otherwise.

The clients spend several months undergoing rehabilitation. During this period, extremist interpretations are challenged by trained scholars. Participants are exposed to alternative teachings that reject violence and promote lawful coexistence.

Years of conflict leave deep psychological scars. Counselling addresses trauma, fear, guilt, anxiety, behavioural conditioning, and emotional instability. Participants receive practical skills training designed to support lawful livelihoods.
Clients learn about citizenship, lawful conduct, and responsibilities within society.

The rehabilitation programme increasingly focuses on changing behaviour, addressing trauma, and creating alternatives to violence rather than attempting to achieve ideological transformation alone. Within OPSC, rehabilitation reportedly includes religious reorientation, psychosocial support, vocational training, civic education, behavioural assessment, and skills acquisition.

The objective is to help participants disengage from violence and develop the capacity to function productively within society.

One challenge in evaluating deradicalisation programmes is determining what success actually means. Is success measured by the number of people processed through the programme, by the number who do not return to violence, or by broader security outcomes?

Officials point to several indicators. On the other hand, some high-risk or captured terrorists have been detained for seven to eight years in Giwa Barracks and Kainji while prosecution of their cases continued.

Officials at the Joint Investigation Centre located at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri, said it has so far investigated about 1,450 terrorism-related cases, while over 500 Boko Haram terrorists were subsequently convicted by the Federal Ministry of Justice in Kainji, Niger State.

The Commander of the facility, Brig.-Gen. Yusuf Audu, who disclosed this while outlining the structure, operations, and reforms of the multi-agency detention and investigation centre supporting counterterrorism efforts in the North-East, said the facility remains central to Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents.

He disclosed that “recently, the centre moved over 500 suspects for trial, most of whom were convicted and are serving various jail terms,” adding that the development reflects improved coordination among security and justice institutions handling terrorism cases.

The existence of Operation Safe Corridor and the Borno Model is believed to have contributed to the surrender of over 300,000 individuals to Nigerian troops over time. Some of the rescued or surrendered victims have been reunited with their families by the Borno State Government, while Operation Safe Corridor has so far graduated more than 2,600 individuals from the programme since inception.

From a strategic perspective, these figures suggest that the programmes may be helping to reduce the pool of active fighters available to extremist groups, as every surrender represents not only one less combatant on the battlefield but also a potential source of intelligence and a signal to others that exit options exist.

Nevertheless, experts caution that long-term outcomes remain the most important measure.
The true test lies in whether reintegrated individuals remain peaceful, productive, and accepted within their communities years after completing rehabilitation.

Critics often portray Operation Safe Corridor as some bizarre Nigerian experiment. It is not. Comparable programmes exist worldwide. Somalia has implemented disengagement initiatives for defectors from Al-Shabaab. Colombia developed reintegration systems following the FARC conflict. Many countries facing insurgencies rely on combinations of military pressure and rehabilitation frameworks.

Consequently, acceptance of former associates of terrorist groups is often difficult. Many victims understandably question why resources appear to be directed toward former combatants while communities continue to struggle. This perception has become one of the most significant public relations and policy challenges facing OPSC.

Programme managers acknowledge the concern and argue that sustainable peace requires a balance between supporting victims and rehabilitating eligible returnees.

According to officials, victim-centred initiatives are increasingly being incorporated into broader stabilisation efforts, including psychosocial support and community recovery programmes.

Another major issue is funding. According to OPSC officials, Defence Headquarters and a few non-governmental organisations currently bear much of the financial responsibility for activities within the rehabilitation camp.

However, reintegration, the phase widely regarded as the most important remains significantly underfunded. Successful reintegration requires transportation, livelihood support, community sensitisation, monitoring, mentorship, and follow-up services.

Without adequate resources, there is a risk that individuals may return to environments characterised by unemployment, social rejection, and economic hardship.

Such conditions can undermine rehabilitation gains and increase vulnerability to relapse. Therefore, experts argue that the long-term success of OPSC will depend not only on what happens inside the camp but also on the strength of support systems available after graduation. International experiences also show that weak reintegration systems can undermine otherwise successful rehabilitation efforts.

This lesson appears particularly relevant to Nigeria, where economic challenges and community mistrust remain significant obstacles.

As insecurity continues to evolve, Operation Safe Corridor itself is undergoing transformation. Authorities are expanding deradicalisation infrastructure beyond the North-East, including facilities in Zamfara and planned structures in the North-Central region.

There is also increasing emphasis on victim support, community ownership, strategic communication, and livelihood programmes.
Ultimately, the debate surrounding OPSC reflects a broader question confronting modern counterterrorism efforts worldwide.

Can security be achieved solely through military victories, or does lasting peace require addressing the human dimensions of conflict?
While opinions remain divided, one point appears increasingly clear.

Military operations may remove immediate threats, but sustainable peace often depends on what happens after the guns fall silent. In that regard, Operation Safe Corridor represents Nigeria’s attempt to navigate the difficult balance between security, justice, rehabilitation, and long-term stability.

Whether the programme ultimately achieves its objectives will depend not only on the quality of rehabilitation within the camps but also on the nation’s ability to support victims, strengthen communities, and sustain reintegration long after participants leave the programme.

Zagazola Makama is a Counter-Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region.

OPINION: Operation Safe Corridor Is Not a Reward for Terrorists — It Is One of Nigeria’s Most Strategic Weapons Against Terrorism

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Scholarship or Trap? Why Northern Nigerian Youth Must Verify Foreign Opportunities

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Scholarship or Trap? Why Northern Nigerian Youth Must Verify Foreign Opportunities

By Alhassan Bala

Hundreds of young Nigerians, including students and graduates from northern Nigeria, have benefited from legitimate scholarships and educational opportunities offered by foreign governments and institutions. Such programmes can open doors to quality education, professional development and international exposure.

However, the growing use of social media to advertise scholarships, jobs and training opportunities abroad also presents serious risks.

Some seemingly attractive offers may be fraudulent, exploitative or even serve as channels for human trafficking and forced recruitment.

This is why young Nigerians must exercise extreme caution before accepting foreign scholarships or employment opportunities promoted online.

Recently, I came across a northern Nigerian professor working outside the country advising Nigerians, particularly young people from the North, to take advantage of a scholarship opportunity reportedly being promoted by educators he knows in Russia.

I have enormous respect for the professor, as I do for many academics who genuinely want to help young Nigerians access opportunities abroad.

Nevertheless, his recommendation reminded me of the disturbing experience surrounding the Alabuga recruitment programme in Russia and the need for prospective applicants to verify such offers independently before travelling.

The Alabuga warning,
For those unfamiliar with the Alabuga controversy, the programme began attracting young Africans through online advertisements offering employment, vocational training and what was presented in some cases as educational opportunities in Russia.

Investigations by international and Nigerian media later raised serious concerns about the programme.

Young Africans, including Nigerians, were recruited through social media and other online channels and taken to Russia.

Reports indicated that some participants who expected education or employment opportunities ended up working in facilities associated with the production of drones used by Russia in its war against Ukraine.

The Nigerian Ministry of Education subsequently said its website had been compromised and that advertisements for the controversial Alabuga Start programme had been posted without official authorisation.

Officials also stressed that the programme was not part of Nigeria’s approved bilateral scholarship arrangements with Russia.

The episode should have taught Nigerians an important lesson: the appearance of government endorsement, the involvement of a university professor or the presence of an attractive scholarship advertisement on social media does not, by itself, establish that an opportunity is genuine or safe.

From scholarships to the battlefield.

There is an even more disturbing dimension to the growing concern over recruitment of Africans to Russia.

In recent years, reports have emerged of Africans travelling to Russia after being promised civilian employment, only to find themselves recruited into the Russian military and deployed to the war in Ukraine.

In February 2026, the Russian ambassador to Nigeria, Andrey Podyelyshev, denied that Moscow operated any government-supported programme to recruit Nigerians to fight in Ukraine.

He said that if illegal individuals or organisations were recruiting Nigerians unlawfully, such activities were not connected to the Russian state.

Despite the denial, investigations and reports have documented cases involving Nigerians and other Africans who allegedly travelled to Russia believing they were taking up civilian jobs before being sent to the battlefield. In one widely reported Nigerian case, Adam Anas and other Nigerians were recruited under the guise of security employment and subsequently deployed to fight in Ukraine.

The cases are not limited to Nigeria. In March 2026, the Association of Nigerien Students in Russia announced the death of Abdoulaye Issaka Ismael, a Nigerien master’s student who, according to the student organisation, had been recruited into Russian combat forces and deployed to the frontline in Ukraine.

Ghana has also reported serious losses. Its Foreign Minister disclosed in February 2026 that 55 Ghanaians had died after being lured into fighting in the Ukraine war, while hundreds more were believed to have joined the Russian military.

These cases demonstrate that the danger is not merely theoretical.

The lesson for young Nigerians, especially those desperately seeking educational or employment opportunities abroad, is straightforward: verify before you travel.

Anyone offered a scholarship in Russia or any other foreign country should first establish whether the programme is officially recognised by the Nigerian government and the government of the destination country.

Applicants should independently contact the Federal Ministry of Education, the Federal Scholarship Board, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant embassy or high commission before committing money, submitting sensitive documents or travelling.

They should also verify the name of the university, its accreditation, the exact course of study, the physical location of the institution, the identity of the sponsoring organisation and the legal status of whoever is recruiting them.

Most importantly, prospective applicants should be suspicious of opportunities that are promoted exclusively through WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, TikTok or other social media platforms, particularly when recruiters pressure applicants to travel quickly or discourage them from contacting government authorities.

A genuine scholarship should withstand scrutiny.

Northern Nigeria has millions of young people searching for education, employment and opportunities to improve their lives.

That makes the region particularly vulnerable to individuals who exploit unemployment and economic hardship with promises of quick opportunities abroad.

Professors, academics, journalists, community leaders and other influential Nigerians therefore have a special responsibility when sharing foreign opportunities.

Before recommending a scholarship or job to young people, they should verify it through official channels and make the evidence available to prospective applicants.

A recommendation from a respected professor can give an opportunity credibility that it may not deserve. If the opportunity later turns out to be fraudulent, the consequences may be devastating.

The Nigerian government also needs to do more.
Government agencies responsible for education, foreign affairs, Nigeria Immigration Service, labour and youth development should maintain accessible, regularly updated databases of approved foreign scholarships and legitimate overseas recruitment programmes.

They should also promptly alert Nigerians whenever questionable opportunities emerge online.

The Alabuga experience showed how easily a dubious programme could acquire an appearance of legitimacy when its advertisements appeared on an official government website.

The subsequent reports about Africans being deceived into military service demonstrate the potentially fatal consequences of inadequate verification and oversight.

Young Nigerians deserve opportunities, but they also deserve protection.

A scholarship should lead to a classroom, laboratory or recognised institution not a factory where they are exploited, and certainly not a battlefield.

For young Nigerians seeking opportunities abroad, the safest rule is simple: do not trust an opportunity because it looks attractive; verify it because your life may depend on it.

Alhassan Bala, wrote this piece from Abuja

Scholarship or Trap? Why Northern Nigerian Youth Must Verify Foreign Opportunities

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When Official Directives Become More Powerful Than the Law

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When Official Directives Become More Powerful Than the Law

By: Ibrahim Welye

There is a dangerous habit gradually becoming normal in Nigeria’s public institutions: the assumption that once an instruction comes from a sufficiently powerful office, somebody somewhere must have the authority to carry it out.
A letter arrives from a senior official. A ministry acts on it. Another agency processes the request. A bank opens an account. A department prepares a budget. A committee gives its approval. Before long, what began simply as an instruction has acquired all the appearance of legality.
But there is a question we too often forget to ask:
Where is the law that gives you the power to do this?
That question should come before the letterhead, before the signature and certainly before the status of the person issuing the instruction.
In a constitutional democracy, authority does not flow from importance. It flows from law.
A minister is powerful because the law gives the office certain powers. A governor exercises authority within powers conferred by the Constitution and legislation. The President, despite occupying the highest executive office in the country, does not possess unlimited authority merely because he is President.
Public office does not create its own powers.
Yet increasingly, our institutions appear willing to confuse political authority with legal authority. And that is where the danger begins.
A Government Letter Is Not the Law
There is a strange reverence for official correspondence in our public system.
Once a letter carries the right crest, the right signature or the name of the right office, institutions sometimes behave as though the legal question has already been settled.
It has not.
A completely genuine letter can contain an unlawful instruction. A properly constituted office can act outside its powers. An official can have authority over one matter and absolutely no authority over another.
This distinction is fundamental.
The first responsibility of any ministry, department, agency or public institution receiving an instruction should therefore not merely be: Who sent this?
It should be: Under what law are we being asked to act?
That simple question could prevent an extraordinary amount of institutional misconduct.
Instead, what often happens is an administrative chain reaction.
One institution assumes another institution has done the legal checks. The next institution assumes the first would not have approved the matter without authority. A third sees two government approvals and concludes that the issue must be legitimate.
Eventually, an act for which nobody can clearly identify a legal foundation has accumulated enough stamps, minutes, signatures and approvals to look perfectly official.
We could call this the administrative laundering of illegality.
Something questionable enters the system at one end and emerges at the other wearing the full uniform of government.
The number of institutions involved does not make it lawful.
Ten government agencies cannot collectively manufacture a power that the law gave to none of them.
The Problem With ‘Oga Said’
Many Nigerians will recognise the culture behind this problem.
‘Oga said.’
‘The Honourable Minister directed.’
‘The Governor has approved.’
‘The Presidency wants it done.’
These statements may explain why somebody wants an action taken. They do not necessarily explain why government has the legal authority to take it.
There is a difference.
And a country gradually loses its institutional foundations when its civil servants become more afraid of questioning an instruction than of violating the law.
The public officer who asks for the statutory basis of an instruction is not being difficult.
The legal adviser who says, ‘We do not have the power to do this,’ is not obstructing government.
The permanent secretary who insists that proper procedure be followed is not necessarily resisting political leadership.
Sometimes, these are the very people protecting the government from itself.
Political appointees will eventually leave office. Directors will retire. Administrations will change.
The files will remain.
The signatures will remain.
The payment records will remain.
And when questions are eventually asked, ‘I was instructed’ may explain what happened, but it does not automatically make what happened lawful.
The Precedent You Celebrate Today May Be Used Against You Tomorrow
Perhaps the most troubling part of Nigeria’s relationship with institutional illegality is our tendency to judge it according to who benefits.
When an administration we support stretches the rules, we suddenly discover the virtues of pragmatism.
We say government must be allowed to work.
We say procedure should not frustrate development.
We say critics are being political.
Then power changes hands.
The same institutional shortcuts are used by people we dislike, and suddenly we rediscover the Constitution.
This is how countries weaken themselves.
The danger of tolerating unlawful power is not simply what the present government will do with it. The greater danger is that the power survives the government that created the precedent.
Those benefiting from weakened safeguards today should remember that they will not remain in office forever.
Every shortcut created for your convenience becomes available to your successor.
Every institution taught to obey personalities rather than law will simply transfer that obedience to the next personality.
If an agency learns today that a powerful political instruction is enough to bypass its rules, why should anyone expect that same agency to suddenly become courageous when a future administration gives an instruction against today’s beneficiaries?
Institutions do not remember who first corrupted their standards.
They simply remember the new standard.
That is why defending the rule of law only when one is in opposition is not a commitment to democracy. It is merely political convenience.
The Real Victim Is the Ordinary Nigerian
Institutional illegality may sound abstract until we consider who ultimately pays for it.
The ordinary Nigerian is expected to obey the rules.
Bring this document.
Complete this form.
Obtain this approval.
Wait for this process.
Pay this statutory fee.
Meet this deadline.
Then another person arrives carrying a letter from an influential office and suddenly the same institution discovers flexibility.
That is how citizens begin to realise that Nigeria has two administrative systems: one governed by procedure and another governed by access.
Once political connection becomes more useful than legal compliance, people stop believing that institutions are neutral.
Businesses become uncertain about whether today’s approvals will survive tomorrow’s administration. Public resources can be directed towards structures whose legal foundations are questionable. Appointments can be created outside established frameworks. Government institutions spend money, time and credibility implementing decisions they may never have had the authority to make.
The cost is eventually paid by citizens through weaker services, wasted resources, arbitrary government decisions and declining trust in the state.
We Should Stop Treating Legal Scrutiny as Disloyalty
One cultural change is particularly necessary.
Public officials must be allowed to say no.
Not a political no.
Not an ideological no.
A professional no.
‘No, Minister, the law does not give this institution that power.’
‘No, Director-General, this procedure has not been completed.’
‘No, Chairman, we need legal advice before proceeding.’
‘No, there is no statutory basis for what we are being asked to do.’
That kind of resistance should be valued, not punished.
A leader surrounded entirely by people who say yes eventually becomes dangerously uninformed about the limits of his own authority.
The best civil servants are not necessarily those who implement every instruction fastest. Sometimes, the most valuable officer in the room is the person courageous enough to prevent everyone else from making a mistake.
Oversight Must Ask a Different Question
Our accountability institutions also need to widen the way they think about misconduct.
We often wait until money disappears before asking questions.
But sometimes the first failure happened long before the money moved.
Before asking whether funds were stolen, an auditor or legislature should sometimes ask: Did this institution have the authority to create this programme in the first place?
Was the entity receiving public resources lawfully established?
Who authorised it?
Under what legislation?
Was a lawful delegation made?
Which institution first accepted the arrangement as legitimate?
What legal advice was obtained?
Those questions matter because government can waste enormous resources implementing something that should never have entered the administrative system at all.
Accountability should follow the entire chain.
And every institution involved should explain its own decision.
‘We acted because another agency approved it’ cannot become the standard defence of public institutions.
Citizens Must Also Be Consistent
There is another uncomfortable truth.
Politicians are not alone in encouraging this culture.
Citizens often excuse illegality when the outcome favours their party, region, religion, ethnic group or preferred leader.
That is a mistake.
A constitutional safeguard surrendered because it inconveniences your opponent will not magically reappear when you need it.
We cannot demand strict legality from governments we dislike and invent excuses for governments we support.
The rule of law cannot be a weapon we bring out against our opponents and put back in the cupboard when our friends are in power.

Either the law restrains everybody or, eventually, it restrains nobody.
Nigeria’s challenge is therefore bigger than any single questionable directive, appointment, agency or programme.
It is about the kind of state we are building.
Do we want institutions whose first instinct is to ask, ‘What does the law permit?’
Or institutions whose first instinct is to ask, ‘Who gave the instruction?’
The difference between those two questions is the difference between an institution and an entourage.
Governments will come and go. Today’s powerful officeholder will eventually become yesterday’s officeholder. Political beneficiaries will change. Parties will rise and fall.

The institutions will remain.
We should therefore be extremely careful about what we teach those institutions to obey.
Public power is borrowed, not owned.
An official directive can begin an administrative process, but it cannot create powers that the Constitution or legislation does not provide. A dozen official signatures cannot transform an unlawful act into a lawful one.
And whenever government is about to act, one question should remain stubbornly at the front of the file:
Where is the legal authority to do this?
Nigeria will be safer when asking that question becomes an act of professionalism rather than an act of courage.
— Ibrahim Welye

When Official Directives Become More Powerful Than the Law

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THE EFCC BILLIONS AND THE NDDC: WHAT NEXT?

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THE EFCC BILLIONS AND THE NDDC: WHAT NEXT?

By Frank Tietie

The reported recovery by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of substantial statutory levies owed to the Niger Delta Development Commission by defaulting oil companies is commendable. It demonstrates what determined regulatory enforcement can accomplish when public institutions act decisively.

According to disclosures made before the Senate Committee on Public Accounts, the EFCC investigated 43 oil companies following findings in the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s 2021–2023 Oil and Gas Sector Audit Report. Twenty-four companies had outstanding liabilities totalling approximately ₦76.88 billion and $81.08 million, while 19 were cleared.

The EFCC further disclosed that some companies paid ₦6.71 billion and $16.99 million directly to the NDDC. Of the sums recovered through the EFCC, ₦73.37 billion and $67.07 million had reportedly been released to the Commission, leaving ₦3.51 billion and $14.01 million in the EFCC recovery account.

These recoveries are significant, but recovering the money is only the beginning. The more important question is: what happens to the funds after they reach the NDDC?

For too long, the NDDC has failed to maximise its statutory mandate to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta, particularly in communities directly affected by oil and gas exploration and production.

Instead of transforming the living conditions of the people, the Commission has repeatedly been associated with allegations of political patronage, abandoned projects, inflated contracts, procurement irregularities and payments for work that was either poorly executed or never performed.

A particularly troubling example involved allegations made by the NDDC against the late Senator Peter Nwaoboshi. In 2020, the Commission alleged that he used 11 companies as fronts to secure contracts worth approximately ₦3.6 billion in September 2016. The late senator denied the allegations. The NDDC subsequently demanded the refund of about ₦2.5 billion in relation to a contract for the supply of plastic desks and chairs.

The public deserves to know whether the demanded sum was ever recovered and, if not, what steps are being taken against the estate, companies, or other persons legally responsible. Allegations involving public funds should not simply disappear because an accused person has died. Although criminal liability is personal, properly established civil claims, recovery proceedings and forfeiture orders may, where legally sustainable, continue against companies, assets or an estate.

The wider picture is even more disturbing. The forensic audit submitted to the Federal Government in 2021 reportedly identified 13,777 projects whose execution was substantially compromised, despite the NDDC receiving approximately ₦6 trillion from statutory and non-statutory sources between 2001 and 2019. This represents a profound betrayal of the people for whose benefit the Commission was established.

If the Federal Government truly cares about the Niger Delta, it cannot simply congratulate the EFCC for recovering the funds and then allow those funds to enter the same opaque system that produced thousands of abandoned and questionable projects.

The EFCC should apply comparable determination to investigating past and current NDDC contracts, particularly contracts for which substantial or full payments were made without corresponding performance. Such investigations should determine whether contracts complied with the Public Procurement Act and applicable procurement regulations and whether the projects were actually executed at the approved locations with the quality and quantity of work delivered corresponding with the sums paid;

Where criminal conduct is established, those responsible should be prosecuted. Where money was paid without value, recovery proceedings should be commenced against the contractors, their companies and any public officials who facilitated the unlawful payments.

The NDDC must move beyond the politics of loyalty and patronage. Its management should understand that the recovered funds are not a political windfall. They are statutory resources that, in practical and moral terms, belong to Niger Delta communities that continue to endure environmental degradation, poor roads, inadequate healthcare, unemployment, polluted water, and deficient educational facilities despite decades of oil production.

Priority should therefore be given to projects that have an immediate and measurable impact on the people, such as the provision of potable water, healthcare, education, environmental remediation, electricity, roads, skills development and sustainable employment.

The EFCC deserves commendation for recovering funds owed to the NDDC. However, its responsibility should not end with transferring the money. It must help ensure that the recovered funds do not become subject to the same corruption and embezzlement that have historically undermined the Commission.

The true success of this recovery will not be measured by the billions announced before the Senate. It will be measured by completed roads, functioning hospitals, equipped schools, clean water, restored environments and improved livelihoods across the Niger Delta.

The money has been recovered. The next and more difficult task is to ensure that it reaches the people.

Frank Tietie
Nigerian Lawyer, Media Personality and Executive Director of Citizens Advocacy for Social and Economic Rights (CASER) writes from Abuja

THE EFCC BILLIONS AND THE NDDC: WHAT NEXT?

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