Opinions
THE BIU FORUM: FEW THINGS TO KNOW
THE BIU FORUM: FEW THINGS TO KNOW.
By: A G Abubakar
The Biu Forum was a child of circumstances. It was born in response to the fall out from the August 1991 state creation exercise by the Babangida military regime which initially located Biu in Yobe but removed same after a couple of days. To push for a redress or for an answer, the Forum was initiated. Its drivers came from the entire spectrum of the present day Biu Emirate and Shani Chiefdom, who were then resident in Lagos, the former federal capital.The first meeting was held in October 1991 at Block 4, Flat 3, the Bar Beach Towers, Victoria Island.
The inaugural and subsequent meetings of the forum were attended by such personalities as Shettima Saleh, Saidu Pindar, Tahir A.Musa, PC Abdullahi Mohammed, Musa Yamta, Hassan Bdliya, John Balami, Audu Shettima, Sanda Usman, Adamu Abdullahi, Musa Shani, Major (now Gen) Usman, Muhammad Dili, Ahmed Kuru, Jibrin A.Jibrin, A.G.Abubakar (Convener along with Musa Yamta), Mamman Audu, Paul Mari, Ishaku Abdullahi, Sale Mari Maina, Major. Ibrahim Bantam, Samaila Mamman, Sule Usman, C.D.Gali, and many more. These foundation members nurtured the Forum for years in Lagos before the seat of government was formally moved to Abuja.
Some of them are of blessed memory (may the Almighty grant them His mercy, Ameen), though a lot more are still living. The major objective of the forum at inception was to build a unity of purpose to tackle the challenges facing Biu Emirate, particularly its excision from the then newly created Yobe State. Plus, the need to call for attention to the brazen discriminations visited upon Biu people in the state’s civil service, while also pursuing the creation of a Savannah State. Same, with extending moral and material supports to victims of natural disasters and others like the then Waka-Biu crisis.
It would be recalled that after the Babangida military government decided to split old the Borno State, late General Abacha, then the Chief of Army Staff and the defacto number “two” man, who happened to be of Borno extraction, was assigned to consult with the Shehu as well as other opinion leaders on the government’s proposal to curve out a new state out of Borno. Late Bunu Sherrif, a son of the soil (Goniri), who was then serving as Minister of Labour among others, was to serve as a facilitator. The rough edges were therefore smoothened.
Eventually, Yobe was created. The configuration of which comprised three emirates, namely Biu, Fika, and Bade. Borno and Bama emirates were to remain as the New Borno State. The number of local governments was equally balanced at 22 each. Now, it is lopsidedly 17 and 27 LGAs for Yobe and Borno, respectively.
Along the line, some forces opposed to the inclusion of Biu emerged. The first one was the supposed friction between the Emirs of Biu and Fika regarding the order of protocol. A smokescreen, however, because the real reason was that Fika Emirate was promised the State capital (precisely Potiskum), but that was if Biu wasn’t part of the equation. The other reason was that Biu and Borno Emirates had a historical tie that made the duo almost conjoined. This was also untenable in that Ngazargamo that served as the capital of the old Kanem-Borno was severed into Yobe State. In the end, Biu remains part of Borno.
This development polarised the citizens of Biu Emirate into two. The Elders were not so favourably disposed towards leaving Borno, while the larger youth groups were at home with Yobe.
The advantages they averred included the possibility of playing more dominant political and economic roles in the new state, given the fact that Biu used to hold and still holds the Deputy Governor portfolio in Borno. The emirates (Fika and Biu) equally serve as the manpower base of the region . State politics could turn out to be like Adamawa, where all ethnic groups and/or stripes of faith can become the number one citizen of the state. The Emir of Biu would naturally be the most senior, in addition.
Based on the foregoing, Biu made a case for inclusion or, better still, a re-inclusion into Yobe. A move that was resisted vehemently by certain quarters under the umbrella of BEDA. Others who lent their voices included the Birma, Galadima Stanley Balami, PC Ali Biu, and Alhaji Ibrahim Damchida, all of blessed memory.
The Biu citizens who were pushing for the readjustment initially got the support of His Royal Highness, the Revered Mai Umar, who gracefully endorsed the demand document titled, “A Call For the Adjustment of Biu Emirate into Yobe State.” Or rather agreed for the document to be endorsed on his behalf, which was done. However, under pressure from all corners, His Royal Highness had to reconsider his support, as the Emirate found itself in a difficult situation. It was this development and regardless of the push back that the Biu Forum was formed as an alternative platform to still pursue the inclusion of Biu and Shani into Yobe State.
A petition to the government, was subsequently produced and forwarded. And to get a wider publicity and forestall suppression the Forum’s document was sent to the press . The rested influencial national newspaper, the Sunday Concord of 6th October 1991 carried the entire document. Yours faithfully picked the bill.
One of the the committed and highly articulate members of the Forum at the time, Alh. Muhammed Shehu Birma had his relationship with his principal, the Hon. Minister, Bunu Sheriff strained because of his role and support. Alh. Birma was one of the Special Assistants to the Minister who worked tirelessly to obtain the concurrence of major stakeholders to buy into the Forum’s activities.
When the misunderstanding so created on account of the state creation seemed unabating, formal meetings were called by the late elder statesman Alh. Damcida at his Probyn road, Ikoyi, home to sort things out. The “family” gathering enjoyed the presence of late Dr.Saidu Muhammad, PC Ali Biu, A.G.Abubakar, Muhammad S.Birma, Amb. Saidu Pindar, Alhaji Madu Biu, Shettima Saleh, with apologies from Dr.Bukar Usman.
One of the resolutions that came out of the series of dialogues was an undertaking by Mallam to seek an audience with General Abacha for possible reconsideration of the petition. The outcome was the creation of Hawul and Kwaya Kusar LGAs, while Biu as a whole stayed in Borno State.
As time went on, moves got started to merge the activities of the Forum to those of the senior Biu Development Association, BDA. The BDA is now BEDA (Biu Emirate Development Association). The move never materialised and the activities of both slowed down. It took the efforts of patriots like Engineer Ibrahim Usman, Dan Masani Muhammad Ibrahim, Adamu Abdullahi, Amb. Saidu, Ibrahim M.Kwajaffah, Muhammad Buba, Mai Musti, Bukar Umar and a host of others to revive the Forum and keep it going.
So for all intents and purposes the Biu Forum was not a Biu Local Government outfit. It was initiated to protect and promote the interest of Biu and Shani Emirates. And indeed every Aburwa on the planet. How it became a Forum exclusively for Biu Local Government Area was maybe a later development to give the Forum a sharper focus. And maybe to ensure a seamless coexistence with the senior BEDA.This has been a short story of the now, 33-year old (1991 to –) initiative.
A.G.Abubakar agbarewa@gmail.com
THE BIU FORUM: FEW THINGS TO KNOW
Opinions
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
By: Zagazola Makama
The Jan. 29 attack on Niger’s Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey has exposed a dangerous evolution in jihadist cooperation across West Africa: a tightening operational axis between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin and Islamic State affiliates operating across the Sahel.
Beyond the symbolism of striking a capital-city airport, intelligence indicators point to something more consequential, the emergence of a transnational fighting concept that seeks to fuse manpower, logistics and media operations from Lake Chad through Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
For years, ISWAP’s Lake Chad network and Sahel-based Islamic State factions operated on largely parallel tracks. That boundary is now blurring. Recent intelligence indicates ISWAP elements are travelling westward from the Lake Chad Basin into Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions, while Sahelian militants rotate into Borno and neighboring areas for logistics, training and media coordination.
The signature of this cooperation was first visible in northeastern Nigeria in early 2025, when ISIS released a video showing some foreign fighters training ISWAP fighters in the Lake Chad shores of Marte and Kukawa. In 12 Aug 25, about 200 ISWAP elements, including ISIS affiliated members from BURKINA, MALI, NIGER, CAR and MOZAMBIQUE were sighted near Lake Chad.
To consolidate their cooperations 8 foreign fighters (5 light skinned ARABS, and 3 non-ARAB dark skinned foreigners) infiltrated the LCRBA some months ago. Another top ABU YASIR, an ARAB, later arrived. The foreign fighters are said to have infiltrated unnoticed into the North East to gain access to ISWAP Camps via ungoverned borders of DIFFA (NIGER Republic) into the LCRBA. In November, about 63 foreign fighters arrived the Lake Chad through Kusuri in Cameroon with armed drones.
According to the arrangement, these ISIS-linked ARABs are to be in full control of coordinating major operations like specifying targets, timings for attacks, training on new tactics using armed drones and overseeing conduct of attacks.
Since then, ISWAP had launched a series of attacks involving rudimentary drones, a capability believed to have been supported by technical expertise from Sahel-based ISIS affiliates. Separate intelligence streams also point to the movement of non-African Islamic State fighters into the Lake Chad theatre, particularly around Monguno, Kukawa and the Timbuktu Triangle.
Footage released by Amaq on Jan. 2, showing militants infiltrating Niamey, burning a Bayraktar TB2 drone in a hangar and damaging other air platforms, suggests a coordinated, multi-cell operation. Notably, the cameraman’s use of Kanuri dialect dominant in ISWAP’s Lake Chad heartland, implies ISWAP’s hand in logistics, operational security and media. Most fighters appear to have been Nigerien, but ISWAP’s role in enabling and packaging the attack points to command-and-control integration.
Assailants reportedly entered through Niamey 2000 a critical access node evading layered security and nearby community watch structures. This indicates pre-attack reconnaissance and possible sleeper support.
At least five attackers were neutralised at the scene, while others escaped northwards through the Tiloa area. On the side of Niger’s forces, casualties were heavy. Security sources say 27 personnel were killed, 24 Nigerien soldiers and three African Corps members while 18 others were wounded and evacuated to the Military Garrison and the Referral Hospital in Niamey. Several drones and about five aircraft were destroyed in the attack.
Nigerien authorities initially claimed higher terrorist losses, but sources say the damage appears to have fallen more heavily on government forces and infrastructure. This points to a coordinated, multi-cell operation with ISWAP providing command-and-control functions. It’s no longer just ideological alignment, it’s operational integration.
The attack lands amid a widening rift between the Alliance of Sahel States (AES Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso) and ECOWAS. Niamey’s leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tiani, publicly accused Côte d’Ivoire’s Alassane Ouattara, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Benin’s Patrice Talon of sponsoring the attack charges those governments deny. Abidjan’s summoning of Niger’s ambassador illustrates the rapid diplomatic deterioration.
The raid has brought to the fore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in Sahelian capitals. The fact that militants could strike an international airport in the heart of Niamey and degrade aviation assets is deeply worrying. Airports are economic lifelines. Attacks like this ripple through tourism, trade, investor confidence and humanitarian logistics.
Given the Islamic State network’s history of targeting high-profile facilities, other airports, military airstrips and energy installations across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin could be next.
Diplomatic cold war has continued to result in security consequences as counter-terrorism coordination is eroding in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, regional polarisation is deepening while Jihadist narratives are gaining traction. Mutual suspicion between Niger Republic and other countries had reduced intelligence sharing and cross-border security cooperations which is exactly what a mobile jihadist alliance is exploiting. Niger’s pivot toward Russia, and the growing role of the African Corps, also complicate unified regional responses. Accusations of foreign interference feed recruitment and justify attacks on “collaborators.”
Against this backdrop, Washington’s decision to send a senior official to Mali to “reset ties” is telling the U.S. is recalibrating from heavy security conditionality toward pragmatic engagement that emphasises sovereignty, economic development and stability.
Mali has increasingly been viewed as the “COG” (centre of gravity) of the AES. Access to Bamako, therefore, is seen as a gateway to broader engagement with the bloc and a means to counter expanding Russian and China influence while safeguarding interests in critical minerals. Whether this reset can translate into improved regional security cooperation remains uncertain, especially as AES states bristle at Western pressure and ECOWAS sanctions.
For Nigeria, It is clear that the Lake Chad Basin is no longer just a local insurgency theatre; it is becoming a launchpad for Sahel-wide operations. If ISWAP fighters can move westward to Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for joint missions and Sahelian militants can cycle into Borno for training, logistics and media, then the basin risks becoming the connective tissue of a transnational Islamic State corridor. Nigeria and its Lake Chad partners needs a renewed joint tasking framework that anticipates mixed cells, foreign fighter inflows and media-enabled operations.
For the region, (NIGERIA) the choice is urgent, rebuild cooperative security despite political rifts with NIGER or allow insurgents to exploit the fractures. The cost of delay will be paid across capitals, at airports, bases, regional hubs and cities across West Africa.
Cross-border intelligence must be rebuilt, not just within ECOWAS but with pragmatic channels to AES states. Form a fushion of Information cell with representatives of all controls for prompt intelligence sharing on terrorists activities. Ideological divides should not trump the common threat. If left unchecked, this alliance could stitch together the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel into a single battle-space, multiplying the reach, resilience and propaganda power of jihadist networks.
Zagazola is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region.
OPINION: Growing ISWAP–ISIS ties in Sahel after Niamey attack threaten Lake Chad and West African security corridor
Opinions
Rewriting the Past: Why Repackaging Kemi Adeosun Is a Dangerous Exercise in National Amnesia
Rewriting the Past: Why Repackaging Kemi Adeosun Is a Dangerous Exercise in National Amnesia
By: Michael Mike
Recently, there have been coordinated media efforts to repackage Nigeria’s former Minister of Finance, Mrs. Kemi Adeosun, an exercise which appear less like public enlightenment and more like a calculated attempt at historical revisionism. Through selective recollection and moral posturing, one of the most embarrassing scandals of the Buhari administration is being reframed as an act of personal integrity rather than what it truly was: a case of sustained deception that collapsed only under intense public pressure.
Mrs. Adeosun’s resignation in 2018 did not occur in a vacuum. It followed months of public outrage over the revelation that she possessed a forged National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) exemption certificate, an offence under Nigerian law. Long before her eventual exit, Nigerians demanded a clear and honest explanation. None came. Instead, what unfolded was silence, deflection, blame-shifting, and an unconvincing attempt to wait out public anger.
In a recent interview with Mr. Laolu Akande on Channels Television, Mrs. Adeosun attempted a rhetorical sleight of hand: she portrayed her resignation as a voluntary moral decision while simultaneously admitting that she stepped down only after it became clear that no one within government was willing, or able, to explain away the forgery. This framing insults public intelligence. A resignation tendered after three months of sustained pressure, mounting evidence, and institutional embarrassment cannot reasonably be described as a proactive moral stand.
The facts of the case remain stubborn and inconvenient.
First, Mrs. Adeosun needlessly procured a forged NYSC exemption certificate. Whether by commission or complicity, the document was fake. Second, credible media reports, including TheCable of September 15, 2018, indicated that attempts were made to enlist senior NYSC officials to manage or neutralize the fallout once the forgery became public. Third, rather than confront the issue directly when it emerged, Mrs. Adeosun initially deflected responsibility. Fourth, when the NYSC announced it would probe the matter, it confirmed only that she had applied for an exemption certificate, pointedly declining to state that one was validly issued.
Most tellingly, Mrs. Adeosun waited for three full months before resigning. By then, the evidence was overwhelming and the silence from government deafening. The resignation came not because the truth had been courageously embraced, but because it could no longer be buried. Her justification in that interview with Mr Laolu Akande that she was not a Nigerian citizen at the time she graduated and therefore was not eligible for NYSC service only deepens the puzzle. If that explanation is true, then there was absolutely no need to seek an exemption certificate at all, let alone a forged one. That she did so points to a deeper and more troubling pattern: the normalization of cutting corners among Nigeria’s elite, secure in the belief that consequences are for the poor and powerless.
It is against this background that Mrs. Adeosun’s recent pontification on Nigeria’s economy, including her robust defense of economic policies of the current administration must be viewed. It is difficult to ignore the timing of this renewed visibility amid rumors and permutations within power corridors to bring Mrs Adeosun back to government . Whatever her intentions, the optics are clear: this is an attempt at whitewashing a past misdemeanor that goes to the heart of public trust.
Public office is not merely about technical competence. It demands unimpeachable integrity. Mrs. Adeosun’s record fails that test. A person who falsified credentials, evaded accountability, and resigned only when cornered cannot credibly present herself as fit for high public trust again. Nigeria is not short of competent, qualified people to hold public office. The country boasts several respected professionals with solid credentials and untainted records. The current administration already boasts a number of brilliant hands, shaping the country’s economy.
At a time when Nigeria is grappling with economic hardship and a crisis of confidence in leadership, we must resist the temptation to recycle discredited figures simply because they once held office. National memory must not be so short, nor standards so low.
Mrs. Adeosun’s media tour of repackaging should not be mistaken for redemption. Accountability delayed is accountability denied. Nigeria deserves better, and the future of public service must rest on competence anchored firmly to character.
Rewriting the Past: Why Repackaging Kemi Adeosun Is a Dangerous Exercise in National Amnesia
Opinions
Opinion Editorial: Nigeria’s Reserved/Special Seats Bill: A Human Rights Imperative for Gender-Inclusive Democracy
Opinion Editorial
Nigeria’s Reserved/Special Seats Bill: A Human Rights Imperative for Gender-Inclusive Democracy
By: Oluwafisayo Aransiola Fakayode (Human Rights Lawyer & Gender Justice Advocate)
fisayoaransiola@gmail.com
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture in its democratic evolution. In few days, the National Assembly will cast a decisive vote on the Reserved/Special Seats Bill -a landmark bill that could reshape the country’s democratic landscape. The bill proposes creating temporary additional legislative seats that would be contested exclusively by women in Nigeria’s National and State Assemblies to address the country’s low rate of female political representation. At its core, this bill is not merely about increasing the number of women in legislative chambers, it is about affirming democracy’s most fundamental promise: equity.
For decades, Nigerian women have remained underrepresented in governance, their voices muffled in spaces where laws and policies are made and futures are decided. Women make up nearly half of Nigeria’s population, yet they hold less than 5% of seats in the National Assembly. This stark underrepresentation is not just a statistical anomaly; it is a democratic deficit. The bill seeks to correct this imbalance by guaranteeing women a minimum presence in parliament, thereby dismantling systemic barriers that have long excluded half of the nation’s population from meaningful political participation.
The bill is more than a political goal, it is a constitutional and human rights obligation hinged on the principles of substantive equality and affirmative action. This human rights obligation stems from Nigeria’s ratification of several relevant international and regional human rights treaties including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol). These instruments place obligation on the country to eliminate barriers to women’s participation in political and public life.
Article 7 of CEDAW obligates States including Nigeria to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country, ensure women on equal terms with men have the right to vote in all elections, are eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, participate in the formulation and implementation of government policy and are able to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government. Similarly, Article 9 of the Maputo Protocol places obligation on States Parties to take specific positive actions to promote participative governance and the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action, enabling national legislation and other measures to ensure that women participate without any discrimination in all elections, women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes and women are equal partners with men at all levels of development and implementation of State policies. States shall also ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making.
Critics of the Reserved/Special Seats Bill often argue that it undermines meritocracy. However, this critique confuses formal equality with substantive equality. While formal equality insists that men and women should be treated the same, substantive equality recognizes that identical treatment does not always produce fair outcomes when historical and structural disadvantages exist. In a society where patriarchal norms, economic disparities, systemic bias and discrimination within political structures hinder women’s access to political participation, substantive equality demands proactive measures. By adopting the bill, Nigeria would be practicing substantive equality: ensuring that women are not only formally entitled to participate but are actually empowered and equipped with a level playing ground to do so. This approach transforms equality from a theoretical promise into a lived reality, creating a legislature that reflects the diversity of the nation.
The bill is not about giving women an unfair advantage, it is about dismantling the barriers that have marginalized them for decades. It is a corrective measure to restore balance in a system that has historically excluded half of the population from political life. The temporary nature of the bill through including provision for a review to take place after four general election cycles (16 years) ensures that it serves as a transitional mechanism, not a permanent measure. It allows women to build political capital, networks, and experience that will enable them to compete on equal terms in the future. Article 4 of CEDAW explicitly permits temporary special measures to accelerate equality, acknowledging that without corrective action, women will remain marginalized.
The forthcoming National Assembly vote on the Reserved/Special Seats Bill is a defining test of Nigeria’s democratic conscience. Lawmakers must recognize that passing this bill is not an act of charity toward women, but a constitutional duty and a human rights obligation to uphold equity and women’s rights. By enshrining guaranteed representation, the National Assembly would be sending a powerful message that Nigeria is ready to build a democracy that reflects the full breadth of its people’s voices. The bill is more than legislation, it is a moral compass pointing toward a fairer, stronger, and more inclusive Nigeria. A democracy that sidelines women cannot claim to be inclusive, just, or truly representative.
As the National Assembly prepares to vote, the question before Nigeria is not whether women deserve a seat at the table, but whether the nation is ready to honor its democratic ideals by ensuring that everyone, regardless of gender, has the power to shape the country’s destiny. This is a litmus test for Nigeria’s commitment to women’s rights, equity, and democratic integrity. To oppose this bill is to endorse the status quo of gender imbalance. To support it is to affirm that democracy must reflect the diversity of its people. Nigeria cannot claim to be a true democracy while half its population remains politically invisible.
It is time to pass the Reserved/Special Seats Bill not as a favor to women, but as fulfillment of Nigeria’s human rights obligations.
Opinion Editorial:
Nigeria’s Reserved/Special Seats Bill: A Human Rights Imperative for Gender-Inclusive Democracy
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