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The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
By Oumarou Sanou
The world appears once again on edge. Tensions in the Middle East involving Iran, Israel and the United States have revived familiar questions about the limits of power, alliances, and survival in an increasingly volatile global order. Yet beyond the immediate theatre of conflict lies a deeper lesson; one that Africa, particularly the junta-led states of the Sahel, would do well to reflect upon.
Recent events in Syria and the mounting pressures faced by countries like Iran and Venezuela demonstrate a hard geopolitical truth: reliance on great powers for protection can often prove illusory. When crises escalate or strategic calculations change, even the most vocal allies may offer little more than rhetorical solidarity.
This is a reality that resonates strongly in today’s Sahel, where Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the core of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), have pivoted sharply toward Moscow while distancing themselves from traditional Western partners and regional institutions such as ECOWAS.
There is nothing inherently wrong with sovereign nations pursuing partnerships with global powers. States must engage the world pragmatically to advance their interests. The danger arises when such alignments become ideological crusades that corner countries into rigid geopolitical camps. History suggests that when great-power rivalries intensify, smaller states risk becoming pawns rather than partners.
The experiences of Iran and Venezuela offer a cautionary example. Both countries have positioned themselves as defiant challengers to Western influence, often invoking anti-imperialist rhetoric to consolidate domestic authority. Yet when sanctions tightened and internal crises deepened, the much-touted backing of powerful allies such as Russia and China proved limited in practice. Diplomatic statements and symbolic gestures rarely translate into decisive rescue when the strategic costs are high.
In many respects, the Sahel is becoming the newest chessboard in the unfolding rivalry between Russia and the West. The region’s fragile states, struggling with terrorism, economic distress, and weak institutions, now find themselves at the intersection of competing geopolitical interests.
For the juntas governing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the embrace of Moscow has been framed as a break from Western paternalism. Yet the strategic risks of relying too heavily on a single external partner are significant. Unlike Iran and Venezuela, which possess vast oil resources that cushion the impact of sanctions and economic isolation, the Sahelian economies lack such buffers.
The limits of anti-Western posturing are therefore far sharper in this context. Iran and Venezuela at least had economic leverage and decades of state infrastructure before confronting global pressure. The Sahel’s military regimes do not enjoy similar advantages. Betting national stability on geopolitical confrontation without economic resilience could prove far more destabilising.
The presence of Russian-linked security contractors, from Wagner’s earlier operations to successor entities such as Redut, illustrates another dimension of the challenge. These deployments offer short-term tactical support but rarely substitute for strong national armies, effective governance, and regional cooperation. Security outsourced to foreign actors tends to be transactional rather than transformational.
Yet the deeper issue goes beyond any single partnership. Africa’s geopolitical dilemma is not simply about Russia, the West, or China. It reflects a recurring pattern in which African states seek external protectors rather than invest in internal strength.
From colonial dependency to Cold War alignments and today’s renewed great-power competition, the continent has often oscillated between competing patrons. Rejecting Western influence only to embrace Russian or Chinese influence does not constitute genuine liberation; it merely replaces one form of dependency with another.
What Africa needs instead is strategic autonomy. For the Sahel, this moment of geopolitical turbulence could become an opportunity to rethink its development trajectory. Strengthening governance, rebuilding public institutions, and addressing the root causes of insecurity: corruption, marginalisation, and economic exclusion, would offer far more durable stability than reliance on external military support.
Coups, after all, are symptoms of governance failure, not solutions to it. The region’s demographic reality makes this urgency even greater. With one of the youngest populations in the world, the Sahel cannot afford the economic stagnation that often accompanies geopolitical isolation. If instability persists, the consequences will be felt not only within the region but across West Africa and beyond through migration, economic disruption, and expanding insecurity.
A stronger African security architecture is therefore essential. The limitations exposed in ECOWAS responses, the underutilisation of the African Union’s standby mechanisms, and the fragility of regional intelligence cooperation all point to the same conclusion: Africa must build more credible collective security systems.
Equally important is the need for an assertive but balanced African foreign policy. The Sahel’s pivot toward Russia is partly a reaction against perceived Western paternalism. Yet the answer to unequal partnerships is not to substitute one patron for another. It is to negotiate from a position of confidence and independence.
Africa should engage with all global actors: East and West alike, in line with clear national and regional interests. Trade, investment, technology transfer, and security cooperation are welcome from any partner that respects African sovereignty. What should be avoided is ideological alignment that turns African states into frontline proxies in someone else’s strategic contest.
The Sahel today stands at a crossroads. Its choices will shape not only its own future but also the broader trajectory of governance and security across West Africa. If there is one lesson from Iran, Venezuela, Syria and other states caught in great-power rivalries, it is this: external patrons may offer support, but they rarely guarantee salvation. Therefore, Africa’s long-term stability will depend less on the promises of distant powers and more on the strength of its own institutions, leadership, and collective resolve.
Oumarou Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, regional stability, and African leadership dynamics.
Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com
The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
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Troops Raid Illegal Bunkering Site in Bayelsa, Recover Equipment, Stolen Products
Troops Raid Illegal Bunkering Site in Bayelsa, Recover Equipment, Stolen Products
By: Zagazola Makama
Troops of Sector 2, Operation DELTA SAFE (OPDS), have raided a suspected illegal oil bunkering site at Kpansia general area in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State.
The operation, which took place at about 00:40 hours on 16 June 2026, led to the recovery of two vehicles, one pumping machine, 53 sacks of illegally refined Automotive Gas Oil (AGO) estimated at about 2,650 litres, five empty drums, and two wheelbarrows.
A military source said the troops acted on credible intelligence and stormed the location, disrupting ongoing illegal bunkering activities in the area.
The recovered items and products were evacuated to a safe location for destruction, owing to the densely populated nature of the community.
The source added that operations are still ongoing in the area to track and apprehend other members of the syndicate.
Troops Raid Illegal Bunkering Site in Bayelsa, Recover Equipment, Stolen Products
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Electoral Act 2026: A New Threat to Nigeria’s Democracy
Electoral Act 2026: A New Threat to Nigeria’s Democracy
By: Victor Emejuiwe
The political environment ahead of the 2027 General Elections presents one of the biggest tests of Nigeria’s democracy since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Unfortunately, this test is taking place amid growing concerns about the shrinking space for political competition and the increasing concentration of political power in the hands of the ruling party.
In recent months, Nigerians have watched a steady movement of opposition politicians and governors into the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). At the same time, attempts by opposition leaders to build a united front ahead of 2027 have faced legal and judicial obstacles. Internal crises and factional disputes have emerged in key opposition parties, many of which have ended up in court. The recent deregistration of the African Democratic Congress (ADC) by the Federal High Court has only added to public anxiety.
Many Nigerians believe these developments are not mere coincidences but part of a broader strategy to weaken the opposition ahead of the next elections. Whether this perception is correct or not, one thing is clear: the Electoral Act, 2026 has deepened concerns about the future of democracy in Nigeria.
These concerns came to the fore during a stakeholders’ meeting convened to examine the Electoral Act, 2026 and its implications for the credibility of the 2027 General Elections. Electoral experts, legal practitioners, civil society organisations and democracy advocates expressed serious reservations about several provisions of the Act. Among the leading voices were former Resident Electoral Commissioner, Barrister Mike Igini, and political scientist, Professor Abdulmumini Kuna.
Their concern was not simply that the law contains technical flaws. Rather, they argued that some provisions create opportunities for manipulation, weaken accountability and make it more difficult to challenge electoral wrongdoing.
One of the most controversial provisions is Section 60. The section provides that where electronic transmission of election results fails because of communication challenges, the result contained in Form EC8A becomes the primary basis for collation and declaration.
Supporters may argue that this is a practical response to network failures. However, Barrister Igini warned that it reopens the loopholes that electoral reforms were designed to close. The introduction of BVAS and electronic transmission of results was intended to reduce human interference and make election results more transparent. By creating room for manual alternatives whenever network challenges are claimed, the law creates an opportunity for abuse. In highly contested areas, electronic transmission could simply be abandoned on the excuse of technical failure, thereby weakening public confidence in election outcomes.
Section 63(2) raises another serious concern. The provision allows Returning Officers to count ballot papers that do not bear official marks if they are satisfied that such ballots came from materials supplied to the polling unit.
While the provision may have been introduced to address administrative challenges, it places too much discretion in the hands of election officials. According to Barrister Igini, election laws should reduce discretion and increase transparency. Once a Returning Officer is empowered to determine which unofficial ballots should count, the process becomes open to abuse. In a closely contested election, such decisions could influence the final outcome and trigger avoidable disputes. This is why stakeholders called for the repeal of Section 63(2) while retaining Section 63(1).
Another provision that has generated concern is Section 77. The section requires political parties to submit membership registers to INEC at least twenty-one days before party primaries and provides that only those whose names appear in those registers can vote or be voted for during primaries.
While transparency in party administration is important, stakeholders questioned whether the provision could be used to exclude candidates from participating in the political process. Nigerian politics is fluid, with political alignments and alliances often changing close to election periods. The strict timelines imposed by the law may prevent otherwise qualified aspirants from contesting elections simply because their names were not captured in a party register within the required period.
In the same light Professor Abdulmumini Kuna acknowledged that digital membership registers could improve transparency. However, he warned that the requirements may place smaller political parties at a disadvantage and could also affect citizens’ constitutional rights to political participation and freedom of association.
Even more troubling are Sections 137 and 138. Section 137(3) provides that where an election petition involves the conduct of an electoral officer, presiding officer or returning officer, such officials do not need to be joined in the petition. Instead, INEC assumes responsibility for defending itself and its officers.
This provision weakens accountability. Electoral officers are often central figures in election disputes. Their actions can determine whether electoral laws are complied with or violated. Shielding them from direct scrutiny makes it harder to establish responsibility when misconduct occurs. Barrister Igini noted that previous legal frameworks allowed electoral officials to appear before tribunals and provide evidence where necessary. The removal of this safeguard raises concerns about the ability of election tribunals to uncover the truth.
Section 138 creates another major challenge. The provision narrows the grounds upon which elections can be challenged. Under the new law, elections may largely be questioned on the basis of corrupt practices, non-compliance with the Electoral Act or failure to secure the majority of lawful votes cast.
What is particularly worrying is the removal of candidate qualification issues as grounds for challenging election outcomes. In the past, allegations involving forged certificates, false declarations and constitutional disqualifications served as important checks on those seeking public office. By excluding such issues from election petitions, the law weakens one of the key mechanisms for holding candidates accountable.
Professor Kuna warned that this creates a conflict between the Constitution and the Electoral Act. While the Constitution sets qualifications for public office, the Electoral Act appears to limit the ability of citizens and political parties to challenge candidates who do not meet those requirements.
Taken together, these provisions raise serious questions about the direction of Nigeria’s electoral system. Stakeholders warned that the Act could weaken electronic result management, reduce accountability, increase litigation and create opportunities for manipulation. There are also concerns that smaller political parties, women, young people and other underrepresented groups may be disproportionately affected.
Most worrying is the possibility that elections may gradually move away from the ballot box and into the courtroom. Democracy works best when voters determine electoral outcomes. It becomes weaker when legal technicalities become more important than the will of the people.
For this reason, stakeholders called for the repeal of Sections 60(3) and 63(2), stronger protections for electronic transmission of results and the restoration of measures that hold electoral officials accountable for their actions. They also urged citizens and civil society organisations to intensify advocacy for electoral reforms before the 2027 elections.
The defence of democracy cannot be left to politicians alone. Nigerians must demand a review of the controversial provisions of the Electoral Act and insist on a legal framework that promotes transparency, accountability and fairness. There is also a need to challenge questionable provisions in court where they appear to conflict with constitutional rights.
The National Judicial Council should develop clear guidelines for election tribunals to ensure that cases are decided on the basis of justice and the will of the people rather than technical loopholes. Likewise, development partners such as the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations should engage the Nigerian government and encourage a review of provisions that threaten public confidence in elections.
The time to act is now. Once the electoral process begins, it may become much harder to correct these flaws. Democracy does not collapse in a day. It is weakened gradually when citizens fail to challenge laws and decisions that undermine accountability and the will of the people. Nigerians must ensure that the Electoral Act, 2026 does not become one of the instruments that weakens the foundations of our democracy.
Victor Emejuiwe
Program Manager
Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education (CHRICED)
Writes from Abuja
08068262366
Electoral Act 2026: A New Threat to Nigeria’s Democracy
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KACRAN Hails Buni Over Appointment of New Ngazargamu Emir, Pledges Support for Peace and Development
KACRAN Hails Buni Over Appointment of New Ngazargamu Emir, Pledges Support for Peace and Development
By: Michael Mike
The Kulen Allah Cattle Rearers Association of Nigeria (KACRAN) has commended Yobe State Governor, Mai Mala Buni, for what it described as a transparent and inclusive process that culminated in the appointment of a new Emir of Ngazargamu.
In a statement issued by its National President, Hon. Khalil Mohd Bello, the association also expressed deep condolences to the government and people of Yobe State, the Ngazargamu Emirate Council, and the royal family over the death of the late Emir, Ahmad Tijjani Ibn Saleh Geidam.
KACRAN described the late monarch’s passing as a great loss to the emirate and prayed for Allah’s forgiveness and eternal reward for his contributions to the development and unity of the people.
The association equally congratulated the newly appointed Emir, Yerima Ibn Mahmud, on his ascension to the throne, describing him as an experienced administrator, accomplished public servant and respected statesman whose wealth of experience would benefit the emirate.
According to KACRAN, the new monarch’s track record in public service, including his tenure as Executive Chairman of Yunusari Local Government Area, member of the Yobe State House of Assembly, Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, Special Adviser on Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters, and Commissioner in the Ministry of Livestock Development, positions him well to provide visionary leadership.
The association noted that Governor Buni’s handling of the succession process reflected his commitment to preserving cultural heritage while promoting peace, stability and inclusiveness in the state.
“KACRAN commends Governor Mai Mala Buni for the transparent, peaceful and inclusive process that produced this appointment. By upholding cherished tradition while ensuring stability, the Governor has reaffirmed his deep respect for culture, heritage and the aspirations of the people,” the statement said.
The group further described the emergence of the new Emir as a positive development at a time when the country requires stronger traditional institutions to foster unity, peace and grassroots development.
Reaffirming its commitment to the emirate, KACRAN pledged its loyalty and full support to the new monarch, assuring him of the association’s cooperation in promoting peace, security and socio-economic development across the emirate.
The association expressed confidence that the combined efforts of the new Emir and the Yobe State Government would usher in a new era of harmony, prosperity and sustainable development for the people of Ngazargamu Emirate and beyond.
KACRAN Hails Buni Over Appointment of New Ngazargamu Emir, Pledges Support for Peace and Development
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