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The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
By Oumarou Sanou
The world appears once again on edge. Tensions in the Middle East involving Iran, Israel and the United States have revived familiar questions about the limits of power, alliances, and survival in an increasingly volatile global order. Yet beyond the immediate theatre of conflict lies a deeper lesson; one that Africa, particularly the junta-led states of the Sahel, would do well to reflect upon.
Recent events in Syria and the mounting pressures faced by countries like Iran and Venezuela demonstrate a hard geopolitical truth: reliance on great powers for protection can often prove illusory. When crises escalate or strategic calculations change, even the most vocal allies may offer little more than rhetorical solidarity.
This is a reality that resonates strongly in today’s Sahel, where Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the core of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), have pivoted sharply toward Moscow while distancing themselves from traditional Western partners and regional institutions such as ECOWAS.
There is nothing inherently wrong with sovereign nations pursuing partnerships with global powers. States must engage the world pragmatically to advance their interests. The danger arises when such alignments become ideological crusades that corner countries into rigid geopolitical camps. History suggests that when great-power rivalries intensify, smaller states risk becoming pawns rather than partners.
The experiences of Iran and Venezuela offer a cautionary example. Both countries have positioned themselves as defiant challengers to Western influence, often invoking anti-imperialist rhetoric to consolidate domestic authority. Yet when sanctions tightened and internal crises deepened, the much-touted backing of powerful allies such as Russia and China proved limited in practice. Diplomatic statements and symbolic gestures rarely translate into decisive rescue when the strategic costs are high.
In many respects, the Sahel is becoming the newest chessboard in the unfolding rivalry between Russia and the West. The region’s fragile states, struggling with terrorism, economic distress, and weak institutions, now find themselves at the intersection of competing geopolitical interests.
For the juntas governing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the embrace of Moscow has been framed as a break from Western paternalism. Yet the strategic risks of relying too heavily on a single external partner are significant. Unlike Iran and Venezuela, which possess vast oil resources that cushion the impact of sanctions and economic isolation, the Sahelian economies lack such buffers.
The limits of anti-Western posturing are therefore far sharper in this context. Iran and Venezuela at least had economic leverage and decades of state infrastructure before confronting global pressure. The Sahel’s military regimes do not enjoy similar advantages. Betting national stability on geopolitical confrontation without economic resilience could prove far more destabilising.
The presence of Russian-linked security contractors, from Wagner’s earlier operations to successor entities such as Redut, illustrates another dimension of the challenge. These deployments offer short-term tactical support but rarely substitute for strong national armies, effective governance, and regional cooperation. Security outsourced to foreign actors tends to be transactional rather than transformational.
Yet the deeper issue goes beyond any single partnership. Africa’s geopolitical dilemma is not simply about Russia, the West, or China. It reflects a recurring pattern in which African states seek external protectors rather than invest in internal strength.
From colonial dependency to Cold War alignments and today’s renewed great-power competition, the continent has often oscillated between competing patrons. Rejecting Western influence only to embrace Russian or Chinese influence does not constitute genuine liberation; it merely replaces one form of dependency with another.
What Africa needs instead is strategic autonomy. For the Sahel, this moment of geopolitical turbulence could become an opportunity to rethink its development trajectory. Strengthening governance, rebuilding public institutions, and addressing the root causes of insecurity: corruption, marginalisation, and economic exclusion, would offer far more durable stability than reliance on external military support.
Coups, after all, are symptoms of governance failure, not solutions to it. The region’s demographic reality makes this urgency even greater. With one of the youngest populations in the world, the Sahel cannot afford the economic stagnation that often accompanies geopolitical isolation. If instability persists, the consequences will be felt not only within the region but across West Africa and beyond through migration, economic disruption, and expanding insecurity.
A stronger African security architecture is therefore essential. The limitations exposed in ECOWAS responses, the underutilisation of the African Union’s standby mechanisms, and the fragility of regional intelligence cooperation all point to the same conclusion: Africa must build more credible collective security systems.
Equally important is the need for an assertive but balanced African foreign policy. The Sahel’s pivot toward Russia is partly a reaction against perceived Western paternalism. Yet the answer to unequal partnerships is not to substitute one patron for another. It is to negotiate from a position of confidence and independence.
Africa should engage with all global actors: East and West alike, in line with clear national and regional interests. Trade, investment, technology transfer, and security cooperation are welcome from any partner that respects African sovereignty. What should be avoided is ideological alignment that turns African states into frontline proxies in someone else’s strategic contest.
The Sahel today stands at a crossroads. Its choices will shape not only its own future but also the broader trajectory of governance and security across West Africa. If there is one lesson from Iran, Venezuela, Syria and other states caught in great-power rivalries, it is this: external patrons may offer support, but they rarely guarantee salvation. Therefore, Africa’s long-term stability will depend less on the promises of distant powers and more on the strength of its own institutions, leadership, and collective resolve.
Oumarou Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, regional stability, and African leadership dynamics.
Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com
The Mirage of Great-Power Protection: Lessons for the Sahel from Iran, Syria and Venezuela
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Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
By Zagazola Makama
Troops of the Joint Task Force North East, Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK), have foiled coordinated infiltration attempts by suspected ISWAP terrorists targeting parts of Maiduguri and Buratai axis of Borno State, forcing the insurgents to retreat after intense engagements.

The attempted attacks occurred between 12:20 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. on Friday, when the terrorists simultaneously advanced toward Muna Garage, Shuwari Village and the Ajilari Cross area in an apparent bid to gain access into the Maiduguri metropolis.

Military sources told Zagazola Makama that the troops, supported by an effective early warning system, detected the movement of the insurgents and engaged them from multiple directions with heavy and accurate fire, disrupting the coordinated assault before the terrorists could penetrate the city.
The sources said the terrorists, overwhelmed by the troops’ swift tactical response, abandoned their mission and fled in disarray.

In related operations, troops also repelled separate infiltration attempts by the insurgents at Miringa and Dutsen Kura in the Buratai area of Borno State.
During the pursuit of the fleeing terrorists at Miringa, a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle activated an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). However, no casualty was recorded among the troops, and the operational situation remained stable.
Security sources said clearance and exploitation operations are ongoing across the affected areas to track down the fleeing terrorists, recover possible abandoned equipment and prevent any further threat to nearby communities.
The military reaffirmed that Operation HADIN KAI would continue sustained offensive operations aimed at denying terrorist groups freedom of movement and safeguarding lives and property across the North-East.
Residents were also urged to remain vigilant and continue providing credible and timely intelligence to security agencies to support ongoing counter-terrorism operations.
Troops foil multiple ISWAP infiltration attempts in Maiduguri, Buratai axis
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CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
PRESS STATEMENT
CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
July 8, 2026
The Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja, expresses its support for the position articulated by security analyst and conflict reporter Zagazola Makama on the imperative of objective, fact-based reporting of criminal activities, irrespective of the ethnic, religious, or political identity of those involved.
CCS believes that the fight against insecurity in Nigeria can only succeed when the same standards of accountability are applied to all offenders without exception. Criminality does not become acceptable because it is committed by a member of one’s ethnic group, nor does violence become justifiable because it is wrapped in the language of communal defence.
The controversy generated by the identification of a suspected attacker involved in the attempted assault on the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, highlights a deeper national challenge: the tendency of some individuals and groups to support transparency only when it exposes those they consider opponents, while resisting the same transparency when facts implicate members of their own communities.
CCS maintains that objective reporting is not ethnic profiling. Where credible facts establish the identity, affiliation, or operational background of criminal actors, journalists and security analysts should not be intimidated into suppressing such information merely because it is politically inconvenient or socially uncomfortable. Selective outrage and selective accountability only deepen mistrust and prolong conflict.
For years, Nigerians have demanded that security reports accurately identify perpetrators of violence. That demand must remain consistent. Whether the perpetrators are Fulani bandits, Berom militias, Irigwe militias, Mwaghavul militias, or any other armed criminal group, the truth must be reported and the law must take its course.
The Centre also commends the professionalism and courage of security personnel who successfully repelled the attempted attack on NIPSS and continue to defend strategic national institutions under difficult circumstances. Their sacrifices deserve public recognition and support.
CCS wishes to emphasize that no community in Nigeria possesses a monopoly on either victimhood or criminality. Across the country, millions of law-abiding citizens from every ethnic and religious background desire peace, security, and justice. Equally, criminal elements exist across communities and must be confronted without bias or sentiment.
Nigeria cannot defeat insecurity if citizens judge crimes based on the identity of the perpetrator rather than the nature of the offence. A criminal remains a criminal regardless of ethnicity. An armed attacker remains an armed attacker regardless of religion. A murderer does not become a hero because he belongs to a particular community.
The Centre therefore calls on the media, civil society organisations, community leaders, and the general public to uphold a single standard of justice and accountability. The protection of criminals through ethnic, religious, or political narratives undermines national security and weakens efforts to build lasting peace.
CCS stands firmly for truth, accountability, and equal justice under the law. We support all responsible efforts to expose criminality wherever it exists and reject every attempt to shield offenders from scrutiny because of their identity.
There must be no sacred cows in the fight against insecurity. There must be no shielding of criminals. Justice must remain blind to ethnicity, religion, and politics.
Yusuf Musa
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja &
Capt. Kabir Aminu (Rtd.)
Director, Security and Strategic Studies
Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS), Abuja
CCS Supports Objective Security Reporting, Rejects Ethnic Double Standards in Addressing Criminality
News
The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
By Senator Iroegbu
Months ago, these pages made an argument that ran counter to conventional wisdom. Nigeria’s most effective answer to disinformation may not be found inside government ministries or technology companies, but in an unlikely place: the mosque, the church and the traditional palace. That idea was named the Kano Model, a simple but powerful proposition that places religious and traditional leaders at the centre of the fight to build public resilience against misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation.

Today, that idea has taken a decisive step forward. In Abuja, between 24 and 25 June 2026, Alkalanci, the Hausa language verification platform, convened the largest edition yet of its fact-checking and media literacy training. Supported by the MacArthur Foundation and in collaboration with the Centre for Democracy and Development, the workshop gathered Islamic clerics and scholars from across Northern Nigeria under a single roof for the first time. It followed earlier sessions in Kano, Sokoto, Gombe, Kaduna and Maradi in neighbouring Niger Republic. More than 120 clerics and teachers have now passed through the programme, across six cities and two countries. What began as a modest experiment in one emirate has matured into a movement.
The timing could hardly be more consequential. Nigeria is moving steadily towards the 2027 general elections, a season when domestic misinformation predictably surges. Across the Sahel, military governments battle violent extremism while geopolitical rivalries intensify and foreign powers compete for influence through information operations as much as through diplomacy or arms. Artificial intelligence now allows fabricated videos, cloned voices and manipulated images to circulate at alarming speed. This is no longer merely a media challenge. It is a national security challenge.
The significance of Abuja lies not only in scale but in institutional weight. The two most authoritative bodies in Nigerian Islam lent their voices to the cause. The Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), led by the Sultan of Sokoto, and Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) both charged clerics with becoming guardians of truth. Speaking through its Secretary-General, Professor Is-haq Oloyede, the NSCIA grounded the appeal in scripture, recalling that Surah Al-Hujurat instructs believers to verify information before acting upon it. Verification, the Council argued, is not an import but a divine injunction.
That moral framing changes the conversation entirely. For decades, governments have tried to combat disinformation through regulation, censorship and technology. Each has a role, yet none reaches the deeper question of trust. People do not always believe institutions. They believe people they know. Across Northern Nigeria and much of Africa, few voices command greater trust than religious leaders and traditional rulers. Every Friday, every Sunday, and at countless community gatherings, millions receive guidance from imams, pastors, scholars, and emirs. When those trusted voices urge citizens to pause before forwarding a message, verify a viral clip or question an inflammatory rumour, they build a social firewall no algorithm can match.

This is precisely where traditional institutions become decisive. The programme has drawn consistent endorsement from the emirates. The Emir of Kano was represented at the pioneering session, the Sultan of Sokoto at another, the Emirate of Gombe at a third. When a Sarkin Alkali speaks for the Sultan, or a royal envoy addresses assembled imams, the message carries an authority no government circular can rival. As the Emir of Gombe’s representative reminded an earlier gathering, truthfulness is not merely an ethical duty. It is an act of faith.
The threats, meanwhile, are evolving. Alkalanci’s Editor, Alhassan Bala, warned that the coming election season will bring a surge of misinformation from domestic actors, alongside foreign information manipulation and interference. Deepfakes, the synthetic speeches, videos and audio, are now cheap enough to flood any campaign, adding a dangerous new layer. The JNI’s Secretary-General, Professor Khalid Abubakar Aliyu, went further still, urging clerics to remain resolutely apolitical, to verify before they speak, and cautioning politicians against enticing religious leaders into partisan corners. In a country where a single doctored clip can inflame a community overnight, a clergy trained to pause and verify is a national security asset.
The Sahel makes the stakes plainer. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, disinformation has become an instrument of war, deployed to justify coups, discredit democratic institutions and turn populations against their neighbours and regional bodies. Much of it is amplified by networks tied to external powers seeking leverage on African soil. That the Alkalanci training has already crossed into Maradi is therefore no small detail. It carries the model into the very theatre where information warfare is fiercest, and through the one channel foreign propagandists struggle to capture: the trusted local voice speaking a local language.
Equally telling is what this reveals about civil society. The programme is not a state project. It is a local organisation building long-term societal resilience, empowering trusted leaders to become educators, validators and defenders of truth. Every such effort is, in plain terms, an investment in peace.
The lesson from Kano and now Abuja is remarkably simple. The fight against disinformation cannot be won by governments alone, nor outsourced entirely to journalists, fact-checkers or technology companies. It must become a societal responsibility, one that reaches beyond the North and beyond a single faith, drawing in Christian clergy, women and youth networks and traditional rulers nationwide.
At a time when falsehood travels faster than truth, Africa’s greatest advantage may not lie in more sophisticated technology, but in its enduring institutions of faith and tradition. The warriors for truth are multiplying. The task before Nigeria, the Sahel and Africa is to keep their ranks growing.
Senator Iroegbu is a security, geopolitics and development analyst. Email: senator.iroegbu@yahoo.co.uk
The Kano Model Comes of Age: Faith Leaders Become Africa’s Firewall Against Disinformation
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