AU’s Sudan Dilemma: Balancing Anti-Coup Norms with Diplomatic Pragmatism

By Sami Abdelhalim Saeed

Since the military coup d’etat in Sudan on 25 October 2021 and the subsequent outbreak of war in April 2023, the African Union (AU) has faced a profound dilemma in Sudan in terms of balancing its “zero tolerance” policy for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) with the pragmatic need to discuss an existential crisis in Sudan, an AU founding member.

While Sudan’s membership in the AU remains officially suspended to uphold constitutional governance, the AU is increasingly applying a normalisation approach to the political landscape by the “step-by-step” strategy. Recently, Egypt championed this approach during its February 2026 Chairmanship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

The goal was to restore Sudan’s AU membership through informal consultations with the PSC and re-engagement in AU technical committees. This allowed Egypt to maintain diplomatic influence without formally legitimising the military regime in Sudan.

Conversely, Sudan’s military generals still actively seek readmission, providing the AU with a diplomatic “carrot” for ceasefire negotiations. The PSC, in its meeting on February 12, 2026, affirmed the suspension of Sudan’s membership. The PSC argued that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) still holds ultimate power, and the constitutional order has not yet been fully achieved.

By maintaining Sudan’s suspension in early 2026, the AU signalled its commitment to promoting constitutionalism and strengthening its anti-coup norms.
AU Legal Framework for Promoting Constitutionalism

The AU has moved from a policy of non-interference, typical of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to one of non-indifference. This shift is evident in the AU policy on the elimination of unconstitutional changes of power. It has produced a robust, though sometimes unevenly enforced, legal framework to prevent and punish such changes across the continent.

The AU has designed a coherent and integrated legal framework, wherein each component complements the others, and the entire system is interpreted collectively to articulate strong protections for constitutional governments across the continent against military coups d’état and the pursuit of power through force.

The AU framework for addressing UCG is anchored in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, which establishes a policy of zero tolerance for the unconstitutional seizure of power. The Lomé Declaration of 2000 identifies four specific triggers, including military coups and mercenary interventions, while the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), adopted in 2007, broadens the definition to encompass so-called “constitutional coups,” such as unlawful extensions of presidential terms.

Enforcement responsibilities are assigned to the PSC in accordance with the PSC Protocol (2002), which implements suspensions and oversees the restoration of democratic governance within specified timelines.
The Legal Basis for Sudan’s Suspension from the African Union
On October 25, 2021, the military unconstitutionally suspended the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration 2019. It dissolved the transition cabinet and arrested the Prime Minister, together with most of the ministers.

There was no legal basis for the suspension of the Constitutional Declaration. This is because such a suspension would have required approval from both the Sovereign Council and the Transitional Cabinet.
This arguably constitutes the offence of rebellion against the constitutional regime under Article 164(1) of the Armed Forces Act of 2007. It makes provision for punishment by;

“death, or imprisonment, for a term, notexceeding twenty years together with the possibility of deprival of all, or part of the pension, or privileges for whoever does, agrees or plans with others to affect the constitutional, or security regime, or unity of the country, by use of military force, or wages war against it, or does the material, or ethical preparation therefor, or commits any acts, or does any communications, or equipages, as by nature cause the sameAs such, the 2021 coup d’état was manifestly illegal under Sudan’s constitutional, military and criminal laws.

Based on the above, the AU issued a communiqué on October 26, 2021, regarding the situation in Sudan. Emphasizing article 4(p) of its Constitutive Act (which establishes the principle of condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments), article 7 (g) of its Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the ACDEG, it decided, to suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led transitional authority.

The AU Mediation Gap: Balancing Peace and Constitutionalism in Sudan Suspending member states from the AU creates a complex paradox for the PSC. While intended to isolate military juntas, suspension often triggers a “mediation gap” that diminishes the AU’s leverage, pushing regimes toward non-democratic partners while stripping the AU of its “left-hand” diplomatic intimacy.

This structural estrangement complicates essential negotiations, as seen in the ongoing Sudanese conflict, where the inability to engage warring parties formally hampers peace-building efforts. Furthermore, suspension risks regional fragmentation. These initiatives also inadvertently punish the populace, as international development aid often dries up alongside diplomatic status, fueling nationalist narratives that paint the AU as an elitist, hostile outsider.

To navigate these pitfalls, the AU’s PSC is increasingly shifting toward hybrid approaches or a shifting, dual-track strategy, such as informal consultations. This pragmatic evolution allows the AU to maintain the technical oversight necessary to steer transitions and oversee peace processes without granting the legitimacy that comes with full membership, effectively balancing principled pressure with the necessity of continued engagement.

The Sudan crisis (2021–2026) exemplifies the AU’s struggle to balance legal integrity with diplomatic pragmatism. Despite intense lobbying for readmission to facilitate mediation between warring factions, the PSC maintained Sudan’s suspension in February 2026 to uphold anti-coup norms. To navigate this deadlock, the AU adopted a “step-by-step” normalisation strategy.

By engaging through technical committees, coordinating via the “Quintet” group ( AU, IGAD, UN, the League of Arab States (LES) and the European Union (EU), and reopening a liaison office in Port Sudan, the AU provides essential humanitarian and peacebuilding support on the ground without formally legitimising the military regime or compromising its foundational AU’s constitutive principles.

At first glance, it seems that the AU policy of combating unconstitutional change of governments conflicts with the mandate of the AU-PSC to maintain peace and security on the continent. It may appear to political analysts that the AU-PSC failed to anticipate the trajectory of the peace process in Sudan after Sudan’s membership was suspended following the military coup of October 2021.

Obviously, the AU aims to balance these by insisting that peace and security cannot be restored without a return to a consensus on a civilian-led transitional government. The 2025 AU priorities focus on restoring constitutional order and protecting civilians as foundational to stability. In addition, the AU’s strategy involves implementing the revised Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy, aimed at both repairing state-society relations and strengthening democratic governance.

The AU’s PSC has experience restoring constitutional order in Africa but continues to face significant challenges in the Sahel, Madagascar, and Sudan. The AU recently lifted the suspensions of Guinea on January 22, 2026, and Gabon in April 2025, following successful presidential elections in both countries. This process—transition, new constitution, elections, and reinstatement—now serves as the model the AU urges the remaining nations to adopt.

Sudan plays a multifaceted role in continental peace and security that extends beyond the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The AU’s Peace and Security Council is encouraged to engage with Sudan on these broader challenges.

However, Sudan’s ongoing suspension is likely to constrain the Council’s effectiveness. Furthermore, Sudan faces unresolved disputes with Ethiopia over the Al-Fashaga Region in eastern Sudan, as well as ongoing issues with South Sudan over the contested Abyei Region.

Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso recommended that, when addressing the challenges of “Peace” and “Democracy” within the context of ACDEG, the AU should adopt an inclusive transitional framework rather than privileging a single perspective.

Dersso’s approach advocates for a negotiated agreement in which the military commits to a specific timeline for withdrawal from politics, while the rebellion consents to disarmament. This strategy enables simultaneous progress toward both peace and democracy.

The AU’s ability to initiate a peace process for Sudan depends on successfully balancing the anti-coup legal framework with a pragmatic, dual-track diplomatic strategy. By applying an inclusive, process-oriented approach that synchronises military withdrawal with civilian-led government, the AU can bridge the “mediation gap” and maintain peace and democracy in Sudan.

Dr Sami Abdelhalim Saeed is an African constitutional expert and rule-of-law scholar with over 15 years of experience advising United Nations missions on peacebuilding and legal reforms in post-conflict environments.

AU’s Sudan Dilemma: Balancing Anti-Coup Norms with Diplomatic Pragmatism

ARTICLE: Cocktail of Meth: Why Nigeria’s Forests Are the New Cartel Brewery

By Danjuma Amodu

The Abidagba Forest in Ijebu East was supposed to grow timber. Instead, it grew Nigeria’s largest known methamphetamine laboratory. On 16 May 2026, NDLEA operatives stormed a remote farm and found what no one wanted to admit: three Mexican “cookers” and four Nigerian collaborators running an industrial-scale drug factory on Nigerian soil. We did not just intercept a shipment. We uncovered a production line. The forest floor had become a chemist’s table. And Ijebu East had become a cartel brewery and beachhead.

This raid should end the fiction that Nigeria is merely a transit country for drugs. Cartels are no longer passing through. They are setting up shop. They choose our forests and mineral belts for the same reasons bandits and illegal miners do: the state is absent, the terrain is remote, and the local economy is desperate. From Zamfara’s gold pits to Ijebu’s timberland, ungoverned spaces are now the preferred address for transnational crime. If Nigeria treats Abidagba as a one-off drug bust, we will miss the war that is already here. The question is not whether more labs exist. The question is whether we will reclaim our forests before they become permanent cartel territory.

NDLEA Chairman Brig. Gen. Buba Marwa said the Ijebu lab confirms what intelligence has long feared: local cartels are “importing foreign technical expertise.” That is how it started in Michoacán and Sinaloa. First come the chemists. Then come the enforcers. Then comes the war for territory. The Anochili Innocent Drug Trafficking Organisation did not stumble into Abidagba Forest by accident. It needed three things: cover, precursors, and a corridor. The forest gave it cover. The same routes that move solid minerals and contraband fuel across the South-West could move acetone and ephedrine. The Lekki “fortress” of the alleged kingpin gave it a financial hub. This is not drug trafficking. This is drug industrialisation. And industrialisation needs protection. Mexico’s cartels moved from drugs to mining, logging, and extortion because control of land meant control of profit. In Zamfara, we already see bandits taxing gold miners. In Ijebu, we now have meth cooks in the bush. The distance between those two points is shorter than we think.

We guard oil pipelines with the Navy and Joint Task Forces. We deploy the NSCDC to power stations. Yet our forests and mineral belts, the very places where N480 billion worth of drugs can be cooked without detection, remain largely unpoliced. That vacuum is the real cocktail. It mixes desperation with opportunity. It turns jobless youths into lookouts for labs. It turns community land into cartel real estate. It turns chemical shipments into just another lorry on a bad road. NDLEA says it has destroyed 1,572 hectares of cannabis farms in 54 months. Cannabis is crude. Meth is corporate. It needs labs, technicians, and capital. The presence of three Mexican nationals means this was a franchise, not an experiment.

Marwa called the syndicate a threat to “national security and public health.” He did not mention arms. But we should. In Mexico, the same cartels that run meth labs run weapons pipelines. In Nigeria’s North-West, bandits are high on tramadol before attacks and flush with cash after ransom. The logistics that brought chemists from Mexico to Ijebu East can bring rifles to the same forest. This is why Marwa’s warning at the commissioning of NDLEA’s Clean Beat 91.5FM in Abuja matters. He called out the “toxic pop culture” that glamourises drug abuse and warned of catastrophic consequences if Nigeria does not control the narrative.

“If we do not control the narrative today, the consequences tomorrow will be catastrophic,” Marwa said. “Substance abuse is a hydra-headed monster that feeds insecurity, decimates public health, cripples economic productivity, and compromises the very future of our workforce.” Clean Beat 91.5FM is NDLEA’s attempt to fight on that second front. “While enforcement wins battles, education and prevention win wars,” Marwa said. “True victory against the scourge of substance abuse cannot be achieved solely by the cold steel of handcuffs or the iron bars of a prison cell.” The station will push a counter-narrative: stories of recovery, life-saving information, and a culture that celebrates sobriety. UNODC’s Dr. Akanidomo Ibanga described it as taking anti-drug advocacy directly into homes and schools. NBC Director-General Charles Ebuebu called it “the strategic deployment of broadcasting as an instrument of national orientation, behavioural change, youth engagement and social transformation.” If Abidagba shows cartels are capturing our land, Clean Beat shows NDLEA understands they are also capturing our minds. You cannot raid a forest lab without raiding the playlist that tells a teenager meth is cool.

Abidagba should force a doctrine shift. Three steps are urgent.
First, map and man the ungoverned spaces. The Office of the National Security Adviser, NDLEA, Mining Cadastre Office, and state governments should create a joint taskforce for forests and mining zones. Drones, local vigilantes, and real-time intelligence must replace ignorance. If a lab can run for months in Ogun, what is running in other parts of the country today?
Second, track the chemistry, not just the product. NAFDAC and Customs must audit precursor imports with the same rigour as arms. Who ordered the acetone? Who cleared it? Who trucked it? Cartels do not cook without a supply chain.
Third, win the cultural war as aggressively as the forest war. Prosecute landowners who lease forests for “farms” that become labs. And fund the platforms like Clean Beat 91.5FM that deglamourise drugs. Enforcement without reorientation is mopping the floor with the tap running.

Nigeria’s resource curse is no longer just about oil spills and illegal bunkering. It is about forests that ferment meth and mines that mint bandits. We called them ungoverned spaces. The cartels have renamed them headquarters. The Abidagba raid gave us the evidence. Clean Beat 91.5FM gave us a weapon. What we do next will decide whether “cocktail of meth” remains a headline, becomes our national drink, or serves as a call to action before this poison is duplicated across every forest to compete with the bandit-backed illegal miners.

Danjuma Amodu is a Journalist and Public Affairs Analyst based in Abuja. He writes on Governance, Politics, Climate Change and Public Policy.

ARTICLE: Cocktail of Meth: Why Nigeria’s Forests Are the New Cartel Brewery

NOW THAT GUBIO HAS EMERGED: A lessom in Continuity and Control.

By: Inuwa Bwala
inuwabwala3@gmail.com.

The emergence of Engineer Mustapha Gubio as the All Progressives Congress consensus governorship candidate for Borno State for the 2027 elections has reignited debate over succession politics in the North East.

The process contrasts sharply with the 2018 pathway that produced Professor Babagana Umara Zulum, as this one reveals how APC’s internal dynamics in Borno have evolved from competitive primaries to a craftily managed consensus.

In 2018 it was a heavily contested primary election, under the tutelage of the then Governor, Kashim Shettima: now Nigeria’s Vice President.

Professor Babagana Zulum, then Commissioner for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement, RRR, entered a field of 10 aspirants. He polled 4,432 votes to defeat his closest rival, Idris Mamman Durkwa, who managed 115 votes.

The contest was open, yet reflected the party’s early attempt to manage a crowded field while preserving the “Borno Model” of Shettima-Zulum continuity. Zulum went on to win the general election with 1,175,440 votes, and secured a second term unopposed in the 2022 APC primary. His rise was built on technocratic credentials as a professor of agricultural engineering, visibility in post-insurgency reconstruction, and the then governor’s backing.

Engineer Gubio’s 2026 emergence, which has been ratified with the affirmation of the consensus over contest
has seemingly changed the the script. Engineer Mustapha Gubio, who untill recently Professor Zulum’s Commissioner for Works and Housing, was presented by the governor as the APC consensus candidate for 2027. The announcement followed the purchase of nomination forms worth N50m and a presentation to Vice President Kashim Shettima at the Presidential Villa.

Zulum described the choice as the product of “extensive consultations” and a “unified position” within the party. His media aide went further to clarify, that, it was an “anointment,” not a formal endorsement, but the effect was the same: other aspirants, including Senator Kaka Shehu Lawan, stepped down to preserve party unity. The move was endorsed by APC Borno Stakeholders, who cited Gubio’s “experience and long-standing interaction with people of diverse religions, cultures, and tribes”.
Many described it as two paths, with one objective.

The contrast is instructive, as Zulum’s emergence in 2018 was a test of internal competition within a party still consolidating after the 2015 merger. It produced a clear winner through votes. Gubio’s path in 2026 bypassed that process entirely, relying instead on elite consensus brokered by the governor, with VP Shettima’s public blessing.

Analysts say the shift reflects Borno APC’s confidence in its dominance and its desire to avoid rancorous primaries ahead of a national election. “In Borno, the governor usually holds the local keys, but the Vice President holds the national map,” a party chieftain once said.

The arrangement also signals Zulum’s attempt to institutionalize a political culture, that differs with the old order, which were always turbulent.
Like many others, it is to me a seamless continuity between two men who share technocratic backgrounds and close ties to powers that be.

Professor Zulum was a professor and Rector before entering politics; while Gubio oversaw infrastructure delivery as Commissioner for Works. The emphasis on continuity, stability, and administrative competence is consistent with the government’s 25 years rolling development plan.

While some may argue that, the consensus model carries risks, to me in particular, it reduces intra-party rivalry and attendant post primary enemity, leaving no room for perceptions of manipulation of the process.
But even this, it tests the durability of the Zulum-Shettima alliance, which has been central to Borno’s political stability since 2015.

For now, APC leaders insist the decision is about unity. Whether it delivers electoral victory in 2027 will depend less on how Gubio emerged, and more on whether he can match Zulum’s public appeal and the party’s track record of delivering Borno to APC in every election since 2015.

It is no longer a question of if, but when Engineer Mustapha Gubio wins the Borno governorship in 2027, the public expectations are naturally high, but may largely be shaped by three things: Professor Babagana Umara Zulum’s legacy, the security situation, and Borno’s development needs.

Already, people are talking about, Sustaining and scaling up security gains.
It is no longer news that. Borno has made progress against Boko Haram/ISWAP, but communities like Gwoza, Chibok, Pulka, Kirawa, Wala and the Lake Chad areas still face periodic attacks with attendant food raids.

The public expects Engineer Gubio to continue Working closely with the military and federal government to secure rural communities and farmlands.
The public also expect him to work towards preventing a resurgence of insurgent recruitment driven by hunger and displacement.

There will be much expectations for him to also continue the “civilian-military” approach, which Governor Zulum used, by visiting frontline communities, supporting vigilantes, and pushing for resettlement.
Recent reports indicate that there may be dare food shortages and Gubio is expected to fix food security and humanitarian gaps.

The IDP crisis is still acute attendant upon the suspension of WFP aid since January 2026, this has further worsened hunger in camps and host communities, and people expect the next governor to push for the return of sustained food aid and livelihood programs, revive agriculture by making farmlands accessible and providing inputs, irrigation, and extension services, to avoid a situation where IDPs return to the bush because the conditions in camps are worse.

Like Zulum, Mustapha Gubio is also likely to deliver infrastructure and reconstruction, coming from the Works and Housing portfolio. There are very high expectations that, he will maintain Zulum’s pace on roads, schools, hospitals, and housing.

I am amongst those who rrmain confident that, he will complete resettlement projects for IDPs to return home with dignity, expand rural roads to open up agriculture and trade, improve electricity and water supply in Maiduguri and satellite towns and maintain Zulum’s “people-first” governance style.
I dare say, that Zulum built his reputation on unannounced visits, direct engagement with citizens, and quick responses to crises.
Borno residents expect Gubio to be visible, accessible, and tough on corruption and inefficiency. Anything less will be seen as a step back.

As a party man, I have seen the merits in managing party unity and succession politics, using the consensus arrangement, that produced Gubio as a model for future primary elections and will reduce rancour and unnecessary financial involvement. And I will not hesitate in recommending same to Engineer Gubio.

I know as a matter of fact, that the public expects him to govern for the whole state, not just as a placeholder, and to avoid alienating other power blocs in Borno politics. This has been the bane of many politicians in other climes.

The bottom line for Engineer Mustapha Gubio, is that, voters in Borno will judge Gubio and of course all those who may come on board to work with him by, whether he or they can keep the state safe, feed the people, and keep reconstruction moving without breaking the trust Zulum built with the masses.

If he’s seen as “Zulum 2.0” on service delivery but with his own approach to security and economy, expectations are that APC will hold Borno in 2027 and beyond.
With Gubio’s emergence and consequent affirmation, Borno looks set for another journey, remeniscient of the Zulum era. May God grant him good health, wisdom and understanding to tower above the public expectations.

inuwabwala3@gmail.com.

NOW THAT GUBIO HAS EMERGED: A lessom in Continuity and Control.