MSF Ends Kano Diphtheria Emergency Mission After Vaccinating 835,000 Children

By: Michael Mike

The humanitarian medical organisation, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)/Doctors Without Borders, has concluded its three-year emergency response to the devastating diphtheria outbreak in Kano State after supporting the vaccination of more than 835,000 children, describing immunisation as the key factor behind the sharp decline in infections.

The organisation, however, warned that the disease remains a major threat to children unless health authorities sustain routine immunisation, disease surveillance and rapid access to treatment.

MSF announced the end of its emergency intervention following the completion of a two-phase mass vaccination campaign carried out in partnership with the Kano State Ministry of Health.

The intervention followed one of Nigeria’s worst recorded diphtheria outbreaks, which claimed over 1,260 lives in Kano alone, most of them children.

According to MSF, more than 14,707 children received treatment during the emergency through MSF-run and supported treatment centres, including both facility-based and home-based care programmes.

The organisation also strengthened referral systems, disease surveillance, data management and community mobilisation while supporting the state’s vaccination drive.

Across two vaccination rounds, 835,028 doses of diphtheria vaccines were administered to children. The second phase, conducted between June 20 and 24, 2026, reached 486,948 children across 20 wards after the first round vaccinated 348,080 children, which ended on April 27.

MSF Project Coordinator in Kano, Abdoul-Aziz Djibrilla, said the outbreak placed enormous pressure on families, healthcare workers and health facilities across the state.

“Kano experienced a critical diphtheria outbreak that placed enormous pressure on families, healthcare workers and health facilities,” Djibrilla said.

He noted that although infections had declined considerably in recent months, largely because of the vaccination campaigns, the disease had not been eliminated.

“Although the number of cases has declined in recent months, mainly due to mass vaccination campaigns, the disease remains a serious health threat to children in Kano, driven by low immunisation coverage, overcrowding, delayed care-seeking, and malnutrition,” he added.

Kano has remained the epicentre of Nigeria’s diphtheria outbreak. According to the Kano State Ministry of Health, the state recorded more than 31,900 suspected cases and over 1,260 deaths between March 2022 and March 22, 2026.

The figures account for a significant proportion of Nigeria’s 65,759 suspected cases and 2,229 deaths reported by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) since the outbreak was officially declared in 2023.

At the height of the outbreak between late 2025 and early 2026, treatment centres were overwhelmed, with more than 100 children admitted daily across supported health facilities and home-based care programmes. Bed occupancy exceeded available capacity in several facilities as healthcare workers struggled to cope with the influx of patients requiring specialised treatment.

Diphtheria is a highly contagious but vaccine-preventable bacterial infection spread mainly through respiratory droplets or contact with infected wounds. The disease causes sore throat, fever, swollen lymph nodes and the formation of a thick grey membrane that can block the airway. In severe cases, toxins produced by the bacteria can damage the heart, kidneys and nervous system, while untreated infections can be fatal in about 30 per cent of cases, particularly among young children.

The outbreak has largely affected children aged between five and 14 years, many of whom had never been vaccinated or had received incomplete immunisation.

Despite the improvement recorded through the vaccination campaigns, MSF cautioned that immunity gaps persist, leaving thousands of children vulnerable to future outbreaks.

Djibrilla stressed that sustained government commitment would determine whether the gains recorded are maintained.

“Continued commitment from health authorities and partners to sustain high immunisation coverage, strengthen surveillance, and ensure timely access to quality treatment will be critical to preventing future outbreaks and protecting the lives of children in Kano,” he said.

MSF has operated continuously in Nigeria since 1996 and currently provides free medical care in 10 states, relying largely on private donations to maintain its humanitarian independence. The organisation said it would continue supporting healthcare interventions in Nigeria beyond the conclusion of the Kano diphtheria emergency response.MSF Ends endence. The organisation said it would continue supporting healthcare interventions in Nigeria beyond the conclusion of the Kano diphtheria emergency response.

MSF Ends Kano Diphtheria Emergency Mission After Vaccinating 835,000 Children

Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse

By: Dr. James Bwala

The insurgency that has plagued northeastern Nigeria for over a decade, popularly known as Boko Haram, has caused immense suffering and destabilization in the region. Despite the profound implications of this crisis, much of the public discourse surrounding its origins is riddled with inaccuracies, oversimplifications, and politically motivated narratives. As a consequence, many Nigerians—including those on the streets of Maiduguri or other affected areas—hold incomplete or erroneous understandings of the group’s history. This lack of historical facts not only clouds efforts to address the root causes of the conflict but also fuels divisive rhetoric and politicization of the tragedy. Nigerians and those who continued to discuss the conflict and its history found a need to know and draw from facts to line up their narratives. Discoursants like lawyer Femi Falana and politicians like Naja’atu need facts to buttress their claims and should not rely on hearsay or half-truths, perhaps from where they heard their stories, because it is not adding up.

For us, who reported this crisis on the front line and studied the historical lines from direct elements and foot soldiers, we know that the widespread misconception is the tendency to attribute Boko Haram’s insurgency exclusively to the late Malam Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s most notorious leader, who emerged publicly in the early 2000s. While Yusuf did play a role in shaping the movement known as the “Yusufiya sect,” claiming he single-handedly started Boko Haram grossly simplifies the complex evolution of this militant group in Borno State or Northeast Nigeria. Such reductionism is evident in popular narratives frequently encountered among ordinary citizens, who often repeat what they have heard without contextual depth. An accurate historical account reveals that the conditions fostering Boko Haram’s emergence existed long before Yusuf’s ascendancy, involving multiple actors and events that laid the groundwork for radicalization and violence from the simply known Islamiyya sect in Kannamma to the Yusufiya sect and Boko Haram, the name given to them after the Bauchi Prison break at the beginning of the one-year conflict in 2010.

Like I did mention earlier, complicating the discourse around the history or founder are politicized allegations by prominent individuals that seek to assign blame to specific personalities without credible evidence. For instance, Hajiya Naja’atu has in recent times launched rhetoric directed at Vice President Kashim Shettima, linking her claims to the arrest of Kabiru Sokoto at the Borno liaison office in Abuja (which she said is Shettima’s house). Similarly, respected lawyer Femi Falana has publicly accused a former governor of Borno State of initiating the Boko Haram insurgency, associating the claims with political thuggery during the administration of Modu Sheriff. While such claims may have come within certain political constituencies, they dangerously oversimplify a multifaceted crisis and divert attention from deeper structural factors. Most importantly, these rhetorics are often founded on partial or misinterpreted information rather than comprehensive, verifiable research into the insurgency’s roots.

Testimonies and records of journalists and observers who were active in Maiduguri and the wider northeastern region since the early 1990s have captured far more interesting narratives. These professionals witnessed firsthand the unfolding developments culminating in the Boko Haram crisis. Their accounts reveal the existence of leadership predating Mohammed Yusuf, notably an individual named Mohammed Ali, who led an early Islamist sect prior to the “Yusufiya” movement. Ali was reportedly killed amid violence after escaping arrest in Kannamma, located in present-day Yobe State, long before Yusuf became publicly acknowledged as Boko Haram’s leader. The circumstances surrounding Mohammed Ali’s demise evidence internal fractures and state interventions that contributed to the radicalization pathway exploited by later insurgents.

Geographically, the significance of certain locations underscores the continuity in Boko Haram’s operational terrain. Mohammed Ali was ambushed and killed between Talala and Ajigil, areas within Damboa Local Government in Borno State. These locations remain critical hubs for Boko Haram activities today, illustrating how the movement’s influence expanded along established routes starting decades ago. Access between Buni Yadi and Damboa, through Foi village, forms a corridor still exploited for logistical and militant operations. Understanding these geographic linkages offers valuable insight into Boko Haram’s sustained presence and the entrenchment of its networks in northeastern Nigeria.

The persistence of incorrect narratives can be partly attributed to inadequate primary research and reliance on hearsay or politically motivated sources. This deficiency highlights an urgent need for esteemed public figures, journalists, analysts, and commentators to engage in meticulous and objective investigation when discussing Boko Haram’s origins. Reckless or uninformed rhetoric risks exacerbating communal tensions, misguiding policy responses, and undermining public trust. For example, assigning blame to isolated individuals without substantial proof politicizes the insurgency, detracting from broader considerations such as socioeconomic marginalization, governmental neglect, corruption, and ideological manipulation—all key contributors to the conflict.

Moreover, responsible storytelling about Boko Haram’s history requires acknowledging the complexity of insurgencies as social phenomena. These are rarely the product of singular agents but rather evolve from layered interactions between various factors, including local grievances, religious ideologies, political exclusions, and external influences. Therefore, simplistic attributions fail to capture the organic, evolving nature of such movements. A comprehensive approach that integrates oral histories, archival materials, community testimonies, and official documents can provide a more accurate chronicle and inform more effective counterinsurgency strategies.

The discourse on Boko Haram’s history demands a progressive shift toward historical accuracy and intellectual honesty. The prevailing narrative that attributes the insurgency solely to late Malam Mohammed Yusuf or assigns culpability to particular public figures without substantive evidence does a disservice to truth and justice. Recognizing the role of earlier leaders like Mohammed Ali and appreciating the broader socio-political context enables Nigerians and the international community to better comprehend the insurgency’s complexities. It is incumbent upon respected voices—whether in politics, law, or the media—to prioritize thorough research and measured discourse. Doing so not only honors the memory of victims and affected communities but also facilitates the formulation of genuine solutions anchored in reality, empathy, and inclusiveness. Only through such a principled approach can Nigeria hope to heal the wounds inflicted by Boko Haram and work toward lasting peace and stability in its northeastern regions.

• James Bwala, PhD, writes from Maiduguri.
• Boko Haram: The Politics, A Call for Historical Accuracy, and Responsible Discourse

HAQ KA PANI: RECLAIMING INDIA’S RIGHTFUL SHARE

Mr. Atul Jain, Former Chairman,
Central Water Commission.

The Hon’ble Prime Minister’s Independence Day assertion last year that- “Haq ka pani will serve Indian farmers”- marks a decisive shift in India’s approach to the Indus Waters. Far from being a departure, it is a long-overdue correction of historical restraint that has disproportionately disadvantaged India while enabling persistent misuse downstream. It signals that India will no longer allow its rightful share of water to go underutilized and wasted while its own farmers face scarcity.
When the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, India, as the upper riparian, made a remarkable concession by agreeing to restrict itself to about 20% of the Indus system waters, allocating the overwhelming 80% share to Pakistan. This decision reflected extraordinary goodwill. The expectation was that such generosity would be matched by responsible conduct and a cooperative spirit. Instead, over the decades, that spirit was never reciprocated.
The Hon’ble Prime Minister’s statement must also be seen against the backdrop of repeated acts of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan that have vitiated the trust. The long-standing reality, captured in the phrase, “blood and water cannot flow together”, is no longer rhetorical. Incidents such as the Pulwama terror attack, along with other attacks in the Valley, including the Pahalgam region, have underscored how sustained hostility undermines the very foundation on which cooperative arrangements like the Treaty rest. No agreement, however well-crafted, can remain insulated from a complete breakdown of trust.
At a structural level, the Treaty itself contained asymmetries that became increasingly untenable. It imposed considerable restrictions on India’s use of its allocated waters, yet places no corresponding obligation on Pakistan to justify its requirements or ensure efficient utilization. This is reflected in the widespread inefficiencies, losses in irrigation systems (estimated at about 47 MAF), inadequate storage, and poor water management on their side leading to large volumes of Indus waters (upto 35 MAF) flowing to the Arabian Sea unutilized.
Meanwhile, India has borne the cost of restraint. Region such as Rajasthan, Haryana have remained water-stressed, their agricultural potential constrained despite the availability of water that India is entitled to use. This imbalance is precisely what the statement seeks to correct.
“Haq ka pani” is, therefore, about rightful utilization—not denial. India is asserting that every drop of Indus system will now be used productively for irrigation, hydropower, and development.
Indian projects on the Western rivers, including Baglihar and Salal, highlight another dimension of the challenge. Over time, sedimentation has reduced their efficiency and storage capacity. Flushing operations, essential for maintaining dam safety and performance, were delayed for years due to unfounded objections and procedural hurdles created by Pakistan. The eventual need to remove accumulated sediment only reinforced the cost of such delays. Going forward, India’s approach will prioritize timely, state of art technical interventions, without being held hostage by malign and hyperbolic political theatrics disguised as technical differences.
The broader message is clear. First, India will fully utilize its rightful share of water in water-stressed regions. Second, it will no longer accept a framework where inefficiency and waste go unchecked on one side while artificial and unscientific constraints are sought to be imposed on the other. Third, it will assert its technical autonomy, ensuring that infrastructure creation and maintenance proceed apace, in line with current scientific thinking and international best practices.
This is not a repudiation of any customary principles; it is a response to the destruction of the foundational pillars of the Treaty. When the very promises that undergird a treaty are breached by hostility, terror, misinformation, and misuse, recalibration becomes inevitable.
For decades, India exercised patience, even at tangible cost to its own development. That era is giving way to one of clarity and balance.
“Haq ka pani” is an overdue commitment that India’s water will serve its people, its farmers, and its future. While some vested interests may try to mischaracterize it as a threat, it is nothing but a necessary course correction in a changing context.

HAQ KA PANI: RECLAIMING INDIA’S RIGHTFUL SHARE